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Stellingen 
1) Omdat praktijken en levensverhalen zich tot onlosmakelijke gehelen verbinden in 
levensstijlen, valt de vraag of de overheid zich in het milieubeleid mag bemoeien 
met levensstijlen niet te omzeilen met suggesties dat een bepaalde vormgeving van 
dit beleid voldoende ruimte laat voor de ontplooiing van ofwel praktijken ofwel 
levensverhalen. 
2) Omdat hedendaagse welvarende samenlevingen zich gelukkig kenmerken door een 
verfrissende veelheid aan levensstijlen, levensverhalen en consumptieve 
voorkeuren, zou het de overheid tot eer strekken om in het milieubeleid ook te 
streven naar behoud van deze veelvormigheid. 
3) Ter voorkoming van onomkeerbare schade aan het natuurlijk milieu, en daarmee 
aan de mogelijkheden voor toekomstige generaties tot ontplooiing van hun eigen 
levensstijlen, dient de overheid zich in het milieubeleid op soms tamelijk 
dwingende wijze te bemoeien met levensstijlen. 
4) De overheid laat een uitgelezen kans liggen, wanneer het milieubeleid niet poogt te 
voorzien in sociale en materiele voorwaarden die mensen stimuleren om een 
actieve en creatieve eigen bijdrage te leveren aan de vormgeving van duurzame 
levensstijlen. 
5) De rationaliteit van consumptieve keuzes valt te verhogen door de uitwisseling van 
informatie over de milieugevolgen van deze keuzes te verbeteren en die 
milieugevolgen ook in de prijzen van consumptiegoederen te verrekenen. 
6) Conceptuele fijnslijperij in termen van hermeneutische cirkels of reflectieve 
equilibria kan weinig toevoegen aan een kernachtige omschrijving van de 
filosofische methode als dialectisch proces van lezen - denken - praten -
schrijven. 
7) Het leerproces van promovendi zou aan inzichtelijkheid winnen door in 
proefschriften naast de gebruikelijke literatuurlijst ook een B-lijst met gelezen 
maar irrelevant of onbruikbaar bevonden literatuur op te nemen. 
8) Omdat het formuleren van stellingen bij proefschriften behoort tot de schaarse 
oefeningen in retorica binnen de hedendaagse academische vorming, dient deze 
institutie niet al te lichtzinnig als archaisch terzijde te worden geschoven. 
9) Sommige stellingen kun je beter schrappen. 
10) De uitbundigheid waarmee een sporter juicht na het scoren van een punt is 
omgekeerd evenredig met het gemiddeld aantal gescoorde punten per wedstrijd in 
desbetreffende tak van sport. 
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Introduction 
"Anyone can become a deconstructionist 
without any knowledge whatsoever [...] 
However, not to deconstruct but to construct 
...that is something different, 
dear deconstructionists" 
(Paul van Ostaijen, 1996; 119)' 
1.1 
A Short History of Sustainable Development (1972-1987) 
The year 1972 must have been a very special year indeed. The Club of Rome published its 
report 'The Limits to Growth' (Meadows et al, 1972), the Ecologist published its 
'Blueprint for Survival' (Goldsmith, 1972), and the United Nations held its first 
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm (UN, 1972). These three occasions 
were also the first to use the notion of sustainable development with its current 
connotations. 
The report of the Club of Rome and the 'Blueprint for Survival' represented the 
climax of the first, alarmist, wave in post-war environmentalism, which thought that a 
revolutionary change of modern industrial capitalism was necessary to prevent any further 
deterioration of nature and the environment. Both reports read like secular doomsday 
prophecies, and their apocalyptic message was that prevailing modes of production and 
consumption could never be sustained into the future. A fundamental break with modern 
industrial capitalism was supposed to be necessary to prevent the short-term breakdown of 
the global natural environment. These survivalist reports emphasised the limited 
possibilities to provide a rapidly growing human population with sufficient food, 
resources and energy, as well as the equally limited capacities of the environment to 
1 Throughout the book, all translations from Dutch originals are my own - VB. 
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absorb increasingly high levels of pollution. The kernel of their prophecies was that these 
natural limits to growth were real and disturbingly quantifiable. Such limits could not be 
transcended by any further substitution of natural resources through advanced 
technological development. The Blueprint listed four conditions of sustainable 
development: 1) minimal disturbance of ecological processes; 2) maximal conservation of 
energy and other natural resources; 3) stabilisation of the population growth; and 4) 
development of a social system in which people would perceive the first three conditions 
as enabling, rather than disabling, their opportunities to follow a good life. This fourth 
condition exemplifies that these reports saw the deterioration of nature and the 
environment as but one dimension of a much deeper, even existential, crisis of modern 
industrial capitalism that called for a revolutionary change of contemporary affluent 
societies. 
The first UN Conference on the Human Environment, on the other hand, signalled 
the start of a second, more pragmatic, wave in post-war environmentalism. This 
conference turned international environmentalism's attention to the pursuit of adjustments 
within modern industrial capitalism as the pathway to sustainable development. It changed 
the alarmist stance of the first wave for the more constructive effort of finding solutions 
for the global environmental problems. For the first time in the environmental debate, the 
participants to this conference also emphasised the reciprocal relation "between 
environmental degradation and economic development. Bridging the growing gap 
between affluent and poor countries, perceived as both cause and effect of environmental 
deterioration, was introduced as a major challenge for international environmental policy-
making. The parties agreed that solutions for the global environmental problems should 
not be pursued at the cost of the legitimate aspirations of developing countries to reach a 
similar level of affluence as western industrialised countries. Both principled and practical 
reasons urged them to argue that environmental policy-making should pursue sustainable 
development and distributive justice as twin objectives. With the foundation of the United 
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), this conference also established an 
international platform for ongoing debate on global environmental deterioration. 
However, the world had to await 1980 before the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) presented the first serious 
elaboration on the intuitively appealing notion of sustainable development in its 'World 
Conservation Strategy' (IUCN, 1980). This report offered the first definition of sustainable 
development that seriously tried to capture people's empathetic concerns about the 
negative repercussions of the current generation's use of nature and the environment for 
the opportunities of future generations to follow their own visions of the good life. It 
defined sustainable development as "the management of human use of the biosphere so 
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that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations while maintaining 
its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations" (IUCN, 1980). 
Moreover, the report also provided a first attempt to carry the implications of sustainable 
development as a policy objective beyond the simple applications on the use of renewable 
resources. It extended sustainable development's field of application by suggesting that it 
encompassed the following principles: "maintenance of essential ecological processes and 
life-support systems, the preservation of genetic diversity, and the sustainable utilization 
of species and resources" (IUCN, 1980). 
The establishment of the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED), that was to develop strategies for a global sustainable development, 
foreshadowed a lasting alteration of the international environmental debate. With the 
presentation of the WCED-report 'Our Common Future' in 1987, the notion of sustainable 
development gained its prospective status as a meta-objective for environmental policy-
making. The report argued that the baseline for sustainable development should be that 
future generations deserve access to roughly the same amount of natural resources as the 
current generation. In order to secure this requirement, the WCED (1987) defined 
sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present generation 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (43). This 
authoritative definition may still seem unduly broad and vague. However, it has shown 
enormous mobilising force. It thus firmly established the dominant interpretation of the 
kernel of sustainable development as articulating people's empathetic concerns about the 
opportunities of future generations to follow their own lifestyles and visions of the good 
life. This dominant interpretation of sustainable development as intergenerational justice 
argues that its pursuit calls for "the existence of the ecological conditions necessary to 
support human life at a specified level of well-being through future generations" (Lele, 
1991; 609). It is based on the acknowledgement that 1) natural resources are limited, 2) 
industrial capitalism tends to ignore these natural limits, and 3) the current generation has 
a moral responsibility to respect these limits for the sake of its offspring and future 
generations in general. Although radical environmentalists challenged, for instance, the 
anthropocentric bias of the dominant interpretation of sustainable development, the thin 
WCED-definition probably saved from oblivion the non-redundant intergenerational 
kernel of sustainable development as a new moral principle (Lele, 1991; Achterberg, 
1994)(see chapter 5 for a further analysis of sustainable development). 
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1.2 
UNCED and NEPP2 
The debate on sustainable development reached a new climax with the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. 
Whereas radical environmentalists criticised this conference for its failure to make a real 
difference in international environmental policy-making, it nonetheless introduced the idea 
that sustainable development requires adjustments of people's lifestyles and modes of 
consumption as well as adjustments of prevailing modes of production. The 8 t h principle 
of the 'Rio Declaration' thus read: "To achieve sustainable development and a higher 
quality of life for all people, states should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of 
production and consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies" (UNCED, 
1992; 10). This principle is particularly important, since UNCED also stated that the 
progressive deterioration of the global environment is primarily caused by current modes 
of consumption and production in the affluent societies of Europe and North America. 
UNCED argued that governments and NGOs (non-governmental organisations) 
should foster positive attitudes towards sustainable consumption by extensive public 
information. Providing full information on the environmental repercussions of their 
behavioral choices should raise people's environmental awareness. Moreover, UNCED 
argued that environmental problems are best tackled with the participation of all people 
concerned. People should not only have ready access to all relevant environmental 
information, but also have ample opportunities to participate in environmental decision-
making. Apart from its emphasis on such communicative strategies, UNCED also 
recognised that it is highly unlikely that any substantial change in non-sustainable 
lifestyles and consumptive preferences will occur without the use of financial incentives. 
Economic strategies should, therefore, make people aware of the environmental costs of 
the use of energy and other natural resources and the disposal of waste. 
The second Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP2) presented a 
national translation of UNCED's emphasis on the need for government intervention in 
non-sustainable lifestyles. The NEPP2 called for a government-initiated "public debate on 
the need and possibilities for a change of patterns of consumption in support of 
sustainable development" (VROM, 1993; 52). It kicked off this debate by emphasising 
that adjustments in non-sustainable lifestyles and patterns of consumption should be 
stimulated primarily by means of communicative and economic strategies. It 
acknowledged that such adjustments would not be easy, for instance because of people's 
hitherto limited knowledge of their own contributions to environmental problems and 
about their possibilities to reduce this contribution. Moreover, the individualisation and 
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pluralisation of people's lifestyles and consumptive preferences in contemporary affluent 
societies compromise any government initiative to address the consumer with a limited 
number of instruments and a singular message about sustainable behaviour. However, the 
NEPP2 also recognised a positive point that the government should capitalise on. People 
are definitely concerned about the deterioration of nature and the environment. 
Unfortunately, although people seem readily willing to change non-sustainable behaviour, 
they will only go from willingness to actual change if this does not incur too great a 
personal cost. In view of these and other problems, the NEPP2 opted for a comprehensive 
mix of communicative and economic strategies for government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles. 
The NEPP2, on the one hand, stressed the importance of providing adequate 
information about the environmental repercussions of people's consumptive choices, and 
the importance of the availability of environment-friendly consumer goods on the market. 
Product information should offer people an insight into the environmental repercussions of 
the production, transport, use, and waste disposal of the products and services with which 
they fulfil their consumptive preferences. And an adequate market supply of sustainable 
products and services should enable them to adopt sustainable lifestyles and patterns of 
consumption. The idea was that adjustments of non-sustainable lifestyles and consumptive 
preferences will become within reach, if these adjustments are felt to be acceptable, 
attractive and feasible. Government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles should be 
about providing an adequate package of information, products and services to enable 
people to enact their eco-conscious attitudes in sustainable behaviour. The NEPP2, on the 
other hand, also emphasised the importance of financial incentives. It argued that people 
would probably make more environment-friendly choices, if they are confronted with 
environmentally correct prices in their weak moments of decision-making on the market. 
Therefore, the government should also develop economic strategies to instigate 
adjustments towards sustainable lifestyles and patterns of consumption. 
1.3 
Objective and Outline of the Book 
Now that the stage is set after this, no doubt too sketchy, historical overview of the debate 
on the notion of sustainable development and its subsequent translation into the first 
proposals for government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles, it is time to present 
the objective of this book. UNCED and NEPP2 instigated an extensive public debate on 
government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles in the Netherlands. However intense 
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this debate may have been since 1992, the question still remains whether the dominant 
communicative and economic strategies are able to provide a satisfactory reconciliation of 
government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles and respect for people's freedom to 
follow their own lifestyles. After an analysis of the Dutch public debate in these terms (see 
chapter 2), the objective of this book is therefore to offer such a reconciliation by 
presenting an outline of a green third way of government intervention in non-sustainable 
lifestyles. This green third way presents an alternative to the first (communicative) and 
second (economic) ways in the Dutch public debate. It articulates and addresses people's 
empathetic concerns about the deterioration of nature and the environment within a 
broadly political liberal frame of reference. 
Although this book now-and-then builds on empirical social-scientific research to 
address the issue of government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles, empirical 
analysis is not its prime objective. The book rather aims at conceptual reflection on the 
words, sentences and narratives that the participants in the public environmental debate 
use to argue their case for one of the possible strategies for government intervention in 
non-sustainable lifestyles. Although this conceptual, or narrative, approach necessarily 
entails extensive discussion of other people's arguments, the bulk of this book is not 
devoted to the deconstruction of these arguments. The prime objective of this book is 
rather to construct a meaningful narrative about government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles. 
The narrative approach sympathises with Rorty's (1999) allegedly post-modernist 
but self-professedly neo-pragmatist stance that sees critical discussion as "an encounter 
with an author, character, plot, stanza, line or archaic torso which made a difference to 
the critic's ... priorities and purposes. Such criticism uses the author or the text not as a 
specimen reiterating a type but as an occasion for changing a previously accepted 
taxonomy, or for putting a new twist on a previously told story" (145). The narrative 
approach thus primarily looks for arguments, while discussing other authors, that could 
strengthen or make a difference in the construction of a meaningful narrative about the 
issue at stake. By confronting, for instance, Berlin's and Rawls's political liberal line of 
argument with the public environmental debate on government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles, the narrative approach mediates "between old ways of speaking, 
developed to accomplish earlier tasks, with new ways of speaking, developed in response 
to new demands" (Rorty, 1999; 66). 
The narrative approach does not put forward any truth-claims about, for instance, the 
social ontology of contemporary affluent societies (cf. Pleasants, 1999). It rather hopes to 
offer a thought-provoking narrative that could be useful in public deliberations on the 
objectives and instruments of environmental policy-making. Although Rorty, like 
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Nussbaum (1997), sometimes seems to suggest that philosophers had better re-educate 
themselves to become novelists, this would stretch the narrative stance beyond the outer 
limits of reason. Notwithstanding the inspirational qualities of novels, poems or, for that 
matter, popular songs in the development of people's morality, it is perfectly reasonable to 
qualify philosophical narratives as yet another cultural thread that could, for instance, 
inspire moral responsibility in people's environmentally mediated relations with future 
generations. 
Although the narrative approach presents a roughly political liberal point of view, it 
is perfectly willing to accept, like Rorty, that it is "a view not from nowhere but from the 
special somewhere of (a certain sort of) Western political experience" (Geertz, 2000; 
260). The narrative approach spells out a green third way of government intervention in 
non-sustainable lifestyles that should be applicable in western affluent liberal-
democracies. It does not claim that this green third way is also applicable in other, non-
western and probably not altogether liberal-democratic, contexts of action. Moreover, it 
primarily reflects on interventions by national governments, although some of the 
arguments may also hold true in a sub-national or supra-national context. One final 
restriction: the book limits itself to government intervention in people's lifestyles and 
patterns of consumption, and leaves aside possible interventions in the sphere of 
production. 
However, the spatio-temporally-contingent narrative approach of this book does not 
imply that it merely tells another narrative about government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles. The narrative it spells out hopes to stand a better chance than other 
competing narratives in articulating and addressing the intricacies of environmental 
policy-making in contemporary affluent liberal-democracies. Therefore, this narrative 
should be able to gain adherents over time. 
Now, let's get down to an outline of the substantial contents of this book. First, the 
next chapter maps the Dutch public debate on government intervention in non-sustainable 
lifestyles. Although communicative and economic strategies dominate this debate, these 
strategies are seriously flawed by their hitherto ineffective attempts to evade the principled 
question of whether government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles entails an 
intolerable infringement of people's freedom to follow their own lifestyles, visions of the 
good life and consumptive preferences. Communicative and economic strategies are 
criticised on three accounts: 1) their failure to recognise the inextricable 
interconnectedness of attitudes and behaviour in people's lifestyles; 2) their evasion of the 
question of how government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles could respect 
people's freedom of choice; and 3) their unwillingness to investigate whether sustainable 
development provides sound reasons to restrict people's freedom of choice. Since both 
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strategies are thus incapable to provide meaningful interpretations of all key terms in the 
phrase 'government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles', it is no wonder that they 
cannot reconcile government intervention and respect for people's freedom to follow their 
own lifestyles. The chapters 3, 4 and 5, therefore, subsequently set out to remedy these 
flaws of the dominant communicative and economic strategies. Lately, luckily, a third 
strategy dawned in the Dutch public debate. This (institutional) strategy offers materials to 
develop a green third way of government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles. 
Chapter 3 mainly builds on Giddens's structuration theory, his and Beck's accounts 
of reflexive modernisation, and Douglas's group-grid analysis to argue for a narrative 
conceptualisation of the notions of lifestyle and self-identity. This narrative 
conceptualisation 1) emphasises the inextricable interconnectedness of people's practices 
and narratives of self-identity, 2) stresses the duality of individual and society in the 
constitution of people's lifestyles, 3) changes the modernist distinction between citizens 
and consumers for the public-private hybrid of the citizen-consumer, and 4) maps the 
dazzling plurality of lifestyles in the globalising, individualising and detraditionalising 
affluent societies of today. The narrative conceptualisation of lifestyles thus implies that 
one can no longer evade the question of whether government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles entails an intolerable infringement of people's freedom to follow their 
own lifestyles by emphasising their freedom in either practices or identities. These 
practices and identities are inextricably interconnected in people's lifestyles. Therefore, 
one needs to fully address the question of why it is important to respect people's freedom 
to follow their own lifestyles in contemporary liberal-democratic societies. 
Chapter 4 mainly builds on Berlin's and Rawls's political liberalism, Raz's liberal 
perfectionism, and Habermas's account of deliberative democracy to argue that most 
government interventions in lifestyles represent intolerable infringements of people's 
freedom of choice. This liberal account 1) argues that respect for people's freedom of 
choice entails a neutral and anti-perfectionist stance of the government, 2) believes that 
directive communicative and economic strategies of government intervention will only be 
justifiable, if people's behavioral choices harm others or themselves, cause distributive 
injustice, or are irrational, 3) accepts, in the second instance, that political liberalism is not 
neutral or anti-perfectionist at all, but believes that this perfectionist reappraisal 
strengthens the need to respect people's freedom of choice, and 4) propagates extensive 
public deliberation about the formation and execution of environmental policy-making to 
enhance people's positive freedom of choice. This account of people's freedom entails that 
directive strategies for government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles do not show 
sufficient respect for people's freedom to follow their own lifestyles, unless it could be 
argued that the pursuit of these lifestyles harms, or does injustice to, others. Therefore, the 
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question of whether sustainable development, as a policy objective that aims to prevent 
harm or injustice to future generations, provides sound arguments to limit people's 
freedom of choice needs to be answered next. 
Chapter 5 mainly builds on Rawls's savings principle, Wissenburg's restraint 
principle, Passmore's chains of love, and De-Shalit's transgenerational communities to 
argue for a double interpretation of sustainable development as representing both a 
principle of intergenerational justice and a future-oriented green ideal. This double 
interpretation 1) embraces the restraint principle and the argument that people cannot 
claim a right to destroy environmental goods to secure an environmental baseline that 
justifies directive strategies for government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles, 2) 
suggests that people's empathetic concerns about nature and the environment are part of 
their future-oriented narratives of self-identity, which call for the deeper responsibilities 
that should inform non-directive strategies, 3) prefers stocktaking or listing primary 
environmental goods to quantifying some environmental utilisation space as a practical 
guideline for day-to-day environmental policy-making, and 4) concludes that the 
uncertainty of scientific knowledge about the unintended environmental repercussions of 
people's behavioral choices compromises attempts to justify directive strategies for 
government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles beyond the minimal requirements of 
securing the environmental baseline of the restraint principle and the list of primary 
environmental goods. Sustainable development thus offers sound arguments to restrict 
people's freedom to follow their own lifestyles when the pursuit of these lifestyles 
threatens to damage this environmental baseline. Beyond the preservation of this baseline, 
people's freedom of choice cannot be trumped by further environmental considerations 
and, therefore, non-directive strategies should by called for to establish any further 
responsibilities towards nearby future generations. 
Chapter 6, finally, returns from these rather unearthly reflections to the more 
mundane issues in the public debate on government intervention in non-sustainable 
lifestyles by presenting an outline of a green third way. This green third way offers an 
alternative to the overly directive communicative and economic strategies for government 
intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles, and broadens the prevailing political landscape 
with a strategy that promises superiority in addressing the intricacies of environmental 
policy-making in liberal-democratic societies. Although this green third way leaves ample 
room to use communicative and economic instruments to secure the environmental 
baseline of the restraint principle and the list of primary environmental goods, these 
instruments are framed in a quite different perspective or set of premises now. After a 
summary of the main line of argument in this book, a short discussion of the Schönau 
Energy Initiatives serves to illustrate the kernel of an alternative strategy. This green third 
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way offers a non-directive strategy for government intervention in non-sustainable 
lifestyles in which the government hopes to stimulate the development of sustainable 
lifestyles by adjusting the social and material conditions that surround people in following 
their lifestyles. The green third way, thus, reconciles government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles and respect for people's freedom to follow their own lifestyles to a 
satisfactory degree. It accepts that the requirement to secure the environmental baseline of 
the restraint principle and the list of primary environmental goods justifies the use of 
directive strategies for government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles in a limited 
set of conditions. However, it also emphasises that non-directive strategies should do the 
majority of the job. In this non-directive strategy the government should provide the social 
and material conditions in which a plurality of sustainable lifestyles could flourish. 
One proviso: Callinicos (1999) qualified Giddens's 'The Third Way' (1998) as "one 
of the worst books by a leading social theorist" (80). This devastating qualification is not 
entirely off the mark. Why then call this book 'A Green Third Way'? On the one hand, 
because this book does present a third way in the public environmental debate on 
government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles. On the other hand, because 
Giddens's formal theory of structuration, and to a lesser degree also his substantial theory 
of reflexive modernisation, still provides superior inspiration in writing a book like this. 
On the third hand, it is a catchy title, isn't it? 
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2 
The Dutch Public Debate 
"Yes it's fucking political, 
everything's political" 
(Skunk Anansie, 1996) 
2.1 
Introduction 
She, a slovenly type of woman, shuffles into her kitchen. She can't find the glasses behind 
her ears and is complaining, grumbling and muttering about her husband, who is a 
physician and has gone off with a spruce nurse (no doubt a dumb and busty blonde). The 
lightbulbs are flickering, the washing machine staggers through the kitchen and when she 
opens the refrigerator to get some milk for her coffee, it spews its contents on her. 
It is time for a change, agrees the pitiful main character in the commercial of the 
joint Dutch energy companies from which this image is taken. The message is clear: 
wasting energy has no style whatsoever. The need for a change of lifestyles and a possible 
government intervention in lifestyles has become a topic of public debate in the 
Netherlands in recent years, not only because of the need to reduce energy consumption 
but also in view of the broader issue of sustainable development. Mainly since the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, 1992) and the second Dutch 
National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP2)(VROM, 1993), the desirability of a change 
of lifestyles has the attention of the Dutch government, political parties, environmental 
organisations, social scientists and other participants in the public debate. 
The central idea in most contributions to the Dutch public debate on government 
intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles was expressed by McCIuney in the context of 
coming to terms with the ethical issues raised by UNCED: "Everyone wants the freedom 
to follow a lifestyle of one's own choice; however, some lifestyles can be injurious to self, 
family, friends, or society in general. [...] When one follows a lifestyle that is clearly 
injurious to others, or to the biosphere upon which we all depend, then some loss of this 
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freedom is necessary, either by rule or law, or by the 'rules' of nature" (McCluney, 1994; 
25). Thus, the idea is that if the government does not place any restrictions on non-
sustainable lifestyles now, nature will eventually strike back and impose an even more 
severe reduction of lifestyle opportunities on us or our offspring. Therefore, the debate 
centres mainly on the question of which instruments should be used, if government 
intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles is considered to be necessary. 
Initially, two main positions could be distinguished in this debate. One party argued 
the case for a government initiative to influence people's attitudes towards nature and the 
environment through public information and education, hoping that this would also induce 
an adjustment of behaviour in a sustainable direction. Others argued for a government 
attempt to keep the effects of people's behaviour within sustainability limits by means of 
financial incentives, without denying current preferences for comfort and speed. These 
positions diverge on how they seek to accomplish the desired change of non-sustainable 
lifestyles; either by confronting people about their attitudes, or by confronting people with 
their behaviour. Lately, however, a third position has sprung up in this debate, which feels 
that sustainable lifestyles should not be discussed and shaped primarily by the government 
but by people themselves. The government's only task is to provide the social and material 
conditions in which people can take an active part in shaping sustainable alternatives. In 
the subsequent analysis of the three positions (2.2, 2.3 and 2.4) people will be referred to 
consistently as citizens, consumers and citizen-consumers (see 3.3 for an elaboration on 
these terms), respectively, in order to highlight the differences between the three positions. 
Apart from these three strategies currently propagated in the Dutch public debate, a fourth 
strategy is seen as a menace by the proponents of all three other strategies: some sort of 
coercive adjustment of non-sustainable lifestyles. Since such a coercive strategy is hardly 
defended by anyone in the current debate, it will not be discussed separately. 
This chapter maps the Dutch public debate on government intervention by 
successively analysing the arguments for communicative strategies (2.2), economic 
strategies (2.3), and social and material conditions (2.4) as so many answers to the 
question which instruments best to use for this intervention. The analysis presented in this 
chapter focuses on the contents of the proposals defended in the public environmental 
debate. Without denying the importance of a strategic analysis of public debates, it seems 
to be a form of justified philosophical restraint and modesty to try to figure out whether 
the arguments in such debates can be made intelligible by looking at their contents first. 
Only if they cannot, and thus only in the second instance, should one resort to 
explanations in strategic terms (cf. Hajer, 1995). This analysis will take the political 
parties, environmental organisations, and social scientists of various denominations to be 
the main participants in the debate. Of course, social scientists not only participate in the 
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public debate, they also inform it with empirical and theoretical descriptions and interpre-
tations of socio-cultural processes. However, most contemporary social scientists no 
longer live up to the strict distinction between fact and value that was so vigorously propa-
gated by Weber (1922). As a result, descriptive and prescriptive elements are not always 
that clearly distinguishable in their work. The chapter ends with a summarising conclusion 
on the divergent and problematic assumptions underlying the various positions in the 
seemingly instrumental debate (2.5). 
2.2 
Communicative Strategies 
The class of instruments that was first propagated in the Dutch public debate consists of 
public information and other communicative instruments. Proponents of such a communi-
cative strategy believe that all citizens should make a change. Every citizen should drive 
less, produce less waste, reduce energy consumption, purchase environment-friendly 
products, and so on. They also believe that in order to achieve such behavioral 
adjustments, citizens will first have to reflect on the environmental repercussions of their 
behaviour. These reflections should be guided by changed attitudes towards nature and the 
environment. This is where the government enters the picture. It is the government that 
should provide citizens with lots of information and instructive material, so as to set this 
change of attitudes in motion and support the subsequent reflections of citizens.2 
The criticism of current car-driving practices is paradigmatic for the views of the 
advocates of communicative instruments. We are too much in love with our cars, to 
paraphrase the title of a quite sympathetic if rather naive booklet by students from an 
antroposophical College (Kamper et al., 1992). The proposed first task for the government 
is, therefore, to develop a communicative strategy to change these loving attitudes of 
citizens towards their cars, since it is those attitudes which cause citizens to overlook 
environmental repercussions when deciding whether or not they will take the car. Even if 
they do consider these repercussions, it will seem as if their own share in causing or 
solving these problems is negligible. Given that the environmental repercussions of 
2 Proponents of communicative strategies can be found among government representatives (e.g. 
Pe & Spanjersberg, 1996), political parties (e.g. Van der Wal et al., 1993), environmental 
organisations (e.g. LMO, 1994; Juffermans, 1995a & 1995b; Peters, 1995) and social scientists 
(e.g. Midden & Bartels, 1994; Steg, 1996). The analysis in this section draws on these sources but 
also on Van Soest (1991 & 1993) and Spaargaren (1997), who both analysed the debate as social 
scientists and participated in it by criticising communicative strategies for government intervention. 
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current car-driving practices can only be addressed if all citizens contribute to a solution, 
the government should make the citizens: 1) aware of the environmental repercussions of 
current car-driving practices, 2) acknowledge that these repercussions are serious social 
problems, 3) feel responsible for causing them, and 4) convinced that they can make a 
difference in solving them. This communicative strategy should aim to reduce car-driving 
by reducing mobility, influencing the choice of means of transport, and stimulating a more 
efficient use of the car. The proponents of such a communicative strategy acknowledge 
that within the citizens' loving attitudes the car symbolises individual freedom, and that the 
government should not wish to restrict this freedom. However, the government could try 
to tempt citizens to look for another symbol to express their freedom. In short, what is 
proposed to the citizens is indeed to divorce their beloved cars (Peters, 1995; Steg, 1996). 
The proposals to use communication and persuasion as instruments for government 
intervention, as illustrated in the car-driving example, can be generalised into a strategy 
for accomplishing adjustments in other non-sustainable practices as well. Proponents of a 
communicative strategy do in fact recommend public information and education, product 
information, certification, monitoring and feedback, and publicising the existence and 
advantages of alternative options as instruments to influence the attitudes on which 
citizens found their choices for certain behavioral options. This strategy aims at instigating 
a learning process among citizens, getting them to reflect more seriously on their 
behavioral options, judge sustainable options more positively, use new background views 
in addressing environmental problems, and change their deeper preferences. Thus, it 
focuses on the individual motivation of citizens to choose a certain behavioral alternative, 
and on the individual possibilities and capabilities of citizens to express their preference 
for certain behavioral alternatives. Besides car-driving, other travelling practices, eating, 
heating and using domestic electrical appliances are generally identified as the most 
relevant and problematic practices in terms of environmental deterioration. Juffermans 
(1995a), for instance, drew up a list of over twenty priorities for changing non-sustainable 
lifestyles. His top 5: 1) reduce car driving, 2) reduce flying, 3) reduce meat consumption, 
4) reduce domestic use of electricity and gas, and 5) eat more organic food. 
These proposals to use communicative instruments for government intervention in 
non-sustainable lifestyles are principally embedded in the socio-psychological attitude-
behaviour paradigm (Fishbein & Azjen, 1975). Of course, social scientists on the one hand 
and political parties and environmental organisations on the other differ in the way they 
relate their proposals to theory. Whereas the formers refer explicitly to the theory in their 
contributions to the debate, the latter can merely be assumed to use it intuitively. However, 
the high level of reflexivity of lay people in contemporary affluent societies (see chapter 3) 
makes it quite plausible that they too are not wholly unfamiliar with the theory. Behaviour, 
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including its environmental repercussions, is perceived in this paradigm as resulting from 
the conscious and rational choices of individual citizens. This view on behaviour as 
primarily resulting from citizens' conscious choices implies a fixation on attitudes as the 
predictors of behaviour, and thus on non-sustainable attitudes as the prime variable to be 
influenced by the government. Hence, practices are merely seen as the result and sum of 
distinct and measurable intentions, motives and reasons for behaviour. These intentions, 
motives and reasons of citizens are conceptualised as logically independent from their 
actual behaviour. In addition, the focus in this paradigm is almost exclusively on singular 
environmentally relevant practices. The general idea deduced from this attitude-behaviour 
paradigm seems to be that citizens are best addressed on singular environmental issues and 
with simple behavioral alternatives. It is suggested, for instance, that the government 
should develop a personal environmental impact test to provide citizens with an insight 
into the environmental repercussions of their current practices, and that publicity 
campaigns should above all highlight specific behavioral alternatives for citizens. Once 
citizens' attitudes are adjusted in a sustainable direction, their practices will soon follow. 
The proponents of communicative instruments often conjure up the spectre of a 
coercive policy to change people's lifestyles. This is quite peculiar, since hardly any party 
in the Dutch public debate calls for coercion as a means to accomplish the desired 
adjustments in non-sustainable lifestyles. The spectre does serve to illuminate one of the 
main assumptions of the proponents of communicative instruments. They are very keen on 
not injuring rights and freedoms of citizens. This is why, for instance, a stringent policy to 
reduce car driving appears to be politically unfeasible at the moment. The reason for this 
was already mentioned. The car symbolises individual freedom, and this freedom is one of 
the most important values in liberal-democratic societies like the Netherlands. 
So, coercive strategies (i.e. commands and prohibitions) to change lifestyles are 
unattractive because of their poor legitimacy. Communicative strategies, which aim to 
gain voluntary cooperation, seem to be much more attractive in this respect. Communi-
cative instruments can encourage citizens to take their own responsibility for nature and 
the environment, and create opportunities for citizens to take environment-friendly 
decisions. Taking such decisions, citizens will weigh up, for instance, comfort, energy 
consumption, prevention of waste, and prices. The government should not be allowed to 
make such decisions for the citizens but it is entitled, say the proponents of a communi-
cative strategy, to influence them by providing information on the environmental 
repercussions of various choices. The question of whether the government is allowed to 
intervene in non-sustainable lifestyles is answered affirmatively, as long as such 
intervention is limited to public information and other communicative instruments. The 
government could and should appeal to the eco-consciousness of citizens. 
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However, a hidden agenda lurks behind this emphasis on the non-directive character of a 
communicative strategy. Public information and education are also propagated as a means 
to create social and political acceptance for more stringent policies to change lifestyles, 
and thus make room for policies that do restrict the individual freedom of citizens to 
follow their own lifestyles and practices. This hidden agenda is veiled by the claim that 
environment-friendly adjustments of behaviour fit into lots of lifestyles, that the definition 
of the good life and how it should be pursued remain in the hands of the citizens. The 
government is called upon to convince citizens that environment-friendly behaviour can 
be attractive, comfortable and convenient. This message is not that easy to communicate, 
however, at a time when citizens are also made to understand that the required adjustments 
of their practices and lifestyles include the following: drive less, fly less, heat your home 
less, eat less meat. 
The problem of this message is that most proponents of communicative strategies 
aim for some predetermined and static notion of the sustainable lifestyle. Therefore, they 
cannot allow room for people's creativity to develop a plurality of sustainable alternatives. 
The ambiguity of these good news stories from the proponents of communicative 
instruments rings even more clearly in the call for austerity coming from several Dutch 
environmental philosophers. These philosophers propagate a lifestyle of caring for the 
earth because we borrow it from our children, and defend policies oriented at stewardship 
and moderation (Jansen, 1990; Klop, 1993; Schuyt, 1993; Van der Wal, 1995). 
In a way these pleas for austerity as the way out of the current environmental 
problems are not much more than a new disguise for a culture-critical stance that is as 
ancient as western philosophy. It is the criticism of consumerism and hedonism that dates 
back at least to Plato: '"Do you think it befits a philosophical man to be keen about the so-
called pleasures of, for example, food and drink?' 'Not in the least, Socrates,' said Sim-
mias. 'And what about the other services to the body? Do you think such a person regards 
them as of any value? For instance, the possession of smart clothes and shoes, and the 
other bodily adornments - do you think he values them highly, or does he disdain them, 
except in so far as he's absolutely compelled to share in them?' 'I think the genuine 
philosopher disdains them.'"(Plato, 1993; 9-10). 
The contemporary green version of this culture-critical stance argues that the 
government ought to set ecological and socio-cultural limits to the consumer society, 
because hedonistic feasting at the expense of fellow man, nature or culture should be 
forbidden. A quite apocalyptic vision of the survival of nature and the environment is 
voiced, which assumes that the strongly rooted and highly consumptive lifestyles in 
contemporary affluent societies directly threaten the quality and diversity of nature. This 
party believes that the deterioration of nature and the environment is essentially a cultural, 
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even mental problem. This deterioration can only be stopped by a change of mentality. 
The connection between contemporary affluent lifestyles and environmental deterioration 
is not accidental, because the citizens leading these lifestyles can be characterised as 
insatiable usurpers and desirers. The environmental problems are the result of an 
excessively high level of aspirations and desires. Only the logic of austerity guarantees a 
sustainable good life on a human scale and in peace with nature. The exhaustibility of 
environmental goods compels citizens to adjust their lifestyles, and give up their excessive 
and prodigal use of these goods. The government should motivate citizens to use their 
creativity in order to become more self-reliant in a small-scale economy, living in 
harmony with their natural environment. This implies, for instance, a personal abstinence 
from all sorts of luxuries (cf. Naess, 1989). One wonders how these admonitions and 
respect for the freedom to follow your own lifestyle could ever be reconciled. 
Unfortunately, the philosophical proponents of a moralistic communicative strategy tend 
to ignore such worries. 
In a more general sense, all proposals of the proponents of communicative strategies 
for government intervention are based on the incoherent assumption of a straightforward, 
one-way relation between attitudes and practices that express these attitudes. Hence, the 
government only has to develop a communicative strategy to influence citizens' attitudes, 
and they will soon change their practices. Since communicative instruments do not force 
anything on the citizens, they remain free in their practices and thus in their lifestyles. At 
least, that is the suggestion. 
2.3 
Economic Strategies 
The second class of instruments propagated in the Dutch public debate on government 
intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles is financial incentives and other economic 
instruments. The advocates of an economic strategy dissociate themselves from the use of 
communicative instruments because of two main reasons: 1) communicative strategies 
don't work, are not effective, and 2) they are morally wrong, based on false assumptions. 
The government should not wish to change citizens' attitudes and should not try to deny 
current preferences for comfort and speed. The important thing is to keep the conse-
quences of consumer behaviour within sustainability limits, and in order to achieve this 
goal the government should touch consumers in their weak spot, i.e. their wallet. Raise the 
prices of environmental goods, reduce the costs of labour, revise the fiscal system, and so 
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on. Without such economic incentives any appeal to people's consciousness or attitude is 
useless, and with these economic incentives such an appeal is no longer necessary.3 
Their diagnosis of the environmentally problematic issue of where people choose to 
go for their holidays and what means of transport they use is paradigmatic for the views of 
the proponents of economic instruments for government intervention: long-distance 
travelling is way too cheap. In their view, therefore, the government's primary task is to 
develop an economic strategy to change the cost-benefit balancing of consumers choosing 
a holiday destination. As things now stand, holiday-makers can choose to travel to remote 
destinations by plane or car and forget about the environmental repercussions of using 
fossil fuels because they are cheap. Even if the consumers making such choices do care 
about nature and the environment, current prices will nonetheless make them opt for 
environmentally unfriendly behaviour on the rational grounds of their well-understood 
self-interest. In situations where such assessments and choices are general practice, the 
result is a deterioration of nature and the environment while at the same time everyone 
regrets this. To avoid this undesirable situation, the government should intervene in the 
relative costs associated with the various behavioral options. With respect to holidays by 
air, for instance, the government could do this by 1) raising the price of airline tickets, 2) 
introducing a VAT levy on international flights, and 3) introducing an excise on kerosene. 
In short, what is proposed is that the environmental cost of long-distance travel be charged 
on in higher prices (Aarts et al., 1995; Van der Linde & Franke, 1996). 
The proposals in the choice of holiday destination example to use higher prices and 
tax increases as instruments for government intervention can be generalised into a strategy 
for accomplishing adjustments in other non-sustainable practices as well. Proponents of an 
economic strategy for government intervention in fact recommend price incentives, fiscal 
instruments, levies, subsidies, and tax differentiation as instruments to influence the prices 
on which the individual consumer founds his or her choice for certain products or services, 
and hence for a certain behaviour. In view of current trends of individualisation, self-
realisation and an aversion against lecturing, this strategy prefers to use market forces to 
accomplish an adjustment of consumptive practices in a sustainable direction. This way, 
the consumers need not be deprived of their freedom to choose practices in accordance 
with their budget and their own preferences. On the one hand, the advocates of an 
3 Proponents of economic strategies can be found among government representatives (e.g. 
Grijpma, 1996), political parties (e.g. Cramer et al., 1991; Schermer, 1991; Basset, 1992; 
Groenveld & Smit, 1992; Van Driel, 1992 & 1993; Van Driel ef al. (eds.), 1993; Den Hartogh, 1993), 
environmental organisations (e.g. Buitenkamp, 1992; Van der Linde & Franke, 1996) and social 
scientists (e.g. Aarts ef al., 1995). Again, the analysis also draws upon Van Soest (1991 & 1993) 
and Spaargaren (1997). 
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economic strategy acknowledge the inevitability of allowing the government to hamper 
the development of certain behavioral practices. On the other hand, they argue that "it 
doesn't follow ... that it is also a permissible policy option for governments to try to 
change people's preferences or views of the good life" (Den Hartogh, 1995; 88). The 
government should try to influence the choices of consumers by raising or reducing the 
costs associated with certain behavioral alternatives, but environmental policy should not 
in any direct way aim to change preferences. The important thing is to change consumer 
behaviour in so far as it entails an excessive use of environmental goods. The government 
had better restrict itself to reducing the negative impacts of consumer behaviour on nature 
and the environment, while keeping the motives for choosing certain behavioral practices 
outside the debate. If people choose to follow envhonment-unfriendly patterns of 
consumption, they will simply have to pay the price. 
These proposals to use financial incentives and other economic instruments for 
government intervention are principally embedded in the social dilemma paradigm 
(Hardin, 1968) which stems from game theory, and are sometimes even based on the 
reduction of the individual into a stereotyped homo economicus. Behaviour, including its 
environmental repercussions, is perceived in this paradigm as resulting from the conscious 
and rational pursuit of self-interest by individual consumers. In this perspective, 
environmental deterioration is seen primarily as resulting from a situation in which the 
rational behaviour of individuals leads to a sub-optimal outcome for the collective. This 
situation has been described as a social dilemma. The tension between self-interest and the 
collective interest of a sustainable development results from two circumstances: 1) while 
the contribution of each individual to environmental deterioration seems negligible, the 
sum of all contributions causes severe problems; 2) the repercussions of certain practices 
on nature and the environment stretch across large scales of space and time. It implies a 
fixation on self-interest as the motivation for behaviour, and thus on prices as the prime 
variable to be influenced by the government. The general idea deduced from this social 
dilemma paradigm seems to be that the model of financial reward and punishment is the 
best starting point for a government strategy to intervene in environmentally relevant 
behaviour. 
In order to back up their case, the proponents of economic instruments do not 
conjure up the spectre of coercion, but that of a communicative strategy. What they find 
particularly dreadful about a communicative strategy is the moralising tendencies it 
carries. This fear is illustrative of one of the main assumptions of the proponents of 
economic instruments. Although, like the proponents of a communicative strategy, they 
are very keen not to injure rights and freedoms of consumers, their emphasis is on freedom 
of preferences. They will not care so much, if government policies work out differently for 
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divergent practices. In their view, the government should neither wish to change, for 
instance, current preferences for remote holiday destinations, nor try to eliminate this 
envkonment-unfriendly behavioral option by coercion. The reason for this was already 
mentioned. The government should respect the high value attached to individual freedom 
in liberal-democratic societies like the Netherlands. It should only attempt to change 
consumer behaviour by raising the price of non-sustainable behavioral alternatives. 
So, both coercive and communicative strategies to change lifestyles are unattractive 
because of their poor legitimacy, and an economic strategy seems to be much more 
attractive in this respect. Financial incentives and other economic instruments are more 
likely to motivate consumers to give up their envkonment-unfriendly habits, to subordi-
nate their self-interest to the collective good of a sustainable development. With such 
instruments the government can make environment-friendly behaviour more affordable, 
less time-consuming and easier for the consumer. This facilitates a sustainable shift in 
consumption patterns from products to services, with consumers buying environment-
friendly products, using and disposing products in an environment-friendly way, reducing 
car driving and energy consumption. The government should not be allowed to moralise 
about the practices of consumers, say the proponents of economic instruments. Instead, it 
is perfectly entitled to adopt price control measures in order to make the prices of products 
and services reflect the accompanying environmental costs, and thus induce consumers to 
make responsible choices. The question of whether the government is allowed to intervene 
in non-sustainable lifestyles is answered affirmatively, as long as such intervention is 
limited to financial incentives and other economic instruments. The government could and 
should make the consumers as polluters pay for their polluting practices. 
However, some ambiguity rests in this emphasis on neutrality towards the various 
preferences, on the non-moralising character of an economic strategy for government 
intervention. If financial incentives are meant to change consumption patterns, and even 
reduce consumption of certain products and services, this implies a moralising of prices. 
But if the intended outcomes are not neutral, it is hard to imagine how this fits in with the 
professed neutrality towards the contents of the good life. This tension is veiled by the 
claim that consumers remain free to respond to financial incentives according to their own 
preferences, that they can enjoy a similar level of prosperity and satisfaction while 
sustaining reductions in their use of energy and other environmental goods. However, the 
message that an on-charging of the use of energy and other environmental goods in higher 
prices will not affect individuals' freedom to follow their own preferences will not be easy 
to communicate when consumers are made to understand that the purpose of financial 
incentives is to reduce car-driving, flying, eating meat, and domestic energy consumption. 
As with communicative strategies the problem of this message is that most proponents of 
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economic strategies aim for some predetermined and static notion of the sustainable 
lifestyle, and are unwdlling to allow room for the development of a plurality of sustainable 
lifestyles. 
Moreover, similar ambiguity rests between the social dilemma character that is 
ascribed to many environmental problems, and the instruments proposed by the 
proponents of an economic strategy to resolve these dilemmas. Therefore, Aarts et al. 
(1995) introduce significant amendments to the generally accepted story about 
environmental social dilemmas. Instead of merely assuming the actuality of social 
dilemmas in environmentally relevant behaviour, they see social dilemmas as a 
potentiality whose becoming an actuality depends on whether consumers will indeed 
adopt envirormient-unfriendly practices in a certain choice situation while nonetheless 
preferring a sustainable development. Consumer behaviour is paradigmatically perceived 
as intentional and rational, but Aarts et al. leave room for the possibility that consumers 
will refer to some combination of individual self-interest and other more collective 
interests in their considerations. This depends on the characteristics of each choice 
situation, i.e. 1) the availability of envhomnent-friendly alternatives; 2) the cost of 
environment-friendly alternatives; 3) the perception of whether taking a decision about the 
alternatives is a public or private matter; and 4) the connection between environment-
friendly alternatives and particular interests or strategic positions. This emphasis on the 
importance of the specific characteristics of each choice-situation for lifestyle choices not 
only presents a critique of the attitude-behaviour paradigm but also ramifies the social 
dilemma paradigm. With respect to cases like the choice of holiday destinations, the 
challenge for the government would be to detect which specific characteristics of this 
practice it is that keep consumers from choosing environment-friendly alternatives. 
If one does not answer this challenge, one reduces individuals to the impoverished 
image of the homo economicus. Such a consumer is assumed to choose among behavioral 
options solely on the basis of individual cost-benefit balancing. If that is the case, the only 
remaining instrument for the government to influence consumer behaviour would be to 
raise the cost of envhonment-unfriendly behaviour, even while it continues to suggest that 
such financial measures do not interfere with the individual's freedom to follow a lifestyle 
of his or her own choice. One wonders why people should take such suggestions as 
gospel. The suggestion will be even less plausible, if the proponents of an economic 
strategy go on to say that if financial incentives do not go far enough to achieve the 
objectives of environmental policy, a quota system should be considered. Yet this is 
exactly what the proponents of an only seemingly neutral economic strategy for 
government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles expect the consumers to believe. 
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In fact, the whole idea of economic instruments that do not interfere with the individual 
freedom of choice is based on a quite simplistic behavioral model. Whereas on the one 
hand, it assumes that prices relate directly to practices, these practices are not assumed to 
reflect on the preferences of which they are an expression. Hence, the government only 
has to influence the prices, and people will soon change their behaviour. Since economic 
instruments do not interfere with preferences, the consumers remain free in these 
preferences and thus in their lifestyles. At least, that is the suggestion. 
2.4 
Social and Material Conditions 
Recently, a third position has cropped up in the Dutch public debate on government 
intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles. It is the position of those who feel that 
government intervention should centre on providing social and material conditions. 
Although this third position has not yet fully crystallised, it may offer promising material 
for further elaboration. Unlike the preceding two sections, which concentrated on 
criticising the problematic presuppositions of the positions in question, this section will be 
looking for starting-points for the development of a green third way in the remainder of 
the book. According to the spokesmen for this third position the proponents of communi-
cative and economic strategies do have a lot in common and thus share certain short-
comings. The principal objection is that both these strategies only make sense within 
narratives governed by a language of fear and control. It is only the rule of this language 
that makes nature and the environment appear as constraints, limiting conditions on the 
development of practices and lifestyles. Hence, 1) the primacy given to the government for 
adjusting lifestyles in a sustainable direction, 2) the fixation on the effectiveness of the 
proposed instruments, and 3) the tension and ambiguity in the reassurances of respect for 
people's freedom to follow lifestyles of their own choice. In contrast, the proposals offered 
by the proponents of the third strategy are governed by a language of challenge and 
interaction, which makes nature and the environment appear as opportunities, carrying 
conditions for the development of sustainable practices and lifestyles by citizen-consumers 
themselves." 
4 Materials for the development of a third strategy for government intervention in non-sustainable 
lifestyles have been put forward by environmental organisations (e.g. Slob (ed.), 1995; Zijlmans, 
1995) and social scientists (e.g. Bekkers ef a/., 1996; Grin & Van de Graaf, 1996; Tjallingii, 1996; 
Spaargaren, 1997). 
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The views of the proponents of this third strategy for government intervention are not yet 
as crystallised as those presented in the preceding two sections. However, the general idea 
is to shift government intervention from handing out either moralising rules of conduct or 
financial rewards and punishments towards creating social and material conditions to 
achieve the desired adjustments in non-sustainable practices and lifestyles. Environmental 
problems are not primarily caused by individual choices made by citizen-consumers. 
Therefore, environmental policy should not aim to interfere with the autonomy of these 
choices. The aim of environmental policy should be to contribute to the creation and 
development of social and material conditions that facilitate individual and collective 
environment-friendly practices, while according directive steering instruments such as 
public information and economic measures only a complementary role. Such a third 
strategy for government intervention should encourage citizen-consumers to develop 
environment-friendly behavioral alternatives themselves. It should not aim to achieve 
finely predetermined results in terms of environmental impact, but to create conditions for 
a yet to be discovered plurality of sustainable lifestyles. The objectives of environmental 
policy are not the starting points for discussions about this policy then, but the result of 
these discussions. In this strategy the process of developing sustainable practices and 
lifestyles by citizen-consumers themselves is more important than defining the 
characteristics of a static notion of the sustainable lifestyle. Proponents of this third 
strategy for government intervention in lifestyles recommend, for instance, making 
adjustments to physical infrastructure, supporting experiments by early innovators, 
providing environment-friendly services, subsidising NGOs and moralising devices as 
instruments to support the development of sustainable practices by citizen-consumers 
themselves. Although these proposals to provide social and material conditions as a third 
strategy for government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles are not yet embedded in 
any crystallised paradigm, Giddens's (1984) structuration theory seems to be a pretty 
promising candidate because it does not conceive of attitudes as somehow logically 
independent from specific practices but as inextricably bound up with these practices (see 
chapter 3). 
2.5 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the Dutch public debate on government intervention in non-sustainable 
lifestyles distinguished four different instrumental strategies: 
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1) communicative strategies that aim at changing citizens' attitudes; 
2) economic strategies that aim at changing consumers' practices; 
3) strategies that aim at creating social and material conditions for a reshaping of 
lifestyles by citizen-consumers themselves; 
4) coercive strategies (hardly propagated in the debate and therefore not separately 
discussed)(c/ WRR, 1992). 
The differences between the dominant, communicative and economic, strategies in the 
debate, in terms of the instruments they favour, were found to be intelligible against the 
backdrop of the different behavioral models employed by the proponents of these 
strategies: the socio-psychological attitude-behaviour and the game-theoretical social 
dilemma paradigm, respectively. These two strategies were also found to come with 
different justifications as to how they could respect the freedom of individuals to live their 
lives as they please. 
Unfortunately, these justifications fail to provide a satisfactory reconciliation of 
government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles and respect for the individual 
freedom to follow one's own lifestyle. Instead of answering the question of whether their 
proposals for government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles entail an intolerable 
infringement of people's freedom to follow their own lifestyles, the dominant strategies 
offer ineffective attempts to evade this question by suggesting that people remain free in 
either their attitudes or their practices. The failure to recognise the inextricable 
interconnectedness of attitudes and practices in people's lifestyles is the first account on 
which the dominant communicative and economic strategies were criticised. Second, since 
their evasion of the question of how government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles 
could respect the freedom of choice relied on this ill-conceived behavioral model, this is 
the next account on which these strategies are severely compromised. Third, the evasion 
forswears any serious attempts to investigate whether sustainable development might 
provide sound reasons to restrict people's freedom of choice. Since both strategies are thus 
incapable to give meaningful interpretations of all key terms in the phrase 'government 
intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles', it is no wonder that they fail to reconcile this 
government intervention and respect for people's freedom to follow their own lifestyles. 
Therefore, the next three chapters subsequently set out to remedy these flaws in the 
dominant communicative and economic strategies, and to provide more intelligible 
accounts of the key terms lifestyle, autonomy and sustainable development. Luckily, a 
third strategy dawned in the Dutch public debate. This strategy, which aims to provide 
social and material conditions in which citizen-consumers themselves can take active part 
in shaping sustainable lifestyles, serves as a take-off point for the elaboration of a green 
third way of government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles (see chapter 6). 
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3 
Lifestyles and Reflexive Modernisation 
"Either our lives become stories, 
or there's just no way to get through them" 
(Douglas Coupland, 1991; 8) 
3.1 
Introduction 
He drives into town in his brand new convertible like a would-be James Dean, one hand 
on the wheel and the other around the shoulders of a spruce and busty blonde. His wife 
would probably object to his speeding, but well, he only had a few beers and you have got 
to feel this freedom. Then suddenly, just in front of him three sheep cross the street. His 
first thought is to be hallucinating, but then his foot already hits the break 
"Say baa-baa to bad driving", headed a Sunday Times (1996) article on the rather 
bizarre idea to use sheep as living speed bumps in a provincial Dutch town called 
Culemborg. If car driving were only about fulfilling utilitarian needs and speeding merely 
one of the negative externalities to be tackled by the local authorities, it would have been a 
bizarre idea indeed. However, car driving is also about identity construction and individual 
freedom. Most men would definitely consider speeding in a convertible to be quite stylish. 
Current public debates on government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles (chapter 
2) are confused about a meaningful conceptualisation of the terms lifestyle and identity, 
and their relation with speeding practices. Such debates have much to gain from 
conceptual clarification on matters of identity in contemporary affluent societies. 
Therefore, this chapter attempts to answer the question of whether a narrative 
conceptualisation of identity and lifestyle would contribute to such clarity. This attempt 
builds on the materials developed in section 2.4.5 
5 This attempt will be illustrated with car-driving examples (based on: Peters, 1995). 
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A good place to start reflecting is Giddens's conceptualisation of the term lifestyle as 
inextricably interconnected narratives of self-identity and reflexively organised social 
practices. Giddens (1991) defines a lifestyle as: "a more or less integrated set of practices 
which an individual embraces, not only because such practices fulfil utilitarian needs, but 
because they give material form to a particular narrative of self-identity" (81). Further 
elaboration on this narrative conceptualisation of lifestyle is the prime objective of the first 
sub-section in this chapter (3.2.1). However, the search for a meaningful conceptualisation 
of identity should proceed by making important ramifications on an otherwise overly 
discursive, individualistic and static picture of narrative identities. First, it will be argued 
that the structural properties of society are both the medium and the outcome of a 
reflexively organised construction of narrative identities, and second, that narrative 
identities are not primarily constructed by atomised individuals but largely constituted by 
the social groups to which they belong (3.2.2). Next, the analysis will be broadened by 
incorporating a discussion of the term citizen-consumer as a conceptual tool to bridge the 
unfruitful gap in talking about citizens and consumers as if these terms don't refer to the 
same people (3.3). At that stage it is about time to shift attention towards a more 
contingent analysis of the specific characteristics of narrative identities in contemporary 
affluent societies. It will be argued that the processes of detraditionalisation, 
individualisation and globalisation profoundly influence the narrative turn in 
conceptualising identity (3.4.1). Then follows a labelling exercise, an attempt to order the 
plurality of lifestyles in contemporary affluent societies (3.4.2). Finally, the chapter ends 
with a summarising conclusion on the implications for the pursuit of a green third way for 
government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles of taking the narrative character of 
identity serious (3.5). This conclusion will also establish the link to the reason why 
government intervention in lifestyles is considered to be a morally problematic issue in 
contemporary affluent societies (see chapter 4). 
3.2 
Lifestyles 
The preceding chapter criticised the attitude-behaviour and social dilemma paradigms for 
considering attitudes to be somehow logically independent from the practices in which 
people engage (2.2 & 2.3). Alternatively, it argued that these attitudes, or narratives of 
self-identity, should rather be conceived as inextricably interconnected with specific social 
practices (2.4). This tentative conceptualisation of lifestyles as reciprocally constituting 
narratives of self-identity and practices deserves further elaboration. 
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3.2.1 
Narrative Identities and Reflexive Practices* 
For a further clarification on the conceptual meaning of the terms identity and lifestyle, it 
might be wise to start by quoting Giddens's (1991) definition of a lifestyle once again. A 
lifestyle is: "a more or less integrated set of practices which an individual embraces, not 
only because such practices fulfil utilitarian needs, but because they give material form to 
a particular narrative of self-identity" (81). The notion of lifestyle thus refers to a certain 
coherence in people's practices. A lifestyle connects people's day-to-day behavioral 
options into more or less ordered patterns of choices. The maintenance of this coherence 
across their divergent practices is one of the prime means by which people preserve a 
reasonably stable sense of identity. The notion of lifestyle tries to capture this necessary 
coherence in people's daily life. For most men it is, for instance, simply too confusing to 
be at once a loving, responsible husband, and a drink-driver fooling around with busty 
blondes. 
The notion of lifestyle also tries to capture the idea that the coherence in people's 
practices and identities presumes telling a narrative. The construction of a coherent self, a 
lifestyle, is to be understood as a process of integrating practices by a particular narrative 
of self-identity. Such narratives form a coherent trajectory of development from past 
experiences to anticipated future practices. They connect divergent behavioral choices to a 
particular lifestyle. People's behavioral choices are not just decisions about how to behave 
but also about whom to be. Or, as Taylor (1989a) puts it: "In order to have a sense of who 
we are, we have to have a notion of how we have become, and of where we are going" 
(47). The moral thread of establishing narrative unity in one's lifestyle is a thread of 
authenticity, of being true to yourself. That is the reason why government intervention in 
car-driving practices is such a precarious issue. This intervention is not just about 
interfering with people's behavioral choices but also about matters of identity, since being 
a mobile person is one of the leading threads in many contemporary narratives of self-
identity. 
A lifestyle is a reflexive project of the self, and consists in preserving a coherent 
biographical narrative amidst an almost infinite plurality of behavioral options. Each 
individual not merely has but actually lives such a biographical narrative, reflexively 
constructed in distinction to other possible lifestyles and identities. To have a reasonably 
stable sense of identity means to have a sense of reflexively grasped biographical 
continuity. People's identities and lifestyles are to be found in their capability to keep a 
6 This sub-section roughly follows the argument in Giddens, 1991. 
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particular narrative going. These inherently fragile narrative identities establish a certain 
unity that connects divergent practices into coherent lifestyles. So, if dominion, freedom, 
and speed are significant threads in most male narratives that are symbolised in cars, men 
will probably stick to these cars no matter how many other travel options are open to 
them. 
One of the prime characteristics of contemporary affluent societies is that people are 
almost continuously confronted with changing behavioral options. This means that people 
need ongoing construction and reconstruction of their biographical narratives to preserve a 
reasonably stable sense of identity. In view of the rapidly changing circumstances in the 
flow of daily life, people's narrative identities have to be shaped, altered and reflexively 
sustained in reasonably coherent lifestyles. A reflexively organised narrative identity 
provides the means to establish this coherence in the changeable social conditions of daily 
life. People's identities form a trajectory across their divergent practices over the durée of 
the life cycle. These narrative identities have to be constructed, and more or less 
continuously reconstructed, against the backdrop of the ever-changing experiences of daily 
life. These experiences may even be contradictory, as when the government 
simultaneously tries to persuade people to reduce car driving and raises the prices of 
public transport. 
Ricoeur (1992) elaborates on this metaphorical use of the term narrative when he 
argues that individuals are but characters in a story. These characters are not entities 
distinct from people's daily experiences. The narrative rather constructs the identity of the 
people and the story in the same move. The identity of the story makes the identity of the 
individual. Narrative and daily experiences are inextricably intertwined in synchronous 
processes of identity construction. The narrative unity of a lifestyle "not only results from 
the summing up ofpractices in a globalizing form but is governed equally by a life project 
... and by fragmentary practices, which have their own unity, life plans constituting the 
intermediary zone of exchange between the undetermined character of guiding ideals and 
the determinate nature of practices" (158). The idea of gathering a lifestyle together in a 
narrative identity is to serve as a solid basis for conducting an individualised vision of the 
good life. Unfortunately, lots of visions of the good life include non-sustainable practices 
like excessive car driving. 
Identity is a reflexively organised endeavour of actively explored and constructed 
choice. This endeavour presumes reflexive awareness on part of people, and has to be 
routinely created and sustained in their practices. A narrative identity is "the self as 
reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography" (Giddens, 1991; 
53). It presumes continuity over time and space, while people are aware of the relation 
between their here-and-now behaviour and spatio-temporally distant events and practices. 
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The more people are reflexively aware of the possibilities to construct their own narrative 
identities, the more they will be aware that current practices shape future opportunities. 
This point is worth special emphasis. It could imply that once this awareness stretches 
across vast spans of time-space and includes the opportunities of future generations to 
follow their lifestyles, this influences here-and-now-behavioral choice. 
The more people make themselves as individuals, the more the very question of 
what it is to be an individual becomes a central question. People never just passively 
accept the social and material conditions for their behaviour. They more or less 
continuously reflect upon these conditions, reconstituting them in view of their particular 
lifestyle. An essential element of identity is simply that of choice in daily life. People not 
only follow lifestyles, they are obliged to do so: "we have no choice but to choose" 
(Giddens, 1991; 81). It is important to avoid the plausible, yet misguided impression that 
this argument about choice as a basic condition of daily life is typically affluent middle 
class. Of course, life chances always precondition lifestyle options, but this does not imply 
that the lower strata of society have got nothing left to choose. In the 1950s a private car 
may have been a luxury item, and the working class majority may have had no choice but 
to go by foot, bike or public transport to their jobs. Nowadays, however, car driving has 
become a behavioral option open to almost everyone. 
Since people would not be able to get on with their lives in a world fluid of choice, 
they need some sense of ontological security, a sense of reality shared with other people. 
This ontological security is provided in the natural attitude. This natural attitude brackets 
out existential questions about ourselves, others and the material world, because the 
answers to such questions should be taken for granted to keep on going in daily life. The 
natural attitude is based on the routinisation of behaviour, and means that people somehow 
always have the answers to the existential questions anyone needs to address now and 
then. The development of stable contexts of daily life is crucial for the maintenance of a 
sense of ontological security. It depends on the excavation from daily life of the existential 
issues that would raise almost unbridgeable moral dilemmas. The natural attitude forms a 
protective cocoon, which enables people to get on with their daily practices without 
continuously having to reflect on a diversity of behavioral options. This might also explain 
why public information about the environmental repercussions of car driving is doomed to 
fail in talking people into a feeling of guilt. Instead of digging a hole in people's protective 
cocoon, it is more likely that this same cocoon reacts by shifting the blame on to others to 
evade any full confrontation with such highly disturbing questions about their lifestyle. 
Directly linked to achieving a sense of ontological security is the notion of trust. 
Trust presumes commitment, a faith in others and their routines that is irreducible and 
especially significant with regard to spatio-temporally distanced others. That is why it is 
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above all important that the government, as an inherently distanced actor, is consistent in, 
for instance, its environmental policy to gain people's trust (see 5.5). Without such trust 
people would not be able to preserve a stable and coherent orientation towards others, the 
material world, and hence towards their own identities and lifestyles. Trust in others is the 
basis of experiencing reasonably stable social and material conditions, and of constructing 
a sufficiently coherent sense of identity. 
So far, the narrative conceptualisation of identity might seem to imply that people's 
foremost concern is to be an authentic individual, a coherent self. This cannot be the whole 
story though. The divergent expectations, interests and intentions of people in 
contemporary affluent societies not only open up the opportunity to construct an authentic 
identity. This identity construction is also about ethical, moral or normative issues. This 
ethical dimension of identities is, for instance, quite obvious when people ask recognition 
for their behavioral choices and argue about the normative merits of these choices in 
public debates. In their choices and practices, people enact the normative projects that are 
attached to their lifestyles. Identity is not just about authenticity in front of others, but also 
about moral autonomy in public discourse. People discuss the natural, social and 
subjective world to construct their identities. This ethical dimension of identity 
presupposes a capability to participate in stable, communicative and open deliberations 
(Habermas, 1988; Korthals, 1992). Without the ethical dimension of identity, the 
government would not have the possibility to develop communicative instruments for 
addressing people on the environmental repercussions of their practices. 
However, the ethical dimension of identity also means that respecting identity 
involves respecting people's moral autonomy. The government has got to face the demand 
that people deserve the freedom to construct their identities in their own way, no matter 
how repugnant these identities may turn out to be. Moral authenticity and moral autonomy 
are highly valued in contemporary affluent societies. Therefore, "notions of what it is to 
respect people's integrity includes that of protecting their expressive freedom to express 
and develop their own opinions, to define their own life conceptions, to draw up their own 
life-plans" (Taylor, 1989a; 25). The ethical dimension of people's identities thus poses a 
moral paradox for policy-makers. It both opens up space to address people on, for 
instance, the environmental repercussions of their car-driving practices, and severely 
restricts the government in exactly this kind of interference with people's choices. Despite 
this paradoxical conclusion, it remains important to be clear that people need a vision of 
the good life to make sense of their lives. This vision has to be interwoven with people's 
understanding of their lives as unfolding stories or narratives. People have a sense of who 
they are through their sense of where they stand on the good life. 
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After all this talking about narrative identities as reflexive projects, it is important to fight 
any suggestion that people's knowledgeability and capability is confined to a discursive 
awareness of the reasons for their behavioral choices. Instead, much of what is needed to 
be able to go on in daily life is carried at the level of practical consciousness, inextricably 
bound up with the ongoing flow of daily life. People have the capacity to understand what 
they do while they do it. This reflexivity hardly operates on a discursive level. What 
individuals know about what they do is largely carried at the level of practical 
consciousness. This practical consciousness consists of all the things people tacitly know 
about how to go on in daily life without being able to give them discursive expression. It 
involves recall in the durée of daily life without being able to express what he or she 
thereby knows. On this level of practical consciousness people do know a great deal about 
the conditions and consequences of what they do in their practices. However, this does not 
mean that they also have the capacity to discuss these conditions and consequences in, for 
instance, the context of a public environmental debate. Most people will probably not be 
able to give full discursive elaboration on their reasons to drive their cars. Therefore, if the 
government is to achieve an adjustment of people's non-sustainable car-driving practices, 
it should raise these reasons to the level of discursive consciousness. Such behavioral 
adjustments call for a reflexive incision in the ongoing flow of daily life. 
Finally, it should be clear that the choice for a certain lifestyle is increasingly 
important in the construction of identity and daily behaviour, because of the pluralisation 
of behavioral options in contemporary affluent societies. A lifestyle, a narrative identity, 
provides a frame of reference in making such divergent behavioral choices as what car to 
drive, what meat to eat, where to go on holidays, what sex to have? At any moment in 
time, people can choose among an almost infinite plurality of behavioral options. Some 
may even use this plurality to construct a distinctive eclectic identity by integrating 
elements from divergent styles into a more or less coherent narrative. However, a certain 
segmentation of lifestyles is the more characteristic reaction to this pluralisation of 
behavioral options. "Partly because of the existence of multiple milieux of action, lifestyle 
choices and activities very often tend to be segmental for the individual: modes of action 
followed in one context may be more or less at variance with those adopted in others" 
(Giddens, 1991; 83). Despite this segmentation in people's practices, they still need a 
certain order and coherence in their overall lifestyles to maintain a reasonably stable sense 
of identity. This order will be stronger at the level of what Giddens calls lifestyle sectors, 
i.e. time-space slices of the overall lifestyle within which the consistency and coherence of 
practices can be adopted and enacted to a higher degree then in the overall lifestyle. 
Nevertheless, people also need intersectoral coherence in their lifestyles. Although some 
authors see in the segmentation of lifestyles enough reason to abandon the notion of 
31 
lifestyle altogether (cf. Munters, 1992), these authors seem to stretch their deconstructivist 
mood a bit too far. After yet another brand new convertible, the physician's attempts to 
convert the hospital canteen towards serving organic coffee loose much of their credibility. 
3.2.2 
The Duality of Identity Construction7 
The preceding sub-section (3.2.1) emphasised the active and reflexive character of 
people's identities. Any tendency to conceive of people's behaviour as merely resulting 
from, or structured by, social forces was implicitly rejected. However, it should also be 
made perfectly clear that narrative identities are not to be understood as constructed by 
atomised individuals, but as largely constituted by the social groups to which they belong. 
Although coherence of identity and practices presumes reflexivity on part of the 
individual, this reflexivity in turn presumes spatio-temporal continuity of social practices. 
Reflexivity should thus be understood as the monitored character of the ongoing flow of 
daily life, in which purposive individuals have reasons for their behaviour and are capable 
of discursive elaboration on these reasons. However, this emphasis on people's reflexivity 
should not amount to an overly individualistic conceptualisation of identity. Identities are 
not constructed within a social vacuum. The duality of identity construction is a specific 
case of Giddens's (1984) notion of the duality of structure. "Structure is the medium and 
outcome of the conduct it recursively organizes; the structural properties ofsocial systems 
do not exist outside of action but are chronically implicated in its production and 
reproduction" (374). Elaboration on the construction of identities as a specific case of this 
duality of structure is the prime objective of this sub-section. 
First, it is important to acknowledge that whatever social and material conditions 
may shape people's identities, these conditions only exist in so far as they are chronically 
reproduced in people's practices over time and space. Whether as a result of reflexively 
grasped narrative identities or as a more or less unintended consequence of their 
behavioral choices, people reconstitute the structural properties of society in enacting their 
practices. These structural properties never operate entirely independent from whatever 
reasons people may have for their behaviour. Knowledgeable and capable people draw 
upon and reproduce these properties in the course of daily life. They only exist in their 
instantiations in people's practices. So, current car-driving practices are of course 
profoundly influenced by the fact that private ownership of a car is the social norm. This 
7 This sub-section by-and-large follows the argument in Giddens, 1984. 
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norm is also crystallised in society's physical infrastructure. Nevertheless, people always 
have the possibility to choose other means of transport. Once enough significant people 
start to choose otherwise, this will necessarily have its consequences for the reproduction 
of the prevailing social norms and physical infrastructure. 
Daily life always involves some autonomy of people's behavioral choices, no matter 
how conditioned these choices may be by the structural properties of society. Each 
individual always has a certain integrity in his or her own behavioral choices and identity, 
no matter how much he or she is submitted to social constitution. This autonomy is 
characterised by the capability to have acted otherwise. Autonomy refers to people's 
capability of making whatever behavioral choices. Autonomy thus depends on people's 
capability to make a difference to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events. It 
logically involves power as a transformative capacity, as the capability to bring about 
intended consequences of behaviour. This power is the medium for the realisation of 
autonomy, freedom or emancipation. 
The duality of structure implies that people not so much construct identities and 
practices, but rather continuously reconstruct them in expressing narratively organised 
selfs. In and through the enactment of their practices people reproduce the social and 
material conditions that made these practices possible in the first place. These conditions 
are drawn upon in the production and reproduction of people's practices. Although social 
continuity does not depend on the practices of any particular individual, society would 
nevertheless cease to exist when all singular-constituting practices disappeared. People's 
identities simultaneously draw upon and reproduce the structural properties of society. 
These properties are produced and reproduced in social interaction. Hence, the 
routinisation of behaviour is one of the prime expressions of the duality of structure in the 
continuity of social life. The daily traffic jams around major Dutch cities could, for 
instance, be seen as expressing this routinisation under a negative sign. The crystallisation 
of people's routines in the structural properties of commuter traffic then makes sense of 
people's choice to take the car at the same time of day over and over again. Another, more 
positive, interpretation would argue that people use the tranquillity of commuter routines 
as a protective cocoon to escape the exceedingly high demands of daily life in 
contemporary affluent societies. 
The very moment of production of behaviour is also one of reproduction under the 
social and material conditions of daily life. On the one hand structural properties have no 
existence independent from individual practices. On the other hand these practices 
continuously produce unintended consequences. These unintended consequences are the 
conditions for people's prospective practices in a feedback fashion. Society only exists by 
virtue of spatio-temporal continuity in social reproduction. This continuity, in turn, only 
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exists in and through people's reflexively organised practices. Thus, social constraints only 
exist when people recognise and act upon them. They only exist in their instantiations in 
people's practices. The structural properties of society always operate through people's 
routines, motives and reasons, thus establishing conditions and consequences of behaviour 
that also affect the behavioral options of others. This is, for instance, quite obvious when 
the acceleration of transport and social life, exemplified in ever faster cars, asks for more 
space. As an unintended consequence this necessarily leaves less space for children 
playing, pedestrians walking, or cyclists biking. Social life is not only an intended product 
of individual choice. It is rather a dialectic interplay between practices and identities in 
which the coherence of people's lifestyles expresses and is expressed in the continuity of 
social life. 
Second, however, the story also holds the other way around. People's positions in 
the wider social order are accompanied by ascribed social identities, which carry a whole 
range of prerogatives and obligations. People have to activate these prerogatives and 
obligations and carry them out. These social identities constitute the role prescriptions 
associated with a specific position in the wider social order. All behaviour is situated 
behaviour, situated in socially constructed space and time. This social context of people's 
behaviour connects even the most intimate aspects of their identities to the broader 
properties of social life. This social order is neither explicable as merely the" sum of 
singular practices, nor fully describable in terms referring to such practices. Society is 
always both enabling and constraining for people's behavioral choices. All practices and 
identities are constructed in social contexts that encompass many aspects the individual 
neither helped to bring about nor has any significant control over. These enabling and 
constraining contexts of practices include the social and material conditions, which were 
appointed as the preferable loci of intervention in a green third way (2.4). With respect to 
car-driving practices they include, for instance, area planning and physical infrastructure. 
Apart from the need to emphasise the duality in the construction of identities, 
another point has to be argued against individualism. Starting from the observation that 
identity and the good life, or lifestyle and morality, are inextricably interconnected, Taylor 
(1989a) argues that to know your identity is a species of knowing where you stand in the 
social order. People's identities are largely constituted by their commitments and 
identifications, which provide the frames of reference in determining what is good, 
valuable, or ought to be done. Any conceptualisation of identity that perceives of 
individuals as free from all social bonds spells an individual in the grip of an appalling 
identity crisis. People have narrative identities reflexively constructed in their lifestyles, 
but perhaps even more important is that significant others recognise these narratives as 
meaningful representations of the self: "One is a self only among other selves" (35). 
34 
People's identities can never be fully described without any reference to these others. 
People construct their identities by defining where they speak from: the family tree, the 
social order, the system of social statuses and functions, or the intimate relations to loved 
ones. No individual has an identity on his or her own. People only have identities in 
relation to significant others. The full construction of people's identities and lifestyles 
involves more or less explicit references to a constituting social group. Speeding in a 
convertible could, for instance, never symbolise a masculine and restrained identity 
without significant others, who construct and reconstruct this symbolic meaning of 
speeding practices. 
The narrative conceptualisation of lifestyle and identity should not deny the social 
character of the practices in which people engage. These practices form the materials for 
the construction of people's identities. People reproduce and transform the social order in 
their identities. They reconstruct the continuity of social practices, instead of constructing 
a new social order from the blue. All behaviour is constructed and reconstructed in social 
practices, carried in the flow of daily life. This implies that any strategy for government 
intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles that does not give due credit to the social 
character of people's practices and identities is in conceptual trouble. Proposals that aim at 
adjusting isolated practices without regard of the social context of these practices should 
immediately be discredited for applying an inadequate ontology of identity. This, of 
course, does not forswear the pursuit of Popperian social piecemeal engineering in 
consumer-oriented environmental policy-making. 
3.3 
Citizens, Consumers or Citizen-Consumers 
One final conceptual issue needs to be addressed before the analysis can shift towards a 
spatio-temporally contingent characterisation of lifestyles and identities in contemporary 
affluent societies. This conceptual issue refers to the modernist distinction between citizen 
and consumer, which at least dates back to the eighteenth and nineteenth century 
distinction between bourgeois and citoyen (cf. Marx & Engels, 1972; Hegel, 1996; 
Rousseau, 1998) and has tainted philosophy and the social sciences ever since. Therefore, 
it seems wise to devote a separate section on the matter, in particular because the 
distinction still informs the public environmental debate. Many environmentalist critiques 
of consumerist tendencies in contemporary affluent societies adopt this clear-cut 
distinction between citizens and consumers, as if these terms don't refer to the same 
people. After the conceptual analysis in the preceding section on lifestyles as inextricably 
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interconnected narrative identities and social practices (3.2), it will not be much of a 
surprise that such critiques are conceptually flawed. Therefore, this section suggests 
bridging this unfruitful gap by introducing the public-private hybrid notion of the citizen-
consumer. Although the citizen-consumer is not a Latourian (1994) nature-culture hybrid, 
the reasons to introduce this hybrid are similar. The purification of the modernist 
distinction between citizens and consumers (or public and private, nature and culture) 
obscures more than it clarifies. It obscures because an initially analytical distinction 
receives an ontological, reified status. 
Bauman (1987) elucidates the distinction between citizens and consumers when he 
tells the story of capitalist markets transforming people into atomised consumers. In this 
transformation process citizens' autonomy is supposed to become subordinated to market-
defined and market-oriented consumptive freedom. This impoverished picture of the 
consumer would effectively postpone, or even remove, from the agenda the need to come 
to grips with the project of citizens' autonomy by emphasising the satisfaction of utilitarian 
needs in the consumption of goods. In the case of car driving this transformation seems to 
amount to an excessive individualisation and acceleration of transport, and a loss of 
indolence, tranquillity and solidarity. Bauman suggests that retailing citizens' autonomy, 
identity and authenticity to where they belong could reverse the removal of these values 
by market dominion in contemporary affluent societies, i.e. returning them to the sphere of 
public debate among autonomous citizens. 
Sagoff (1988) uses a similar distinction when he argues that the two roles diverge 
that much that the respective reasons for people's behavioral choices may support 
incommensurable narrative threads. As consumers people are exclusively concerned with 
their private interests, i.e. the pursuit of satisfying utilitarian needs. As citizens they are 
primarily concerned with the public interest, i.e. people see themselves as members of a 
political community and engage in public debates on normative issues. According to 
Sagoff, for instance, strategies for government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles 
are to be proposed exclusively on the basis of the latter normative positions of citizens and 
not on the utilitarian preferences of consumers. This government intervention should be 
about an open public debate on the normative objective of sustainable development, rather 
than about the pursuit of hedonistic preferences. Thus, environmental policy should only 
involve people in their role as citizens and not in their role as consumers (see 2.2 for a 
quite similar argument). Hence, the inter-personal social dilemma in the case of car 
driving (it benefits the individual motorist at the expense of spatio-temporally distanced 
others) is translated into an intra-personal dilemma between people's divergent roles. 
Keat (1994) offers a quite convincing critique on such talking about citizens and 
consumers as if these two terms don't refer to the same people. Starting from the 
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observation that good reasons seem to exist to question any straightforward appeal on 
people's eco-conscious values as the basis for environmental policy, he suggests to 
acknowledge the importance of consumption in contemporary affluent societies. These 
societies show a "widespread, shared belief in the value of consumption for everyone, a 
belief that what can be achieved through consumption is at least part of'the good life for 
humans', and hence that 'the good society' is one that provides ample opportunities for 
people to enjoy these benefits, and indeed to an ever-increasing extent" (342). People's 
narrative identities, thus, consist partly in their ability to consume. Consumption is not just 
something people pursue for utilitarian reasons, it is also a major element in the shared 
values of contemporary affluent societies. 
The value of consumption and the value of nature and the environment could be 
incommensurable, but that is not primarily because people value consumption as 
consumers and nature and the environment as citizens. People value both consumption and 
the natural environment as citizens and as consumers. Incommensurabilities between these 
two value thus tend to arise in both roles. The recent upheaval of a plurality of so-called 
consumer concerns about agro-food production processes signals these rather limited 
merits of drawing a strict distinction between people's roles as consumers and citizens 
respectively (cf. Brom, 2000). People's consumerist preference for, for instance, speeding 
in a convertible will probably not be irrelevant for their normative stance in a public 
debate on new physical infrastructure as a citizen. On the other hand, people's appreciation 
of nature and the environment as a citizen is quite likely to influence their choice for a 
certain means of transport as a consumer. 
A tension may arise between the value of consumption and the value of nature and 
the environment in people's narrative identities, and such tension would not be surprising 
in view of the almost infinite pluralisation of behavioral options in contemporary affluent 
societies. This tension may be regrettable but it does not have much to do with people's 
divergent roles as citizens or consumers. People do not stop to value nature and the 
environment once being a consumer on the market, and they do not stop to have utilitarian 
preferences once discussing the public good of nature and the environment as a citizen. 
This should be reason enough to embrace the term citizen-consumer to highlight that 
people are public-private hybrids. Now that this final conceptual issue is settled, the 
analysis can shift to a spatio-temporally contingent characterisation of lifestyles in 
contemporary affluent societies. 
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3.4 
Reflexive Modernisation 
The narrative turn in conceptualising identity is not independent from a specific spatio-
temporal context, since the processes of globalisation, individualisation and 
detraditionalisation profoundly influence it. The preceding analysis (3.2) might have 
suggested a rather static picture of identities and overly emphasised the almost infinite 
plurality of behavioral options in contemporary affluent societies. Therefore, this section 
starts to remedy this one-sidedness by first paying due attention to the profound influence 
of globalisation, individualisation and detraditionalisation on the specific characteristics of 
lifestyles and identities in contemporary affluent societies (3.4.1). Second, some order will 
be constructed in people's apparently infinite plurality of behavioral options. People's 
behavioral choices will appear to come in package deals (3.4.2). 
3.4.1 
Globalisation, Individualisation and Detraditionalisation3 
Globalisation is one of the major processes with a profound influence on the constitution 
of people's identities under reflexive modern conditions. It can be defined as: "the 
intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way 
that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa" 
(Giddens, 1990; 64). Globalisation refers to the intersection of presence and absence, the 
interlacing of social events and relations at distance with local practices. The local and the 
global have become inextricably mtertwined in the current era. Current car driving 
practices, for instance, on the one hand profoundly influence the lives of spatio-temporally 
distanced others through their contribution to global warming by entitling C 0 2 . On the 
other hand, the oil crisis of the early 1970s quite dramatically showed the influence of 
distant events on people's here-and-now mobility. Thus, globalisation connects people to 
large-scale systems as part of dialectical processes of change at both the local and the 
global poles. It involves an intrusion of distant events into daily life that establishes a 
single world where none existed before, i.e. a world where nobody is outside. This 
intrusion of distance into local practices radically changes the world. Although everyone 
lives a local life, the world has become truly global. 
8 This sub-section is primarily based on Giddens's account of reflexive modernisation (Giddens, 
1990,1994a & 1994b). 
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People contribute to social influences with global consequences in constructing their 
identities, no matter how local their specific contexts of behaviour. These globalising 
influences are directly bound up with far-reaching changes in the tissue of daily life. Even 
changes in the most intimate aspects of people's lives are directly tied up with the 
establishment of social relations of an ever-widening scope. Not only local communities 
but also the most intimate features of people's lives and identities become inextricably 
intertwined with social relations of indefinite spatio-temporal extension. Thus, 
globalisation truly is an in-here phenomenon, directly bound up with the conditions of 
daily life. It affects, or is dialectically related to, the most intimate aspects of people's 
lives. Remember, for instance, the physician who bought a brand new convertible as a 
libidinal attempt of identity construction, and try to imagine its environmental 
repercussions. 
An important aspect of globalisation is the disembedding of social relations from 
local practices and their reconstruction across indefinite spatio-temporal spans. 
Disembedding mechanisms take things out of control by specific individuals or groups, 
and prise social relations free from the hold of specific locales. Thus, place becomes 
thoroughly interpenetrated by disembedding mechanisms that recombine local practices 
into spatio-temporal relations of ever-widening scope. Expert systems provide the prime 
disembedding mechanisms and have come to play an increasingly pervasive role in the 
construction of daily life. People have to construct their identities amidst a plurality of 
behavioral options provided by these expert systems. Expert knowledge is reappropriated 
by lay people and routinely applied in the course of their daily practices. They reflexively 
and selectively incorporate many elements of expert knowledge in their daily behaviour 
{cf. Beck, 1986). Without scientific experts people would not know a thing about, for 
instance, the contribution of their car-driving practices to environmental problems like 
acid rain and climate change. The accessibility of expert knowledge is thus an important 
structural feature of the conditions in which people have to choose their means of 
transport. 
Individualisation has a profound influence on the constitution of people's identities. 
Individualisation implies that individuals have to achieve a certain autonomy in their 
behavioral choices as a condition of being able to go on in daily life and to construct their 
identities (see 4.3.1). This individualisation is also crystallised in the technological 
construction of society's most favoured conveyances. It is rather obvious that a private car 
facilitates a more individualised form of mobility than public transport could offer. 
Identity and style become as evident markers of social differentiation as people's 
professional position in contemporary affluent societies. Whereas consumerism already 
broke away from the modernist idea of work as the standard bearer of identity, it still 
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expressed the need to construct an identity in a distorted and impoverished way. Under the 
individualised conditions of reflexive modernisation identity and happiness are rather 
promoted by security, self-respect, opportunities for self-actualisation, and the ability to 
love. The pursuit of happiness may even be seen as a distinctive universalisable value of 
contemporary affluent societies. The construction of identity has become quintessentially 
about the question of whether people experience their relation to social and material 
conditions as incapacitating or rather as generating opportunities for self-enhancement or 
self-renewal. 
Individualisation only has this profound influence on people's identities under the 
further condition of detraditionalisation. The notions of identity and lifestyle only take on 
particular significance under reflexive modern conditions when tradition loses its hold and 
daily life is reconstituted in terms of a dialectical interplay between the local and the 
global. The notions of lifestyle and narrative identity have quite different meanings when 
applied to traditional or modernist societies. Detraditionalisation means that the question 
of 'How shall I live?' has to be answered as an intrinsic part of people's day-to-day 
behavioral choices. It stems from the disembedding mechanisms that propel social life 
away from the hold of pre-established precepts or practices. In a thoroughly post-
traditional order an mdefinite range of possibilities presents itself, not merely as a set of 
behavioral options but also as an aspect of the principal openness of social life. 
Detraditionalisation implies an acceleration of people's reflexivity. Practical 
knowledge becomes vitally important in a detraditionalising society because reflexive 
people need this knowledge to filter all sorts of expert knowledge. The excavation of local 
contexts of behaviour and the disembedding of behavioral choices thus imply processes of 
intensified detraditionalisation. This is probably the first time in history that people live in 
thoroughly post-traditional societies as both the condition and the outcome of their very 
reflexivity. In such detraditionalised societies behavioral choices have to be made on the 
basis of a more or less continuous reflection on the conditions of daily life. Therefore, 
routinisation becomes meaningless unless it is geared to ongoing processes of reflection. 
To end up in traffic jams day after day lacks any meaning, unless the motorist is capable 
of discursive elaboration on the reasons to stick to his or her car-driving routines no matter 
what inconveniences accompany those routines. 
The processes of globalisation, individualisation and detraditionalisation radically 
alter the balance between traditional and modernising tendencies in the constitution of 
people's lifestyles and identities. These processes imply that lifestyles and identities 
become open for ongoing critique and public deliberation. People can no longer rely on 
traditionally constituted definitions of reality, on religious norms, or on self-evident 
identities. More and more people have no choice but to take responsibility for the 
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construction of lifestyles and identities on their own resources, since faith and routine 
loose their hold on culture, social life and identity construction. All convictions, social and 
material conditions, and narrative identities need to be discussed with arguments and 
counter-arguments in the absence of any absolute truths (Keulartz, 1987). Under reflexive 
modern conditions individual motorists have to be ready to discuss their car-driving 
practices at any moment in time. 
3.4.2 
Plurality of Lifestyles 
Cultural theory might offer the labelling tools for constructing some order in the 
apparently infinite plurality of people's behavioral and lifestyle options in contemporary 
affluent societies. Douglas's (1996) book on consumption is particularly enlightening in 
this respect. Her argument starts with the assertion that distinction is the foremost aspect 
of consumption, which reveals people as individuals with a coherent identity. People's 
consumptive practices are continuously and pervasively inspired by the wish to distinguish 
oneself from others. The basic question people have to answer is the question of what kind 
of society they would like to live in. Choosing consumer goods is thus also choosing 
between cultures: choosing one and rejecting the others. Buying a brand new convertible 
is, for instance, not only a choice for a certain kind of car, not even merely a choice for a 
culture of speed and comfort. Above all, it is the rejection of, and hostility towards, a 
culture of tranquillity. 
Douglas's argument is heavily inspired by Bourdieu's 'Distinction' (1984). Bourdieu 
argues that people distinguish themselves in and through the distinctions they make 
between the bold and the beautiful, the distinguished and the vulgar, the sustainable and 
the non-sustainable, and so on. Through these distinctions people establish a coherence 
that unites their behavioral choices in apparently quite different practices like car-driving, 
eating food, or going on holidays. Both people's capability to construct distinguishable 
practices and their capability to distinguish and appreciate these practices, i.e. their taste, 
constitute contemporary affluent societies as universes of lifestyles. People's practices are 
both the medium and outcome of constructing coherent narrative identities and lifestyles, 
and inherently distinct from the practices that constitute other lifestyles or identities. 
Identity is continuously constructed and reconstructed in and through distinction, and 
people's practices owe their stylistic affinity to the fact that they are (re)constructed within 
the same narrative identities. Taste is thus the one constitutive aspect of a lifestyle as a 
coherent set of behavioral choices in, for instance, travelling, eating or making love. Taste 
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is the basis of the mutual adjustment of people's practices, and of a distinctive lifestyle or 
identity (Bourdieu, 1989). 
Bourdieu holds it that the main distinction in consumption is between practices 
distinguished by their rarity (the practices of the economically and culturally richest 
people) and practices identified as vulgar, easy and common (the practices of the poorest 
people). The basis of all differences in consumptive practices is this distinction between 
the tastes of luxury and freedom and the tastes of necessity. People cannot be neutral on 
these tastes. What for the one is shameless and slovenly, is straightforward and 
unpretentious for the other. This distinction is also "reflected in the two relations to the 
natural world, on the one hand the taste for natural, wild nature, on the other, organized, 
signposted, cultivated nature" (Bourdieu, 1984). 
Douglas, however, does not find this story satisfactory at all. She argues that the 
choice between lifestyles is neither a choice among an infinite plurality of options, nor a 
choice between only two options. Douglas erects a scheme with on the Y-axe the degree to 
which people believe that society is, or should be, divided in rather strict or static social 
positions (= grid). On the X-axe she puts the degree to which people orient themselves and 
feel that they belong to a constitutive social group (= group). She believes that these two 
variables could explain most people's behavioral choices in daily life, if put into a matrix 
with four cells. Although Douglas puts forward the totalising, and dogmatic, claim that 
these cells are entirely exclusive and present the whole plurality of lifestyles in 
contemporary affluent societies, a more modest option would be to perceive of these styles 
as ideal-types in the Weberian sense of the word. 
Douglas labels the resulting ideal-types as, first, the lifestyle of the 'individualist' (= 
low group, low grid). This would be a lifestyle of competitive open networks, sporty, arty, 
risky styles of entertainment, and a freedom to change commitments. The physician 
speeding in a convertible may count as an example of this style. Second, the lifestyle of 
the 'hierarchisf (= high group, high grid). This would be a lifestyle of formality, adhering 
to established traditions and institutions, and maintaining a stable network of family and 
old friends. Third, the lifestyle of the 'egalitarian' (= high group, low grid). This would be 
a lifestyle against formality, pomp and artifice, rejecting authoritarian institutions, 
preferring simplicity, frankness and intimate friendship. Fourth, the eclectic, withdrawn 
but unpredictable lifestyle of the 'fatalist' (= low group, high grid). This is the lifestyle of a 
free isolate or, in a negative frame of reference, an alienated individual. The slovenly type 
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of woman shuffling in her kitchen may count as an example of this style (see 2.1).9 
Douglas holds it that those four distinct lifestyles persist in contemporary affluent societies 
because they rest on incommensurable organisational principles or narratives. 
Now, while the vivacity of the Dutch public debate on government intervention in 
non-sustainable lifestyles suggests that people have become truly interested in the 
preservation of nature and the environment, one no longer needs to wonder why this 
interest has had no uniform consequences for people's practices. Cultural theory shows 
that 'individualists' will claim that their identity is robust as long as they are not under 
stifling controls. Their true identity is to be free, and they will suffer if constrained. On the 
other hand, the lifestyle of 'fatalists' is merely maintained by an uninvolved eclecticism, 
whereas 'hierarchists' will argue that it is their true identity to live in organised social 
groups. Finally, 'egalitarians' will hold it that the same unequal structural features of 
society that cause the deterioration of nature and the environment also offend their 
identities. It is cultural distinction between these four lifestyles that explains much of the 
diversity and coherence in people's consumptive practices, including their environmental 
repercussions. 
It might seem obvious to believe that caring for nature and the environment and 
caring for social equality would necessarily go hand-in-hand. Although this may be true, it 
should not be forgotten that consumerism, now criticised for its deteriorating 
repercussions on nature and the environment, could only take hold once enough people 
were liberated from sumptuary laws and traditionally routinised patterns of consumption. 
Consumerism started as a liberation process, in which individuals came to have their own 
narratives and lifestyles. Thus, consumerism is not in itself irrational. What would be 
irrational, is when the very people who voice concerns about nature and the environment 
also demand private transport in and around town. 
Once you try to map the previously analysed positions in the Dutch public debate on 
government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles (see chapter 2) in a cultural theory 
perspective, you will soon notice that things are not as simple as they may seem to be. 
Whereas Douglas seems quite ready to argue that all environmentalists are but egalitarians 
in disguise (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), the dominant communicative and economic 
strategies only seem to be intelligible within hierarchist or individualist frames of 
reference respectively. Perhaps these divergent empirical findings could be explained in 
terms of the different spatio-temporal contexts of the respective analyses. Notwithstanding 
9 Schulze (1997) develops a similar but far more empirically grounded characterisation of 
people's lifestyles in contemporary affluent societies. However, in analytical terms his scheme does 
not add much to the simplicity of Douglas's matrix. 
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this explanation, the initial absence of egalitarian contributions to the Dutch public debate 
is the more reason for elaboration on a green third way of government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles (see chapter 6). This initial absence of egalitarian contributions to the 
Dutch public debate might be explained by people's fear that egalitarianism implies a 
return to the massive social control in the dreadful tea-cosy culture of the 1950s 
(Kunneman, 1996). Douglas seems to think that egalitarianism necessarily amounts to 
such a narrow-minded and oppressive culture indeed, but wouldn't it be a major challenge 
to look for novel, reflexive modern forms of egalitarianism (cf. Lash, 1994). This updated 
egalitarianism should, for instance, perceive of non-sustainable car-driving practices as a 
negative aspect of an otherwise positive individualisation, and hence as a reason to take up 
the challenge of pursuing the public good of sustainable development. Nowadays, an 
unbridgeable gap appears to exist between this public good and people's private practices, 
but constructing novel, egalitarian social groups might bridge this gap. These groups could 
address people on their own creativity and responsibility in constructing sustainable 
lifestyles. However, this emphasis on the challenge of developing an egalitarian 
perspective on government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles should not be 
understood as an exclusive project. In contemporary pluralistic societies the most 
important thing is to leave ample room for a heterogeneity of strategies and the elaboration 
of novel forms of reflexive egalitarianism serves this objective. 
3.5 
Conclusion 
The Dutch public debate on government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles 
appeared to be highly confused about a meaningful conceptualisation of the terms lifestyle 
and identity (see chapter 2). Since conceptual clarification on these matters of identity and 
lifestyle is necessary for an eventual justification of government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles, this chapter tried to answer the question of whether a narrative 
conceptualisation of identity and lifestyle would contribute to such clarity. It also tried to 
investigate what implications for a green third way of government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles would accompany such a narrative conceptualisation. 
First, it has been made perfectly clear that lifestyles are to be conceptualised as 
inextricably interconnected narrative identities and reflexive practices. A certain coherence 
across people's divergent practices is necessary for the maintenance of a reasonably stable 
sense of identity. A narrative establishes this coherence. The construction and 
reconstruction of narrative unity in people's lifestyles is crucial for people's sense of 
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ontological security amidst an almost infinite plurality of behavioral options. The 
inextricable interconnectedness of narrative identities and reflexive practices in people's 
lifestyles implies that government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles always 
interferes with both practices and identities. Thus, the escape-route of disconnecting 
practices and identities in order to evade the question of justification (see 2.2 & 2.3) is 
closed. 
Furthermore, it has been made clear that a narrative conceptualisation of identity and 
lifestyle does not mean that identity construction is merely about authenticity. Part of 
people's narrative identity is ethical or moral, and thus involves their stance on normative 
issues. However, this ethical dimension of people's identities posed a dilemma; it both 
opens up the space for the government to address people on their non-sustainable practices 
and lifestyles, and severely restricts the government in this very interference because a 
certain amount of autonomy should be respected. Nevertheless, any adjustment of non-
sustainable practices and lifestyles seems to require some moment of discursive attention 
on part of the individual, notwithstanding that people's reflexive awareness of their 
narrative identities is largely carried at the level of practical consciousness in the ongoing 
flow of daily life (3.2.1). 
Next, it was argued that the relation between people's practices and the structural 
properties of society is to be conceived as a specific case of Giddens's notion of the duality 
of structure. The structural context of people's practices and identities is always both 
enabling and constraining for their behavioral choices. Furthermore, the social groups to 
which they belong largely constitute people's practices and identities. This emphasis on 
the duality of structure in people's identity construction, and on the social character of their 
resulting identities, suggests that the social and material conditions of daily life should be 
appointed as the preferable loci of intervention in a green third way of government 
intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles (3.2.2). 
At that stage it was time to emphasise that the distinction between citizens and 
consumers, as if these terms do not refer to the same people, is deceptive. A conflict may 
arise between the value of consumption and the value of nature and the environment, but 
incommensurability between these values does not necessarily have got much to do with 
people's divergent roles as consumers or citizens. Contrary to what many contemporary 
critiques of consumerism seem to hold, consumption is also valued in the public sphere. 
Therefore, the term citizen-consumer was introduced as a conceptual hybrid to bridge the 
unfruitful gap in talking about citizens and consumers as disconnected entities (3.3). 
Then, it had to be made clear that this narrative conceptualisation of identity and 
lifestyle is not logically independent of a specific spatio-temporal context. The processes 
of globalisation, individualisation and detraditionalisation profoundly influence it. 
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Globalisation means that people's here-and-now behaviour influences, and is influenced 
by, spatio-temporally-distanced events. Questions about the non-sustainability of people's 
practices only get their significance in these circumstances of ever increasing spatio-
temporal extension. Individualisation results in the high value of autonomous identity 
construction in contemporary affluent societies. This impact of individualisation on the 
value of autonomy could only come about in the context of a detraditionalising society. 
Detraditionalisation means that tradition looses its hold on people's identities and 
practices, which become open for continuous critique and public deliberation, for instance 
with respect to their environmental repercussions (3.4.1). 
Finally, it was argued that, despite people's apparently infinite plurality of 
behavioral options in contemporary affluent societies, these options appear to come in 
package deals. The four distinguished package deals, or lifestyles, in turn, quite 
surprisingly, neatly matched the four different strategies for government intervention in 
non-sustainable lifestyles in the Dutch public debate (see chapter 2). The elaboration of a 
green third way then appeared to amount to the pursuit of a reflexive modern form of 
egalitarianism, in which novel social groups will have to play a key role in the 
development of sustainable alternatives (3.4.2). 
While this chapter largely had a social theoretical character, it now-and-then touched 
upon the normative issue of autonomy in people's identity construction and its eventual 
repercussions for a justification of government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles. 
Autonomy is one of the main reasons why people think that government intervention in 
non-sustainable lifestyles is a morally problematic issue, and will be the prime subject of 
chapter 4. 
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4 
Autonomy and Public Deliberation 
"Freedom is a lax notion, 
especially for the Dutch" 
(Postbank Commercial) 
4.1 
Introduction 
"Oh Johnny-boy, I'm starving, could we please stop at that hamburger-joint?" my own 
private Pamela asked. How could I resist? "Sure babe, but we've gotta rush, we're 
running late already". I pulled over, stopped at the McDrive and asked for two burgers. 
"Wouldyou like a McProtex, McFibrex or McFungopie?" "What?" I couldn't help asking, 
but I sure wish that I hadn't triggered this guy lecturing: "The McProtex is made by 
Spirulina bacteria, the McFibrex by Fusarium fungi and the McFungopie from 
Leguminous plants. They are environment-friendly, healthy and quite tasty, if 1 may say 
so". "Let's go babe, I simply need a proper pig-meat burger. What do you think?" "No 
worries mate, you could of course also settle for our Mclmmoral, or what we used to call 
a BigMac. But well, it'll cost you an extra quid on top of the price of our regular burgers. 
Eco-tax, you know?" I don't have a clue what he's talking about and, quite frankly, I 
couldn't care less. Anyway, "OK, make it two of those McWhats, McMorons?" 
Mclmmorals, idiot. "Coming, do you want cokes with your burgers? " "Yes, but rush, we've 
gotta catch our plane to Ibiza". 
Science Fiction, Ecotopia? Who knows, may be, but if it were for the engineers of 
the Dutch interdepartmental research programme 'Sustainable Technological 
Development' (STD) this story could be very real indeed by the year 2040. It is known that 
animal husbandry has met severe criticism over the last two or three decades. It has been 
accused of maltreating animals, polluting the natural environment, spoiling rural scenery, 
and contributing to injustice in the global food distribution. All these criticisms and 
accusations were thought to be answered when the STD engineers proposed to develop 
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novel protein foods (NPFs) to replace our piece of meat. The STD engineers reasoned that 
if people converted from meat to these NPFs, animal husbandry for meat production 
would no longer be needed. Hence, all its accompanying problems would disappear as 
well. The only remaining problem seemed to be how to construct an alternative with the 
real meat bite. 
The technological fix in this specific translation of normative choices in agricultural 
practice is fascinating, but this chapter should rather focus on the issue of whether 
government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles could be reconciled with respect for 
people's freedom to follow lifestyles of their own choice. The proposals of the STD 
programme for a government-initiated conversion from meat to NPFs will thus be used to 
illustrate the problems of such reconciliation. In accordance with the rationale of the STD 
programme, this chapter will only focus on a government-initiated conversion from meat 
to NPFs that is motivated by long-term environmental considerations. However, the 
exclusion of animal welfare or global justice issues does not dismiss such issues as 
important reasons for questioning current animal husbandry practices. The question is 
whether the importance of meat consumption for the construction of self-identity in 
contemporary affluent societies is reason enough for not tolerating any interference with 
people's freedom to eat meat. In other words, this chapter will pay specific attention to the 
role of the government in liberal-democratic societies, and thus to the reciprocal relation 
between citizen-consumers and the government in the formation and execution of 
environmental policy. 
In addressing these issues, a further introduction to the proposals of the STD 
programme for a government-initiated conversion from meat to NPFs will be given first 
(4.2). The subsequent section will then reflect on the question of why government 
intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles is a morally problematic issue in contemporary 
liberal-democratic societies. The answer to this question is to be found in the need to 
respect people's autonomy in following their own lifestyles, people's freedom from 
interference with their consumptive preferences. This notion of autonomy will get a 
specific political liberal interpretation (4.3), which emphasises individual freedom of 
choice (4.3.1), embraces governmental neutrality and anti-perfectionism (4.3.2), accepts 
harm, justice and rationality as freedom-limiting principles (4.3.3), and sees public 
information and financial incentives as possibly legitimate policy instruments (4.3.4). 
However, further reflection will show that the anti-perfectionist stance of political 
liberalism rests on incoherent, or even false, premises. A modest perfectionist, though 
otherwise still liberal, position will be defended to remedy this flaw of the political liberal 
frame of reference (4.4). Finally, the liberal frame of reference needs to be left altogether 
to remedy a blind spot of liberalism. Whereas political liberalism rightly emphasises the 
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need to safeguard people's freedom from interference by others or the government, it 
forgets about the other side of the coin. A qualitatively symmetrical account of the proper 
relation between government and citizen-consumers in contemporary affluent societies 
should also address the question of how people could be enabled to participate in the 
formation and execution of the objectives and instruments of environmental policy. Here, 
focus will be on the Habermasian idea of a deliberative democracy as a procedural 
approach in which extensive public deliberation supplements the parliamentary bodies of 
representative democracies (4.5). At that stage, it should be possible to draw conclusions 
on the preferable division of responsibilities between government and citizen-consumers 
in shaping sustainable lifestyles (4.6). 
4.2 
Novel Protein Foods 
In 1993 the Dutch government launched the 5-year interdepartmental research programme 
'Sustainable Technological Development' (STD). Part of the STD research programme 
was directed at achieving a sustainable food production, i.e. food production without 
reduction of biodiversity, without accumulation of waste, and with a minimal use of space, 
energy and resources. This objective was further operationalised as the attempt to reduce 
the environmental impact of food production (I) by a factor of two in the year 2040. 
Current trends in population growth (P) and growing affluence (A) imply that 
environmental metabolism (= environmental impact per unit of affluence)(M) needs to be 
reduced by a factor of twenty to achieve this objective (I = P x A x M). According to the 
research programme current Dutch food production is non-sustainable in at least the 
following respects: 1) it wastes manure and causes eutrophication; 2) it pollutes soil and 
water; and 3) it uses non-renewable energy and resources. It is known that animal 
husbandry causes the majority of the environmental impacts of food production, e.g. it 
wasted 78.8 million kilograms phosphate and 142 million kilograms ammonia in 1996. 
Nevertheless, ninety percent of all meals contains meat, resulting in an annual meat 
consumption of 88.7 kilograms per person1 0. Meat is thus still the most important source 
of protein in our diets. 
Therefore, the engineers of the STD research programme proposed to develop novel 
protein foods (NPFs) to replace our piece of meat. These NPFs are protein containing 
products made on the basis of (bio-engineered) vegetable substances or microorganisms. 
1 0 Figures from the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (1997). 
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The production of NPFs is supposed to use less resources and energy and to cause less 
pollution. Thus, the environmental impact of NPFs would be a factor of five to thirty 
lower compared with the impact of meat production. The STD engineers did not know 
whether people would be willing to eat these NPFs instead of their piece of meat. They 
nonetheless guessed that it should be possible to achieve a conversion of five percent by 
the year 2005 and of forty percent by the year 2040. This would amount to an annual NPF 
production of 300,000 tonnes. With this prospect in mind they set out to develop specific 
NPFs with the rather prosaic names of Protex, Fibrex and Fungopie. The STD engineers 
used modern biotechnology to raise the cost-effectiveness of the developed NPFs, which 
resulted in an estimated cost reduction of twenty to sixty percent compared with meat 
production. Although the STD engineers acknowledged that people pay attention to both 
price and taste in choosing between meat and NPFs, they nonetheless thought that this 
need not imply that NPFs should also taste like meat. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that, 
whereas meat consumption has certain distinctive qualities, the market prospects of NPFs 
are adversely affected by largely negative emotional valuations. The research programme 
therefore concluded that it is necessary to change these negative valuations by informing 
people about the objective qualities of NPFs: they are tasty, healthy and easy to prepare 
(DeKuijere/a/., 1997). 
Vegetarians tend to take the credo 'You are what you eat' quite literally and accuse 
non-vegetarians of being beasts, but a somewhat different interpretation of the relation 
between meat consumption and self-identity seems to be more promising. According to 
such an interpretation meat consumption is one of the practices in which people construct 
their self-identities and distinguish themselves from others. That is probably the reason 
why any interference with practices of meat consumption is such a precarious issue. This 
interference is not only about interfering with people's consumptive choices, but also 
about matters of self-identity and lifestyle. Furthermore, eating meat, just like car driving 
and going on holidays by air, is one of those practices that were reserved for the upper 
class in the 1950s and 1960s and have become wthin reach of even the lowest strata of 
contemporary affluent societies. Eating meat has become a leading thread in many 
contemporary narratives of self-identity. To put it bluntly, people express their self-
identities and lifestyles in their burger (Giddens, 1991)(see 3.2.1). 
Some scholars wish to question the importance of meat consumption for people's 
self-identities and lifestyles (cf. Rippe, 2000). However, you have to be sociologically 
disabled to think that a full account of people's preferences for meat or vegetarian dishes 
could be given in exclusively nutritional terms. You really should not need to argue for the 
inclusion of socio-cultural dispositions in understanding such preferences (Bourdieu, 
1984; Douglas, 1996): "[FJor humans to meet their need for food is not solely a matter of 
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consuming a certain necessary minimum bundle of nutrients, but it is a matter of 
collecting, preparing, and socially consuming what are culturally recognized as foods 
according to the customs and standards of the people involved. So, through participating 
in one and the same social practice, people affirm and reproduce their cultural identities 
and meet their nutritional requirements" (Benton, 1999; 205). 
4.3 
Political Liberalism 
Respect for people's freedom to follow their own self-identities, visions of the good life or 
consumptive practices is one of the core values in contemporary liberal-democratic 
societies. Therefore, any government intervention in this freedom, for instance by denying 
people the right to their piece of meat, needs to be justified by sound arguments. Political 
liberalism, with Rawls as its most prominent representative and Berlin as an early 
forerunner, both promises to become the dominant moral philosophy in contemporary 
affluent societies and is preoccupied with this respect for people's freedom. Therefore, one 
better starts by spelling out political liberalism's main line of thought when looking for 
such arguments and their implications for a government-initiated conversion from meat to 
novel protein foods. 
4.3.1 
Individual Freedom of Choice 
Political liberalism's main line of argument about the need to respect individual autonomy 
starts by acknowledging the fact of pluralism. Contemporary affluent societies are, and 
will probably continue to be, characterised by a plurality of lifestyles, visions of the good 
life and consumptive preferences, e.g. people hold on to a plurality of views on and 
practices of omnivorous, piscarían, vegetarian and vegan diets (Newholm, 2000). Thus, 
the first crucial assumption in the Rawlsian political liberal argument to respect individual 
autonomy is that "equal citizens have different and indeed incommensurable and 
irreconcilable conceptions of the good" (Rawls, 1993; 303). The political liberal defence 
of individual autonomy could indeed be seen as a response to this fact of pluralism, to the 
fact that people do and will not agree on how they should live their lives. Liberal-
democratic societies will inevitably and permanently be characterised by a plurality of 
divergent, possibly conflicting, yet reasonable lifestyles and visions of the good life. 
51 
If you do not want to accept this permanent pluralism, coercive forms of government 
intervention would be the only way to ensure common affirmation of one single lifestyle 
or vision of the good life. It is neither clear which lifestyle or vision of the good life could 
apply for such common affirmation in pluralistic societies, nor why people should identify 
with one single such lifestyle or vision anyway. Therefore, political liberalism holds it that 
this pluralism should be accepted as a general fact of life in democratic societies. The only 
alternative for ongoing political conflicts about, and coercive forms of government 
intervention in, the plurality of lifestyles, visions of the good life and consumptive 
preferences in contemporary affluent societies seems to respect the individual freedom of 
choice. Therefore, political liberalism endorses the freedom of choice as its core value to 
remove these highly divisive issues from the political agenda. Ongoing public contention 
of these issues would, after all, necessarily mdermine the social stability of pluralistic 
democracies (Mulhall & Swift, 1992; Van den Brink, 1994a & 1994b). 
At stake is, of course, what Berlin (1969) coined the negative freedom of 
individuals, i.e. their freedom from interference by others or the government. In general, 
political liberals strive for social conditions "in which as many individuals as possible can 
realize as many of their ends as possible, without assessment of the values of these ends as 
such, save in so far they frustrate the purposes of others" (153). Social conditions that 
maximise people's opportunities to follow reasonable lifestyles, visions of the good life 
and consumptive preferences ensure that people are free from any governmental 
constraints on, or intervention in, their choices to do something or not, e.g. people are free 
to choose whether to eat meat or not. This freedom of choice has overriding priority for 
political liberals, and could only be limited for the sake of equal liberties of other people 
(see 4.3.3) and never for perfectionist visions of the good life. However, this freedom from 
governmental interference will only be valuable, when people are also provided with the 
opportunities or freedom to follow their own lifestyles and consumptive preferences 
(Rawls, 1972 & 1993). 
Political liberalism's strong emphasis on the individual freedom of choice is based 
on the assumption that people are above all motivated by their opportunities to frame, 
follow and revise reasonable lifestyles and visions of the good life. People may disagree 
about the way they should live their lives, but they are supposed to share the view that 
everyone should be equally free to choose his or her own way of life. Since people 
acknowledge that they disagree about lifestyles and visions of the good life, they are 
supposed to share the idea that it is in their best interest to be free to frame, follow and 
revise their own way of life. Political liberalism assumes that respect for the individual 
freedom to follow your own lifestyle, vision of the good life and consumptive preferences 
is part of an overlapping consensus in contemporary affluent societies. 
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Coercive forms of government intervention in these lifestyles and visions could never be 
acceptable, since that would imply imposing lifestyles and visions and denying people's 
capacities to choose their own ways of life. In other words, such policies would fail to treat 
people as individuals gifted with reason. Hence, such policies would never find 
justification in the processes of public deliberation that are characteristic for properly 
functioning liberal democracies (see 4.5). Similarly, when people follow lifestyles, visions 
of the good life and consumptive preferences that threaten the freedom of others, these 
same processes of public deliberation will ask them to adjust their lifestyles, visions and 
preferences (Kymlicka, 1990; Mulhall & Swift, 1992; Van den Brink, 1994a). 
Political liberalism's emphasis on the need to respect the individual freedom of 
choice is based on a quite specific idea of what constitutes a person or a self in 
contemporary affluent societies. This is the idea of the autonomous individual for whom 
the freedom to make his or her own choices is more important than the substantial 
contents of these choices, e.g. being able to choose between meat and novel protein foods 
matters more than whatever choice people may make. When Berlin (1969) speaks about 
the positive freedom of individuals, or the freedom to, he refers to this idea of the 
autonomous individual who likes to be in control of his or her own life. Such an individual 
is a self-reflexive, thinking, willing and active person, bearing responsibility for his or her 
choices and able to give these choices discursive expression by referring to a particular 
narrative of self-identity (see 3.2.1). 
Thus, the need to respect the autonomy of choices derives directly from a specific 
view on what constitutes a self, a person, an individual. This autonomy is not only valued 
for its own sake, "but also because being in charge, running our own lives, is for most of 
us linked to a sense of our own worth or dignity or self-respect" (Scoccia, 1990; 323). 
Respect for the autonomy of choices implies enabling people to act instead of being acted 
upon by others or the government. The kernel of this notion of autonomy is the right to 
make choices and "the most basic autonomy-right is the right to decide how one is to live 
one's life, in particular how to make the critical life-decisions" (Feinberg, 1986; 54). This 
right could only be restricted when people's choices harmed or limited the freedom of 
others (see 4.3.3). Apart from that, government intervention in autonomous and reasonable 
choices is always a violation of the individual freedom to follow your own lifestyle, vision 
of the good life or consumptive preferences. The need to respect the autonomy of choices 
implies that others or the government should refrain from any substantial assessment of 
the quality of someone's lifestyle, vision of the good life or consumptive preferences. 
Berlin (1969) explains the idea of a negative freedom also with a spatial metaphor. 
This negative freedom refers to "the area within which the subject... is or should be left to 
do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons" (121-122). 
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Individual freedom is the area within which people can act unobstructed by others or the 
government. Hence, respecting autonomy implies safeguarding a private sphere from 
interference by the government. The big question is of course where the frontier between 
the area of private consumption, or non-interference, and the area of justified public 
interference should be drawn, and whether or not it is right to place meat consumption on 
the public side of that frontier. It might be argued that, whereas such consumptive 
preferences used to be treated as purely private matters, the unintended repercussions of 
meat consumption on the natural environment justifiably move this specific consumptive 
preference to the public side of the frontier. Unfortunately, it is not altogether clear that 
such an argument would not somehow involve veiled perfectionist judgements. However, 
what seems to be beyond question is that a minimal area of non-interference needs to be 
secured to enable people to follow their own self-identities and visions of the good life. 
Interestingly enough, Berlin (1969) spelled out five criteria that could be used as a 
diagnostic test for assessing the extent to which specific policies interfere with the 
individual freedom of choice. This extent depends on: 
"(a) how many possibilities are open to me 
(b) how easy or difficult each of these possibilities is to actualize; 
(c) how important in my plan of life, given my character and circumstances, these 
possibilities are when compared with each other; 
(d) how far they are closed and opened by deliberate human acts; 
(e) what value not merely the agent, but the general sentiment of the society in 
which he lives, puts on the various possibilities" (130). 
At first glance, it seems that a government-initiated conversion from meat to NPFs scores 
negatively on at least the first four criteria of this test: 
a) such a policy aims to reduce consumptive possibilities by the possibility to eat 
meat; or 
b) it at least tries to make this possibility more difficult to actualise; 
c) eating meat is among the most important consumptive preferences in many 
contemporary plans of life; 
d) this policy to close the possibility to eat meat is a deliberate act on part of the 
government. 
The fifth criterion represents a communitarian view that should not be included in a 
political liberal test for assessing the extent to which specific policies interfere with the 
individual freedom of choice. Therefore, the political liberal does not need to ask what 
value the general sentiment of contemporary affluent societies puts on the possibility to eat 
meat. This overall negative assessment seems pretty good reason to be rather suspicious 
about such policies to change consumptive preferences. 
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4.3.2 
Governmental Neutrality and Anti-Perfectionism 
The second crucial assumption in political liberalism's main line of argument is that 
respecting autonomy implies that the government should be neutral between people's 
different lifestyles, visions of the good life and consumptive preferences. Rather than 
forming and executing policies on the basis of the perfectionist ideals that guide people in 
their daily lives, the government should deliberately refrain from using such ideals in the 
construction of its policies. The government should not judge how people ought to live 
their lives, but only provide neutral social and material conditions in which people can 
make their own, possibly conflicting but autonomous, choices. Therefore, the government 
should impartially support the social and material conditions that are necessary for 
everyone's pursuit of his or her lifestyle, vision or preferences. 
The reason for this governmental neutrality is neither that lifestyles and visions of 
the good life are not important, nor that people strive for neutrality in their daily lives. It is 
rather that precisely because daily life is importantly non-neutral and perfectionist that the 
government should be neutral between these styles and visions. It is exactly because 
people highly value their choices that political liberalism objects to the communitarian 
view that the community's way of life should provide the basis for a public ranking of 
people's visions of the good life. The permissibility of people's lifestyles, visions and 
consumptive preferences should not depend on how much they adhere to this common 
good (cf Sandel, 1984; Taylor, 1989a & 1989b; Walzer, 1994). 
Many communitarian critics of the political liberal line of argument ascribe another 
interpretation of governmental neutrality to political liberalism than it self-consciously 
believes to endorse. Therefore, it is important to be clear that the idea that government 
policies should be neutral between different lifestyles and visions of the good life has three 
different versions: 
"1. No political action may be undertaken or justified on the ground that it 
promotes an ideal of the good nor on the ground that it enables individuals to 
pursue an ideal of the good. 
2. No political action may be undertaken if it makes a difference to the likelihood 
that a person will endorse one conception of the good or another, or to his 
chances of realizing this conception of the good, unless other actions are 
undertaken which cancel out such effects. 
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3. One of the main goals of governmental authority, which is lexically prior to 
an other, is to ensure for all persons an equal ability to pursue in their lives 
and promote in their societies any ideal of the good of their choosing" 
(Raz, 1986; 114-115). 
Most communitarians base their critique of political liberalism on the false assumption 
that it endorses either version 1 or version 2 of the neutrality claim, i.e. they assume that 
political liberalism not only aims at neutrality of opportunities but also at neutrality of 
effects. This misunderstanding of the political liberal position implies that communitarian 
critiques aim at the wrong target. Raz, however, rightly ascribes the third version of the 
idea of governmental neutrality to Rawls. Rawls (1993) accepts that this is the version of 
neutrality that he endorses, with one slight ramification: "the state is to secure equal 
opportunity to advance any permissible conception" (193 - emphasis added). He rejects 
the other two versions of the neutrality claim, since they suggest that government policies 
are not to have any effects on which visions of the good life endure and gain adherents 
over time. Rawls acknowledges that such neutrality of effects is a sociological 
impossibility. Furthermore, he restricts the third version to permissible visions of the good 
life, because the government is surely justified in hampering people to follow lifestyles or 
visions that harm other people's opportunities to follow their lifestyles and visions (see 
4.3.3). Hence, environmental policy should not restrict equal opportunities to follow either 
omnivorous or vegetarian diets, unless one of these diets would harm others. 
The Rawlsian interpretation of the third version of the neutrality claim is not that 
different from the first version, because this first version need not aim at neutrality of 
effects. It could define the neutral government as a government "which does not justify its 
actions on the basis of the intrinsic superiority or inferiority of conceptions of the good 
life, and which does not deliberately attempt to influence people's judgement of the value 
of these different conceptions" (Kymlicka, 1990; 205 - emphasis added). Such an 
interpretation of the first version would similarly protect people from government 
initiatives to enforce a vision of the good life on them, e.g. it implies that environmental 
policy should not deliberately favour either omnivorous or vegetarian preferences. 
Another way to say that the government should be neutral between competing 
lifestyles and visions of the good life is that it should be anti-perfectionist in its policies. 
The government should not use perfectionist, or even paternalistic and moralistic, 
arguments to justify its policies, e.g. it should not use ecocentric visions of the good 
environment {cf. De-Shalit, 1995b) to justify a government initiative to promote 
vegetarian diets or have people convert from meat to NPFs. The strongest argument 
against such governmental perfectionism is that "it is an insult to my conception of myself 
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as a human being, determined to make my own life in accordance with my own ... 
purposes" (Berlin, 1969; 157). Governmental perfectionism would distort people's 
autonomy, disrespect their sovereignty, risk to serve vested interests and unfairly harm 
minority visions. Of course, the right to follow your own lifestyle should be limited by the 
boundary set to protect others from harm or injustice (see 4.3.3). Governmental 
perfectionism, however, falsely suggests that the individual freedom could even be limited 
beyond the point where governmental restrictions serve to protect others. It suggests that 
the government may intervene in individual choices on the patronising ground that it 
knows people's good better than they know it themselves (Feinberg, 1986; Kymlicka, 
1989). 
Political liberals, therefore, object to perfectionist policies to change lifestyles, 
visions of the good life or consumptive preferences as intolerable restrictions on the 
individual autonomy. It is not right to use governmental power to repress otherwise 
permissible lifestyles and visions of the good life. Within the limits of justice, lifestyles 
and visions of the good life should not be evaluated on their intrinsic value. Since 
contemporary affluent societies are permanently characterised by a plurality of lifestyles 
and visions of the good life, no perfectionist ideal could be an appropriate ground for 
government intervention. Such pluralistic societies are best governed by policies that do 
not presuppose any particular perfectionist vision of the good life. People should be free to 
choose themselves how they wish to live their lives. 
Political liberalism does not need to object to the truism that people's choices are 
largely constituted by the social group or community to which they belong (see 3.2.2). 
However, it should object to the anachronistic communitarian view that the community's 
vision of the good life should have priority over people's autonomy (cf. Sandel, 1984; 
Taylor, 1989a & 1989b; Walzer, 1994). Political liberalism would rather enable people to 
take a reflexive stance towards their social or communitarian roots. In fact, any serious 
political philosophy should acknowledge the pluralism and reflexivity of people's 
lifestyles and narratives of self-identity in contemporary affluent societies, if it is not to be 
rejected as an anachronistic, conservative or reactionary body of thought (see chapter 3). 
Hence, anti-perfectionism is the only reasonable policy to adopt in view of the plurality of 
lifestyles, visions of the good life and consumptive preferences in contemporary affluent 
societies. The only restriction being that the government is allowed to hamper visions of 
the good life whose pursuit would violate the opportunities of others to follow their 
lifestyles and visions (Mulhall & Swift, 1992; Rawls, 1993)(see 4.3.3). 
Since it is quite difficult, if not impossible, for the government to judge people's 
reasons for making apparently envhorunent-urrfriendly choices like eating meat, a 
government initiative that tries to do so anyway runs the risk of undesirable moralising. 
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However, the political liberal idea that the main governmental responsibility is to provide 
material and social conditions in which a plurality of permissible lifestyles can flourish (cf. 
Brom, 1997) is perfectly in line with the proposals for a green third way of government 
intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles. Such a green third way suggests that, rather than 
by a perfectionist government-initiated conversion from meat to NPFs, environmental 
values are probably best served by a policy focusing on a conversion to organic or other 
more extensive farming practices to counteract the indeed manifold problems of current 
animal husbandry (see chapter 6). 
4.3.3 
Harm, Justice and Rationality 
Political liberals are not entirely naive though. They do acknowledge that no individual 
freedom is possible without constraints, the paradigm case being that no political liberal 
would tolerate the cannibal to follow his or her consumptive preferences. Hence, the need 
to respect individual freedom is restricted to those lifestyles, visions of the good life or 
consumptive preferences that are worthy of people's support (Rawls, 1993). Worthy of 
people's support, what on earth does that mean? In general, political liberals recognise 
three permissible reasons for restricting individual freedom. These reasons are also the 
criteria of when a lifestyle, vision of the good life or consumptive preference counts as 
worthy of people's support. The following analysis of these three reasons does not intend 
to suggest that it is easy to judge whether or not a certain lifestyle is permissible within the 
political liberal framework. This is the more reason to embrace the modesty and restraint 
of an anti-perfectionist stance to the role of the government in pluralistic societies. 
First, the government should restrict individual freedom, if people's choices harmed 
others: the harm principle. So, in the case of a government-initiated conversion from meat 
to novel protein foods things would have been different when meat consumption 
hampered the realisation of other people's visions of the good life. The need to respect 
individual freedom only calls for a respect for choices that do not interfere with the 
freedom of others. Thus, the need to respect individual freedom is constrained by an equal 
respect for the freedom of others. Political liberalism does not endorse the view that 
individual freedom needs respect even when someone's exercise of that freedom harms the 
freedom of others. The government is justified in discriminating against lifestyles and 
visions of the good life whose pursuit would violate the rights of others (Feinberg, 1988; 
Mulhall & Swift, 1992; Brom, 1997). 
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The harm principle secures that people do not harm each other in following their own 
ways of life, but that does not necessarily imply that lifestyles, visions of the good life or 
consumptive preferences will not harm future generations (Kymlicka, 1989). 
Environmental considerations might lead people to suggest that the harm principle could 
be broadened to include the freedom and opportunities of future generations, e.g. harm to 
our offspring might then justify a government-initiated conversion from meat to NPFs. 
However, as soon as otherwise reasonable people seem to disagree on whether or not a 
certain lifestyle or consumptive preference harms our offspring, the government better 
retains its neutrality between the divergent lifestyles and visions of the good life (Jacobs, 
1992). It is not completely out of line to suggest that a government-initiated conversion 
from meat to NPFs could be interpreted as an attempt of certain cultural and economic 
elites to impose their post-materialistic values (Inglehart, 1990) on others. Douglas and 
Ney (1998) show that the abuse of future generations as supposedly neutral witnesses to 
present a case is not unfamiliar in cultural conflicts between social groups in contemporary 
pluralistic societies (see chapter 5). 
Second, political liberalism, or at least its egalitarian branches, accepts that reasons 
of distributive justice could justify government intervention in the individual freedom of 
choice. The idea that a fair distribution of opportunities to follow your own way of life is 
to be safeguarded by the government, the justice principle, sets limits to which ways of life 
are permissible in contemporary pluralistic societies. It implies that people should not be 
allowed to follow lifestyles, visions of the good life or consumptive preferences that 
transgress the boundaries of distributive justice (Rawls, 1993). 
The justice principle was originally formulated to settle issues of distributive justice 
within a fixed spatio-temporal context. However, it could be argued that this spatio-
temporal bias should be abandoned in favour of a spatio-temporally neutral interpretation 
of the principle, i.e. an interpretation that includes distributive justice between generations. 
If people were free to follow their own lifestyles and consumptive preferences without any 
assessment of the repercussions of these styles and preferences on the natural 
environment, this might violate such a spatio-temporally neutral interpretation of the 
justice principle. Therefore, the government is allowed to impose restrictions on people's 
freedom to safeguard future generations from negative repercussions of current lifestyles 
on the natural environment. Such a redefined justice principle might justify a government-
initiated conversion from meat to NPFs, if meat consumption implies that future 
generations will not get their fair share in the use of the natural environment (Achterberg, 
1990; Den Hartogh, 1995; De-Shalit, 1995b; Wissenburg, 1998)(see chapter 5). 
A spatial broadening of the justice principle would be less controversial and could 
also provide sound arguments to question current animal husbandry practices. This spatial 
59 
extension is less controversial, simply because spatially distanced others are real in a sense 
that future generations are not and may never be. They can voice their worries about, for 
instance, the injustice done by western animal husbandry and its massive transportation of 
nutrients around the world. Such worries offer reason enough to justify a government-
initiated conversion to organic or other more extensive animal husbandry practices, if not 
for a government-initiated conversion from meat to NPFs. 
Third, the government does not need to respect people's irrational or unreasonable 
choices. However, political liberals prefer a quite modest interpretation of what counts as a 
rational or reasonable choice, since veiled perfectionist arguments should not be allowed 
to invade their account of rationality. In the political liberal view, the rationality of choices 
mainly depends on the conditions in which people arrive at their choices, e.g. was their 
choice to eat meat based on adequate knowledge about the repercussions of this choice 
and was it arrived at in a properly functioning market? If prevailing social conditions (e.g. 
inadequate information or market failures) hampered people's considered judgement in 
making a specific choice, the government should not need to respect this choice. Contrary 
to the harm and justice principles, the rationality principle does not primarily serve to 
protect others from harm or injustice. This principle intends to protect people from doing 
harm or injustice to themselves. It protects people from the consequences of choices that 
they would not have made, if circumstances hadn't hampered their considered judgement. 
The rationality principle does not protect others, it protects selves (Feinberg, 1986). 
4.3.4 
Public Information and Financial Incentives 
Political liberalism emphasises that the main governmental responsibility is to provide 
material and social conditions in which a plurality of permissible lifestyles can flourish 
(4.3.2). However, its neutral and anti-perfectionist stance leaves ample room to use public 
information and financial incentives in a green third way of government intervention in 
non-sustainable lifestyles. Since the government should also promote the rationality of 
people's choices, it is perfectly reasonable for the government to provide them with 
information on the environmental repercussions of their choices or to use financial 
incentives in case market failures cause prices not to reflect the environmental costs of 
certain choices. 
In fact, people's autonomy is enhanced when they are provided with adequate 
information on significant characteristics of the products with which they fulfil their 
consumptive preferences. It is in people's own best interest that the government requires 
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that "information about harmful and dangerous properties of goods be clearly described 
on the label, or in some other suitable manner" (Rawls, 1993; 364). The availability of 
such information, for instance on the environmental repercussions of animal husbandry 
practices, only helps people to make truly autonomous choices (Rippe, 2000). However, 
the government should be aware that it runs the risk of shifting public information from 
providing information to forms of manipulation that are not acceptable within a political 
liberal frame of reference (Raz, 1986). 
Financial incentives could also help people to make truly autonomous choices, when 
prices do not reflect the environmental costs of certain products. Nothing seems to be 
particularly wrong with the government putting an eco-tax on meat from intensive animal 
husbandry to internalise the environmental costs. Or, even in case of scepticism about the 
adequacy of current environmental scientific knowledge about the repercussions of 
intensive animal husbandry practices, the reasonable political liberal should at least 
acknowledge that the government ought to abandon its repulsive subsidising of non-
sustainable farming practices. 
4.4 
Liberal Perfectionism 
Although the main line of argument of political liberalism certainly looks quite 
reasonable, further reflection shows that political liberalism's anti-perfectionist stance rests 
on false assumptions. Perfectionist liberalism, therefore, aims to repair this flaw in the 
political liberal argument, while remaining a thoroughly liberal body of thought. 
According to such a perfectionist liberalism, with Raz as its most eminent contemporary 
representative, the need to respect individual autonomy is not as neutral between the 
divergent lifestyles, visions of the good life or consumptive preferences in contemporary 
affluent societies as suggested by its political liberal advocates. Autonomy-enhancing 
policies in fact favour those lifestyles and visions that endorse individual autonomy as one 
of their core values. Hence, the emphasis of political liberals on autonomy-enhancing 
policies does not serve a neutral stance. As a matter of fact, none of the nineteenth-century 
founding fathers of modern liberalism ever meant their views to be understood as 
arguments for a neutral or anti-perfectionist government, for a mere modus vivendi. 
The need to respect individual autonomy rather represents liberalism's own 
comprehensive view on how people should live their lives in contemporary affluent 
societies, its own perfectionist vision of what makes a life valuable. "Instead of eschewing 
judgements about what makes a life valuable, liberalism consists essentially of the claim 
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that a good life is one which has been freely or autonomously chosen by the person living 
it" (Mulhall & Swift, 1992; 32). A proper understanding of liberalism, thus, acknowledges 
that it is a perfectionist body of thought, which argues for a substantial view of what it 
means to respect the individual freedom to follow your own lifestyle, vision of the good 
life and consumptive preferences. Liberalism's emphasis on autonomy-enhancing policies 
is perfectionist because it relies on the comprehensive, specifically liberal, vision of the 
good life that gives individual autonomy overriding priority. 
The basic normative assumption of the perfectionist liberal argument about the need 
to respect individual autonomy is that it would be better if people constructed their own 
lives, if they were the authors of their own narratives of self-identity. The liberal emphasis 
on freedom of choice is only valuable because it is a prerequisite for the realisation of this 
ideal of autonomous people who create their own lifestyles through a series of subsequent 
choices from a plurality of valuable options. This perfectionist ideal of the autonomous 
citizen-consumer implies that the good life better be an autonomous life in contemporary 
affluent societies, and that people's well being depends on whether they are the authors of 
their own narratives of self-identity (see 3.2.1). 
However, this perfectionist swing to liberalism's main line of thought does not 
weaken the liberal argument that the government ought to respect people's freedom to 
follow their own lifestyles, visions of the good life or consumptive preferences. Liberal 
perfectionism does embrace the notion of autonomy as the substantial kernel of 
contemporary liberal-democratic societies. Political and perfectionist liberalism are 
equally eager to limit government intervention in people's lives, they merely disagree on 
whether the protection of people's freedom should be motivated by anti-perfectionist or by 
perfectionist arguments. According to Raz (1986), the "most deeply rooted confusion 
leading to the intuitive appeal of the anti-perfectionist is in the thought that anti-
perfectionism is necessary to prevent people from imposing their favoured style of life on 
others" (161). One could not be more wrong indeed. Liberal perfectionism is perfectly 
compatible with a sincere respect for the plurality of lifestyles, visions of the good life or 
consumptive preferences in contemporary affluent societies. It could allow space for the 
endurance of a whole range of reasonable lifestyles and visions over time. Most prevailing 
lifestyles and visions of the good life will not be negatively affected by the perfectionist 
bias in such a properly understood liberalism. 
Moreover, perfectionist liberalism is capable of securing that people can choose 
among enough options to make any respect for the individual freedom of choice truly 
valuable, whereas political liberalism remains empty-handed on this issue. Unlike most 
political liberals, perfectionist liberalism recognises that individual autonomy would only 
be valuable if a plurality of options is available. People should not only be allowed to 
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choose for themselves, they should also be provided with an adequate range of behavioral 
options. Perfectionist liberalism, of course, restricts this range of choices to those choices 
that do not harm others, respect the principles of distributive justice, and are arrived at in 
conditions assuring their rationality or reasonableness (see 4.3.3). The perfectionist liberal 
account of the need to respect individual autonomy "requires that many morally 
acceptable options be available to a person" (Raz, 1986; 378). The perfectionist liberal 
has it that it is only possible to live up to the ideal of autonomous choice under the further 
condition of a plurality of valuable options. It follows that for the perfectionist liberal the 
government also has a positive role in sustaining a diversity of options and opportunities 
over time. The government should, for instance, also look after the opportunity to follow 
both omnivorous and vegetarian diets over time, unless one of these diets would harm or 
do injustice to others. 
Since the perfectionist liberal arguments seem to reflect an overlapping consensus in 
contemporary affluent societies, they should be thought to strengthen the main line of 
argument of political liberalism. The liberal notion of autonomy is probably the only value 
that could count on common affirmation, or express an overlapping consensus, in 
contemporary affluent societies. Therefore, a more communitarian perfectionist line of 
argument would ultimately boil down to this very perfectionist liberal position. 
4.5 
Deliberative Democracy 
Whereas political liberalism rightly emphasises the need to safeguard people's negative 
freedom from interference by others or the government, it tends to forget the other side of 
the coin and largely neglects people's positive freedom to participate in public 
deliberations on governmental policies. Strengthening this positive freedom would enable 
people to become the autonomous co-authors of political opinion-formation. Hence, a full 
account of the proper relation between government and citizen-consumers in 
contemporary affluent societies should not only emphasise people's negative freedom. It 
should also strive for free and equal participation in public deliberations on the formation 
and execution of governmental policies. The government should, for instance, provide 
ample opportunities to discuss policies for dealing with the environmental repercussions 
of animal husbandry. No matter how much Rawls asserts the opposite in his 'Reply to 
Habermas' (1993), political liberalism remains largely empty-handed when it comes to 
addressing this issue of how people could be enabled to gain influence on the formation 
and execution of objectives and instruments of, for instance, environmental policy. 
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Therefore, this section focuses on the Habermasian idea of a deliberative democracy to 
remedy political liberalism's partial blindness and provide a qualitatively symmetrical 
account of the proper relation between government and citizen-consumers in 
contemporary affluent societies. 
This deliberative model of democracy is not so much to be thought of as proposing 
an alternative to the prevailing parliamentary bodies of representative democracies. It is 
rather to supplement or strengthen these bodies with procedures for a more direct 
involvement of people in the formation of, for instance, environmental policies in the 
agro-food sector. This opinion-formation in pubic deliberations should offer fertile soil to 
feed subsequent decision-making processes in formalised democratic institutions. The 
kernel of the deliberative model of democracy is that public deliberation should be 
enhanced in order to enable people to (re)gain influence in the processes of political 
opinion-formation. Its core procedural device is that substantial political decisions should 
be the outcome of extensive public deliberation between free and equal citizen-consumers. 
The deliberative model of democracy has it that political decisions could only claim 
democratic legitimacy, if they are preceded and followed by extensive public 
deliberations. Governmental policies should always be suspectable to ongoing public 
scrutiny (Habermas, 1996 & 1997; De-Shalit, 1999). 
Since the deliberative model of democracy is supposed to strengthen our 
representative democracy, it heavily emphasises the consistency between public opinion-
formation and political decision-making. The general idea is that opinion-formation in 
public deliberations generates political influence once transformed through the periodical 
elections of representative democracies. This political influence is again transformed into 
governmental decisions through a series of legislative procedures. However, the ultimate 
source for the legitimacy of political decision-making is to be found in extensive 
deliberations in the public sphere. A government initiative to have people convert from 
meat to novel protein foods could only be legitimate, if 1) such a conversion has been 
issue of extensive public deliberation, and 2) no individuals perceive of such a policy as an 
infringement of their self-identities, visions of the good life or consumptive preferences. 
Thus, public deliberation is to mediate between individual opinion-formation and majority 
decision-making in the parliamentary bodies of a representative democracy. The political 
decisions of these parliamentary bodies should always reflect the surrounding processes of 
opinion-formation in the public sphere (Habermas, 1996 & 1997). 
At the heart of the deliberative model of democracy is an emphasis on genuine 
participation of citizen-consumers in the public process of deliberation; "a process in 
which citizens attempt to convince others to adopt certain policies on the basis of public 
reasons as they emerge in the give and take of deliberative dialogue" (Bohman, 1996; 15). 
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Deliberative democracy is a means to handle politically controversial issues through 
dialogue rather than through violence or pre-established power-positions, a means of 
living together in a relation of mutual tolerance for the plurality of, possibly conflicting yet 
reasonable, visions of the good life in contemporary affluent societies. The STD proposals 
for a government-initiated conversion from meat to NPFs are tainted by the technocratic 
flavour that is characteristic for such think-tanks. Therefore, it is no wonder that the STD 
engineers appear to abuse their position as scientific experts to impose particular values, 
instead of showing the true respect for other values and consumptive preferences that is a 
prerequisite for genuine public deliberations. 
Extensive public deliberation may also improve political decision-making, because 
it invites people to (re)consider their initial opinions in view of other people's opinions and 
interests. A deliberative democracy encourages people "not merely to express their 
political opinions (through opinion polls, referenda and the like), but to form those 
opinions through debate in public settings" (Miller, 1993; 89). Deliberative democracy 
asks citizen-consumers to exchange their views and discuss their reasons for supporting or 
opposing policies in intersubjective deliberations, and to show a willingness to revise their 
views and opinions once confronted with convincing arguments of others (Giddens, 1994a 
& 1994b; Holemans, 1999; Rawls, 1999). 
Most proponents of the deliberative model of democracy would subscribe to the 
following four parameters to capture the kernel of a fair public deliberation or discourse: 
"(PI) Reasonable Articulation of Need-Claims: All participants in a discourse 
should be capable of reasonably articulating rationally any need-claim 
they take to be morally significant. 
(P2) Bracketing of Power Differentials: Differences in (all forms of) power 
which exist between participants (both within and outside of 
argumentation) should not be any participant's good reason in 
discourse for endorsing any moral judgement. 
(P3) Nonstrategic Transparency: All participants should be able to convey 
their articulations of morally significant need-claims truthfully, without 
strategical reservations. 
(P4) Fusion of Moral Horizons: All participants should be able to sufficiently 
understand articulated need-claims in the corresponding moral 
horizons of whoever articulates them" (Kettner, 1999; 34). 
The approximation of these four parameters would secure that public deliberations are 
exchanges of opinion in which the better argument could gain support, and safeguards 
them from distortion by power-positions, money or strategic behaviour (Bohman, 1996; 
Dryzek, 1997). 
65 
Some proponents of deliberative democracy would like to add as a fifth parameter: 
(P5) Comprehensive Inclusion: Participants should make the following a 
constraint on what their community of discourse can accept as good 
reasons: that participants must anticipate whether their reasons can be 
rehearsed by all nonparticipant others who figure in any moral 
judgement that may result from the discourse" (Kettner, 1999; 34). 
This parameter seems to demand that the participants in public deliberations lay aside their 
narrowly motivated, self-interested opinions and only refer to generalisable interests. This 
condition asks the participants in public deliberations to search for universal moral rules 
that would impartially settle conflicts of interest. Hence, the outcome of public 
deliberations should only reflect arguments that are acceptable to all. Such a parameter 
seems unduly restrictive on the kind of interests, opinions and arguments that people may 
refer to in their public deliberations, seems to stretch people's responsibilities one bridge 
too far (Bohman, 1996; Swierstra, 1998). 
The same holds true for a sixth parameter that some of deliberative democracy's 
proponents wish to embrace. They hold it that the participants in public deliberations 
should show a willingness not merely to exchange and revise their opinions but to reach 
consensus on the issue at stake. However, such a closure parameter is unduly restrictive on 
the freedom and openness of public deliberations, and makes you wonder what these 
public deliberations could be about when all significantly divergent opinions and interests 
are silenced in advance. Proponents of this parameter introduce as a substantial premise, 
consensus, what could only be the outcome of public deliberations that are properly 
structured by the four procedural parameters. To be sure, nothing is particularly wrong 
with a public deliberation resulting in consensus, but it is also perfectly reasonable for a 
public deliberation to result in disagreement on the issue at stake. The mere fact that a 
debate does not result in consensus does not imply, in a feedback fashion, that it has not 
been a good debate. In case of enduring dissensus, subsequent political decision-making 
should respect or tolerate this plurality of interests and opinions, which may entail a need 
to compromise. 
Apart from the general advantages of a deliberative model over other models of 
democracy, scientific uncertainty about the environmental repercussions of, for instance, 
animal husbandry practices adds another reason why it is especially important to introduce 
deliberative forms of democracy in environmental policy-making. "Given the often high 
levels of uncertainty and risk that social-environmental interactions display it would seem 
that ecological rationality requires that institutions regulating these interactions be as 
self-reflexive and open-ended as possible" (Barry, 1999b; 203). So, reflexivity and 
openness should characterise environmental policy-making in view of the high level of 
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scientific uncertainty (see 5.5). The deliberative model of democracy is probably best 
equipped to meet these requirements, since it entails ongoing public scrutiny of the policy-
making process. It is, after all, most sensitive to the possibility that people may wish to 
change initial political decisions because, in the second instance, they turn out to be 
wrong, immoral or simply bad. This sensitivity is guaranteed in deliberative democracy's 
opportunities for re-debating any political decision at any moment in time, for ongoing 
reflection on the basis of ever-new information and arguments. Consequently, public 
deliberation is important in all stages of the opinion-formation and policy-making process, 
from the definition of social problems through the formation of objectives to the execution 
of specific policies (De-Shalit, 1999; Holemans, 1999). 
Fortunately, environmental and other non-governmental organisations have 
recognised the importance of extensive public deliberation and have been playing a 
constructive role in initiating deliberative forms of democracy. Such organisations will 
continue to play an important role in the extensive public deliberations of a revitalised 
democracy. Their primary role in a deliberative democracy is to "open up spaces for 
public dialogue in respect of the issues with which they are concerned" (Giddens, 1994a; 
17). Thus, the activities of environmental organisations express and contribute to the 
heightened reflexivity that is characteristic for a deliberative democracy. Genuine public 
deliberation in the opinion-formation process could also be strengthened by experimenting 
with new deliberative institutions, e.g. citizens' juries, round tables, public inquiries, and 
so on (Giddens, 1991; Barry, 1999a). 
Finally, the extensive public deliberations of a properly functioning deliberative 
democracy might also justify more directive strategies for government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles than political liberalism could ever account for. Such deliberations 
might, for instance, quite reasonably conclude that the government should introduce rather 
restrictive policies towards envkonment-unfriendly animal husbandry practices. The 
legitimacy of such governmental policies ultimately depends on the critical judgement by 
free and equal people participating in a public deliberation. Although this legitimacy of the 
policy-making process is an essential part of the deliberative model of democracy, it is 
secondary to its primary objective of securing ongoing intersubjective opinion-formation 
among free and equal people (Bohman, 1996; Habermas, 1996). 
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4.6 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to answer the question of whether government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles could be reconciled with respect for people's freedom to follow a 
lifestyle of their own choice by offering a specifically political liberal interpretation of the 
notion of autonomy or freedom of choice. The political liberal argument of why the 
government needs to respect this autonomy started by acknowledging the fact of pluralism 
of lifestyles, visions of the good life and consumptive preferences in contemporary 
affluent societies. Next, it argued that respect for the individual freedom of choice is the 
only alternative for ongoing conflicts about these lifestyles, visions and preferences. This 
negative freedom from governmental interference implies that people should, for instance, 
be free to choose to eat meat or not. Furthermore, the political liberal argument had it that 
the autonomy of choices is more important than the substantial contents of these choices. 
Hence, being able to choose between meat and novel protein foods matters more than 
whatever people may choose. This positive freedom to follow your own lifestyle was 
founded on the ideal of the autonomous individual for whom the ability to frame, follow 
and revise his or her own way of life has overriding priority. Subsequently, it was argued 
that respecting autonomy implies safeguarding a private sphere from governmental 
interference. This posed worries as to whether it is right to shift meat consumption from 
this private sphere to the sphere of justified public interference. 
Berlin (1969) offered a final set of four criteria to assess the extent to which specific 
policies respect people's autonomy: 1) how many options do people have, 2) how difficult 
is it to follow these options, 3) how important are these options in people's lifestyles, and 
4) does a policy deliberately restrict such options? A government-initiated conversion 
from meat to NPFs seemed to score negatively on this set of criteria. This was thought to 
be reason enough to be rather suspicious about such policies to change consumptive 
preferences. 
The second major argument in the political liberal emphasis on the need to respect 
people's autonomy was that the government should be neutral between the different 
lifestyles, visions of the good life and consumptive preferences in contemporary affluent 
societies. This governmental neutrality was not taken to call for neutrality in the effects of 
governmental policies. It rather implied that, for instance, environmental policy should not 
deliberately favour either omnivorous or vegetarian preferences and practices. In other 
words, the government should not use perfectionist arguments to justify its policies. It 
should not use, for instance, ecocentric visions of the good environment to justify a 
government-initiated conversion from meat to NPFs. The main responsibility of the 
68 
political liberal, neutral and anti-perfectionist government was to provide the social and 
material conditions in which a plurality of lifestyles could flourish. 
However, the political liberal argument did not amount to a vulgar anything goes, 
since it acknowledged that no freedom is possible without constraints. Three legitimate 
reasons for restricting people's autonomy were recognised. First, the government should 
restrict people's freedom, if their choices harmed others. It was questioned, though, 
whether this harm principle might also include harm to our offspring to justify, for 
instance, a government-initiated conversion from meat to NPFs. It did not seem altogether 
clear that such a spatio-temporally neutral interpretation of the harm principle would not 
somehow involve veiled perfectionist arguments (see chapter 5). Second, the egalitarian 
branches of political liberalism should also accept that reasons of distributive justice could 
justify governmental restrictions on people's freedom. Again, broadening this justice 
principle to include justice between generations in the use of the natural environment 
might justify a government-initiated conversion from meat to NPFs. But then again, it did 
not seem clear that this spatio-temporal extension of the justice principle would not imply 
projecting current preferences on future needs (see chapter 5). Third, the governmental 
respect for people's autonomy should be restricted to rational or reasonable choices. If 
people's choices, for instance the choice to eat meat, are based on inadequate knowledge 
about the environmental repercussions of these choices or on market failures, the 
government should not respect them as truly autonomous choices. 
Consequently, the government was argued to have the responsibility to promote the 
rationality of people's choices by providing them with adequate information on the 
repercussions of their choices. So, the political liberal stance left ample room for the 
government to provide people with information on the environmental repercussions of, for 
instance, animal husbandry. The same was supposed to hold true for the use of financial 
incentives, when market failures cause prices not to reflect the environmental costs of 
certain products. Nothing seemed to be particularly wrong with the government putting an 
eco-tax on meat from intensive animal husbandry. 
At that stage, a flaw in the political liberal argument for a neutral and anti-
perfectionist government had to be repaired by accepting the perfectionist liberal position 
that autonomy-oriented policies are not neutral between lifestyles or visions of the good 
life. Such policies favour those lifestyles and visions that embrace the liberal notion of 
autonomy as one of their core values. In this modest sense, autonomy-oriented policies 
appeared to be perfectionist. Such policies ultimately rest on a comprehensive, specifically 
liberal, vision of the good life, which gives people's autonomy overriding priority. 
Moreover, perfectionist liberalism also offered good reasons to accept that freedom of 
choice will only be valuable, if people can choose among sufficiently divergent options. 
69 
Hence, it was argued that the government should sustain a diversity of options over time. 
The government should, for instance, look after the possibility to follow both omnivorous 
and vegetarian diets over time, unless of course one of these diets would harm others or do 
them injustice. Although these perfectionist liberal arguments traced some essential flaws 
in the political liberal body of thought, they were not taken to weaken the main argument 
that the government needs to respect people's autonomy. The perfectionist liberal 
arguments were rather thought to strengthen the need to respect autonomy, since they 
express an overlapping consensus in contemporary liberal-democratic societies. 
Finally, a neglect of the need to enhance people's positive freedom to participate in 
public deliberation on governmental policies accompanied the political liberal emphasis 
on the need to respect people's negative freedom. This asymmetry was remedied by 
shifting attention to the Habermasian idea of a deliberative democracy. The objective of 
this account of deliberative democracy was to show that the government should also 
enhance people's opportunities to (re)gain influence in the formation and execution of the 
objectives and instruments of environmental policy. The government should, for instance, 
create possibilities to discuss different policies for dealing with the environmental 
repercussions of animal husbandry. The deliberative model of democracy was not 
introduced as an alternative for the parliamentary bodies of representative democracies, 
but rather as an attempt to supplement these bodies with procedures for a more direct 
involvement of people in the formation of, for instance, environmental policies in the 
agro-food sector. This deliberative model of democracy showed that the legitimacy of 
governmental policies ultimately rests on extensive public deliberation of the issue at the 
stake. Genuine participation in such public deliberations was shown to depend on four 
parameters. The participants in public deliberations should 1) be able to reasonably 
articulate their arguments, 2) not allow power differences to influence the argument, 3) 
argue in a non-strategic, authentic way, and 4) be able to understand other people's 
arguments within their frames of reference. Two additional parameters, advocated by 
some of deliberative democracy's proponents, were rejected. It would be unduly restrictive 
on the freedom and openness of public deliberations to ask people to restrict their 
arguments to generalisable interests or to search for consensus. A specific argument for 
introducing deliberative forms of democracy in environmental policy-making was found 
in the uncertainty of scientific knowledge about the environmental repercussions of, for 
instance, animal husbandry (see 5.5). The deliberative model of democracy was shown to 
be most sensitive to the quite obvious possibility that people may wish to revise decisions 
in view of new information or arguments. Finally, it was argued that extensive public 
deliberation on environmental policies might also justify more directive strategies for 
government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles than political liberalism, as a 
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freestanding body of thought, could ever account for. Such public deliberations might, for 
instance, conclude that the government should introduce quite restrictive policies towards 
non-sustainable animal husbandry practices. However, this legitimacy of the policy-
making process was supposed to be secondary to deliberative democracy's primary role of 
providing ample opportunities for intersubjective opinion-formation among free and equal 
citizen-consumers. 
This chapter's account of what it entails to respect people's autonomy and to enhance 
their public deliberations provides the materials for a further elaboration on the proper 
division of responsibilities between government and citizen-consumers in a green third 
way of government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles (see chapter 6). First, 
however, the next chapter (5) will address the question of whether a spatio-temporal 
extension of the harm and justice principles could provide sound arguments for restricting 
people's freedom to follow their own lifestyles and narratives of self-identity. 
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5 
Sustainable Development and Future Generations 
"Nature... Aha! Don't think I haven't caught on. 
This nature business is another fine fraud: Mil it!" 
(Italo Calvino, 1981; 247) 
5.1 
Introduction 
July 21, 20.00, Amsterdam Airport: "Good evening Sir, welcome at Venga Airways. May I 
ask your destination?" "Sure, I'm going to Ibiza but". "Alright, passport and ticket please. 
Wait here for the environmental interview". "The what?" A few minutes later, "Good 
evening mister Doe, may I call you John, thank you for waiting. I'm gonna ask you some 
questions about your flight to Ibiza. No need to be nervous though, this environmental 
interview is standard procedure issued by the government to establish the necessity of 
your flight. It's quite similar to the security interviews with which you're probably more 
acquainted. So John, tell me, why are you going to Ibiza? " "Well, you know, holidays: sun, 
beaches, parties, babes". "I see, how many times did you fly over, let's say, the last two 
years?" "Uh, let's see, last summer I went to Tenerife, in the autumn I went to Goa, and of 
course the millennium-trip to Fiji". "Sir, don't you know that's way above your personal 
environmental utilisation space? Aren't you aware that holidays by air, 60% of all 
international flights, contribute to the greenhouse effect, acid rain and the breakdown of 
the ozone layer?" "Well, that's not my problem, is it?" "Wouldn't you like your children to 
be able to live an agreeable life then?" "Don't got no children and couldn't care anyway". 
"I'm sorry Sir, I'm afraid we've got to cancel your flight. We cannot allow irresponsible 
people like you to fly all over this world for no good reason whatsoever". "Who thefm 
do you think you are to interfere with my personal freedom to decide where I wanna go on 
holidays". 
Obviously, this chapter needs to address one final principled question before the 
outline of a green third way can be presented: the question of whether the notion of 
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sustainable development could provide sound arguments for restricting people's freedom 
to follow their own lifestyles, narratives of self-identity and consumptive preferences? The 
short history of sustainable development (see 1.1) already showed that this question 
amounts to the question of whether concerns about the negative repercussions of current 
lifestyles on nature and the environment could justify government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles. In other words, do the concerns about future generations, 
materialised in the world-wide support for the notion of sustainable development, imply 
that a spatio-temporal extension of the harm and justice principles should be included in a 
political liberal frame of reference (see 4.3.3)? 
First, the next section will explore some of the outer skirts of the political liberal 
frame of reference. Much to the comfort of those environmental philosophers who are 
keen on avoiding any of the rather esoteric intrinsic value of nature arguments in 
mainstream deep ecology, Rawls himself made some minor remarks on the issue of justice 
between generations. Therefore, the first sub-section will discuss Rawls's savings principle 
as a means to address the issue of intergenerational justice (5.2.1). Whereas Rawls's initial 
grounding of this savings principle is defective, his latest defence of the savings principle 
looks much more promising for introducing intergenerational issues in a political liberal 
frame of reference. The next sub-section will introduce Wissenburg's restraint principle to 
give some substantial flesh and bone to the political liberal account of intergenerational 
justice (5.2.2). Although this restraint principle is still unduly abstract, it is probably the 
best that the spatio-temporally egalitarian branches of political liberalism can do. 
Moreover, unlike the popular precautionary principle and the Rawlsian maximin principle, 
the restraint principle does not need controversial assumptions about people's risk 
perceptions to establish a baseline for environmental policy-making. 
An interpretation of the kernel of the notion of sustainable development as justice 
between generations seems to be a promising route to provide a political, not 
metaphysical, justification of directive strategies for government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles. However, it will also draw the argument to an overly abstract and 
survivalist position that does not fully capture people's intuitive, more empathetic concerns 
about the deterioration of nature and the environment. Whereas it is important that the 
restraint principle provides a baseline with minimum requirements for environmental 
policy-making, it would be a pity if the implications of sustainable development were 
confined to such a minimal environmental morality. Therefore, the next section will 
provide a complementary narrative interpretation of sustainable development. First, focus 
will be on Passmore's chains of love and especially De-Shalit's transgenerational 
communities as materials for an account of intergenerational concerns that carries the 
proper empathetic intuition that the current generation owes more to nearby future 
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generations than mere survival (5.3.1). The next sub-section will then use these materials 
to redraw some of the central threads of the narrative conceptualisation of the notions of 
lifestyle and self-identity (see 3.2.1) to provide the complementary interpretation of 
sustainable development (5.3.2). While the narrative interpretation of sustainable 
development embraces the environmental baseline provided by the restraint principle, it 
insists that further environmental policies should be based on current ideals of people with 
narratives of self-identity that stretch beyond their own lifetimes. It will be argued that 
these ideals are ultimately formed in people's immediate encounters with the human and 
non-human other in circumstances of co-presence, and that such encounters can only 
provide a justification for non-directive strategies of government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles. 
At that stage, it is time to shift attention from these rather unearthly issues to the 
more mundane problem of operationalising, or quantifying, the environmental baseline for 
day-to-day environmental policy-making. Therefore, the next section of this chapter will 
discuss two alternative operationalisations of sustainable development. First, a modest 
stocktaking approach that draws a tentative list of transgenerationally universal primary 
environmental goods as a practical guideline to prioritise among the divergent objectives 
of day-to-day environmental politics (5.4.1). Second, the more ambitious systems 
ecological attempt to quantify an overall environmental utilisation space (EUS)(5.4.2). 
Although both operationalisations carry the same spatio-temporally-egalitarian premises, 
the stocktaking approach prefers a pragmatic stance towards these premises instead of the 
principled stance of the EUS. Moreover, the proponents of the EUS seem to be over-
ambitious in quantifying the environmental baseline, and display a somewhat 
anachronistic understanding of science and technology and the relation between science 
and politics. 
The next section will, therefore, criticise the notion of an EUS for its lack of 
attention for the principal uncertainty of scientific knowledge in contemporary affluent 
societies. Building on the account of reflexive modernisation (see 3.4), it will be argued 
that the notions of risk and trust are essential ingredients in any argument about the proper 
relation between science and politics in environmental decision-making (5.5). 
Finally, the chapter will draw the conclusion (5.6) that, whereas the restraint 
principle and a list of primary environmental goods might justify directive strategies for 
government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles, non-directive strategies should do 
the majority of the job (see chapter 6). 
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5.2 
Intergenerational Justice 
The World Cornmission on Environment and Development (WCED, 1987) defined 
sustainable development as "development that meets the needs of the present generation 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (43)(see 
1.1). This authoritative definition of sustainable development suggests that the present 
generation should provide future generations, through the prevention of further 
deterioration of nature and the environment, with the opportunities to follow their own 
lifestyles and visions of the good life. The notion of sustainable development thus seems 
to represent a spatio-temporally egalitarian intuition that the current use of nature and the 
environment should not harm future generations, an intuition that all individuals (no 
matter where or when) should have an equal right to use the natural environment. 
This spatio-temporally egalitarian kernel of the notion of sustainable development 
lead several environmental philosophers to embrace the concerns about the opportunities 
of future generations to follow their lifestyles and visions of the good life as a more 
promising route towards an effective justification of environmental policy-making than the 
hitherto largely ineffective attempts to justify environmental policies on the basis of some 
presumed intrinsic value of nature. Since the opportunities of future generations to follow 
their lifestyles will be harmed in a deteriorated natural environment, it could be enough to 
adopt a long-term, intergenerational perspective to be able to justify environmental 
policies as necessary abatements of the negative repercussions of current lifestyles on 
nature and the environment. Such an appeal to the opportunities of future generations in 
order to safeguard nature and the environment from further deterioration seems to be a 
more promising guideline for day-to-day environmental policy-making than the rather 
esoteric appeals to some intrinsic value of nature. Whereas mainstream deep ecologists1 
preoccupation with the intrinsic value of nature reduces the practical relevance of their 
philosophies for everyday environmental policy-making, the issue of sustainable 
development and future generations invites environmental philosophers to make a 
difference in the real world. Moreover, the worldwide concerns about future generations, 
materialised in the notion of sustainable development, seem to make room to address the 
deterioration of nature and the environment within a liberal frame of reference. Such 
concerns about future generations might justify directive strategies for government 
intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles, even within a political liberal frame of reference 
(Light, 1996; Norton, 1996a & 1996b; Dobson, 1998; Wissenburg, 1998; Barry, 1999a). 
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5.2.1 
A Rawlsian Savings Principle 
In 'A Theory of Justice' (1972), Rawls developed a specific contractarian approach to 
ground principles of justice for well-ordered societies. With his famous hypothetical 
original position, in which the participants were to reach agreement on principles of justice 
under conditions of uncertainty about their position in the real-life social order, Rawls 
constructed a methodological device to strengthen his political liberal argument that the 
principles of justice should protect the worst-off in society. When knowledge about their 
position in the social order is precluded by a veil of ignorance, the participants in the 
original position were supposed to adopt a maxirnin strategy to hedge against the bad 
chance of belonging to the lowest ranks of society. Hence, they would reach agreement on 
principles of justice that favour the interests of society's worst-off. According to Rawls, 
these principles should guide the distributive policies of liberal-democratic governments. 
When Rawls introduced the savings principle to address the issue of justice between 
generations in this contractarian frame of reference, he initially assumed that the 
participants in the original position should also be ignorant about their position in the 
succession of generations. However, he was unwilling to imagine the original position as a 
hypothetical conversation between representatives from all possible generations. The 
participants in the original position were to be contemporaries and knowledge of this 
present-time-of-entry should not be precluded by the veil of ignorance. Unfortunately, 
since the participants in the original position were to know that they are contemporaries, 
nothing would stop them from favouring their own interests by neglecting the 
opportunities of future generations. Whether or not preceding generations restrained 
themselves in their use of nature and the environment, the participants in the original 
position could not change a thing about that. Hence, no savings principle would be chosen. 
To avoid such a counter-intuitive conclusion, Rawls introduced the motivational 
assumption that the participants in the original position were to care about their immediate 
descendants. Then, motivated by a wish to save for their immediate offspring and a claim 
on their immediate ancestors to have saved for them, the participants in the original 
position would reach agreement on a savings principle with regard to their use of nature 
and the environment. With this motivational assumption, Rawls thought that he secured 
intergenerational justice in the emotional ties between successive generations. 
However, the kernel of Rawls's contractarian approach is that he constructed an 
original position in which the participants were to reach agreement on principles of justice 
solely motivated by their self-interest. The motivational assumption, introduced to secure 
justice between generations, seems to be at odds with this kernel of his contractarian 
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approach. The participants no longer reach agreement on principles of justice solely 
motivated by self-interest. Rawls thus seems unwilling to remain true to the anti-
perfectionist stance of his political liberal theory of justice once it comes to hard cases like 
the issue of justice between generations. Moreover, since Rawls grounds his savings 
principle on the emotional ties between successive generations, this principle would 
merely secure justice between a few generations in the use of nature and the environment. 
Rawls's principle only captures concerns about the opportunities of more immediate future 
generations to follow their lifestyles and visions of the good life. Such a time preference is 
alien to the spatio-temporally egalitarian intuition that a mere difference in time, whether 
someone lives earlier or later, is in itself no rational argument to refuse equal opportunities 
in the use of nature and the environment. The preservation of nature and the environment 
should not depend on possibly absent emotional ties between specific individuals in 
successive generations. 
When you, for instance, look at going on holidays by air and focus on the 
environmental repercussions of the necessary use of fossil fuels, Rawls's savings principle 
cannot make a difference in arguments about a reduction of the number of flights as an 
objective of environmental policy-making. Nevertheless, it is known that planes use about 
4.45 MJ/person/kilometre, i.e. more than 2.5 times as much as cars, 4 times as much as 
trains and 6 to 8 times as much as buses. Apart from this enormous use of fossil fuels, 
flying also contributes to the greenhouse effect, acid rain, and the destruction of the ozone 
layer by emitting 0.6 gram CO, 0.2 gram HC, 1.1 gram NO x, 0.2 gram S0 2 , and 300 grams 
C02/person/kilometre. Although technological innovations have been reducing 
emissions/person/kilometre over the last years, the steep growth in the number of flights 
will triple the total emissions of flying by the year 2015 (Raad voor het Natuurbeheer, 
1994; Van der Linde & Franke, 1996; Beckers et al, 1999). Still, since Rawls's savings 
principle is based on the emotional ties between successive generations, it could only 
justify policies to mitigate the short-term environmental repercussions of flying. The 
principle, thus, leaves policy-makers empty-handed in their attempts to address the 
aforementioned long-term environmental repercussions of going on holidays by air. It 
cannot justify any infringements of people's freedom of choice of holiday-destination on 
the basis of these long-term environmental repercussions. 
To avoid this rather unsatisfying conclusion, English (1977), Manning (1981), 
Thero (1995) and others suggested that it might be better to imagine the original position 
as a hypothetical conversation between representatives from all possible generations. Once 
you abandon the present-time-of-entry interpretation and treat the position of the 
participants in the succession of generations as another arbitrary contingency to be hidden 
by the veil of ignorance, the participants in the original position would reach agreement on 
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a spatio-temporally egalitarian savings principle on the basis of their self-interest. Justice 
between generations in the use of nature and the environment would be secured. Since the 
participants in the original position would not know to which generation they belong, they 
would reach agreement on a savings principle to hedge against the bad chance of 
belonging to a remote future generation. Such a principle would demand long-term 
conservation of nature and the environment to safeguard the opportunities of immediate 
and remote future generations to follow their lifestyles and visions of the good life. 
In his 'Political Liberalism' (1993), Rawls admits that his initial grounding of the 
savings principle is defective, but remains unwilling to imagine the original position as a 
hypothetical conversation between representatives from all possible generations. Although 
Rawls is not particularly informative about his reasons to hold on to the present-time-of-
entry interpretation of the original position, he is probably keen on avoiding any of Parfit's 
(1984) non-identity paradoxes in trying to imagine a conversation between all possible 
generations about, for instance, environmental policies. Since any change of policy would 
affect the identity of future individuals, the principal instability of the identities of the 
participants in an intergenerafional original position would frustrate any ongoing 
conversation. Therefore, Rawls follows a different strain of thought to address the issue of 
justice between generations in a political liberal frame of reference. Elaborating on 
English's (1977) suggestion that it is quite reasonable to assume that the choice of 
principles of justice by the participants in the original position will be affected by whether 
they can count on others to follow these principles, Rawls assumes that the choice of a 
savings principle will be affected by whether the participants in the original position can 
count on their predecessors to have followed the principle. He holds it that the participants 
in the original position should assume that other generations save according to the 
principle they choose. In fact, this seems to be a proper intergenerational equivalent of the 
Kantian categorical imperative that the legitimacy of moral principles depends on whether 
the individual can wish that all others embrace and follow these principles. 
Summarising Rawls's latest defence of the savings principle, he now assumes that: 
1) the participants in the original position should reach agreement on principles of justice 
solely motivated by self-interest; 2) they are contemporaries and know that much; 3) 
knowledge about their position in the succession of generations is precluded by the veil of 
ignorance; and 4) the participants in the original position should reach agreement on a 
savings principle under the further condition that they should want all previous 
generations to have followed that principle. Rawls holds it that these assumptions assure 
that the participants in the original position will choose a savings principle that is 
acceptable for all generations and that could guide policy-makers in addressing the issue 
of justice between generations in the use of nature and the environment. His fourth 
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assumption seems reasonable indeed, since any new generation will always enter an 
already ongoing social order. A basic trust that others will follow the same set of spatio-
temporally overlapping moral principles, the kernel of this new assumption, is an essential 
prerequisite for the continuity of any social order. Hence, Rawls's reconstructed original 
position provides sound arguments to embrace a savings principle (Wissenburg, 1998). 
Turning to the going-on-holidays-by-air case again, it should be perfectly clear that 
even the most stubborn neo-classical economic liberal should be willing to accept the 
introduction of an excise on kerosene and a VAT-levy on air tickets. No matter what some 
outdated Chicago Treaty may have to say on the subject, the government should establish 
a level playing field among the divergent means of transport (Raad voor het Natuurbeheer, 
1994; Beckers et al, 1999). However, Rawls's latest defence of the savings principle could 
also justify more restrictive environmental policies towards people's freedom of mobility, 
when the current generation tends to use more fossil fuels than it would grant its 
immediate and remote predecessors to have used. Unfortunately, Rawls's latest, and firm, 
grounding of the savings principle offers few leads on how to quantify what counts as 
excessive use of fossil fuels by the current generation. The savings principle, thus, still 
lacks substance. 
Nevertheless, since no future generations participate in Rawls's latest reconstruction 
of the original position to defend a savings principle, it effectively evades Parfit's (1984) 
non-identity paradoxes in hypothetical intergenerational conversations. Because Rawls 
starts from what current generations wish to save for future generations and what they 
wish previous generations to have saved for them, he also evades the impossible task of 
specifying principally unknowable future preferences. Since "we do not know which 
possible persons will be born to whom, we do not know what they will look like, what their 
abilities and disabilities will be, what preferences, plans of life and theories of the good 
they will have" (Wissenburg, 1998; 175), such preferences could never provide guidance 
in answering the question of how the current generation could secure that nature and the 
environment provide the opportunities for future generations to follow their lifestyles and 
visions of the good life. Fortunately, Rawls's latest defence of the savings principle does 
not need to perform this impossible task anyway. However, whereas Rawls's argument for 
accepting a savings principle might be convincing, his procedural account of the issue of 
intergenerational justice lacks substantial flesh and bone. He does not have much to offer 
in answering the question of what, and how much, the current generation ought to save to 
protect the opportunities of future generations to follow their lifestyles and visions of the 
good life. 
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5.2.2 
The Restraint Principle 
The Rawlsian savings principle adequately represents the core idea of the spatio-
temporally egalitarian branches of political liberalism that people's position in space and 
time does not provide rational arguments for a differential weighing of their interests. It, 
thus, captures the intuition that it is reasonable enough for a future individual to argue that 
members of the current generation should not discriminate against his or her interests in 
the use of nature and the environment, simply because they live now and he or she at some 
future moment in time. It seems to suffice to foresee the existence of future generations to 
argue that current generations should save some natural environment, but does the savings 
principle also imply "an obligation to maintain a non-diminishing range of choices and 
opportunities to pursue certain valued interests and activities" (Norton, 1999; 132-133)? 
Wissenburg's (1998) defence of the restraint principle answers the question of whether the 
savings principle calls for the preservation of the whole, or merely some of, the plurality 
of environmental goods with a qualified version of the first, and most demanding, option. 
Thereby, he gives the political liberal account of intergenerational justice its much-needed 
substance. 
Wissenburg (1998) argues that political liberals should be willing to accept a 
principle that demands that claims on a physically scarce natural environment be granted 
in such a way that nature and the environment remain available for future claims. This 
principle is the restraint principle: "no goods shall be destroyed unless unavoidable and 
unless they are replaced by perfectly identical goods; if that is physically impossible, they 
should be replaced by equivalent goods resembling the original as closely as possible; 
and if that is also impossible, a proper compensation should be provided" (123). The 
definition of the restraint principle does not include the term future generations, because it 
should abstract from specific spatio-temporal contexts to operate as a principle that 
safeguards distributive justice in the use of nature and the environment within and 
between generations. The principle suggests that whenever the current generation has a 
choice between destroying nature and the environment and using nature and the 
environment without reducing the opportunities of future generations, it should choose the 
latter course of action. This argument about the preservation of the natural heritage is 
analogous to Raz's (1986) argument that if you happen to own some significant piece of 
the cultural heritage (e.g. a painting by Matisse or Picasso), you may legitimately choose 
whether to exhibit it in the private or the public sphere. However, you may not destroy it. 
Although the restraint principle may seem unduly abstract, it is an accurate spatio-
temporal extension of the harm and justice principles. The principle is also a practical 
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guideline for day-to-day environmental policy-making, since it does not demand the 
impossible. It clearly states that restraint in the current use of nature and the environment 
could be overruled by reasons of necessity. The principle, thus, assures that future 
generations are provided with as much opportunities to use nature and the environment as 
they could hope for without placing excessively high demands on the current generation. 
Of course, the tough question is how to define the key terms impossible and necessity. It is 
quite likely that once the restraint principle is accepted as a specification of the notion of 
sustainable development, the interpretation of these rather lax terms will be subject to 
further public debate. 
The restraint principle, for instance, implies that the current generation should not 
use more fossil fuels than absolutely necessary. So, the question becomes whether being 
mobile or being able to go on holidays by air counts as a necessity, or a need, in 
contemporary affluent societies. If someone like Brunt (1991) holds it that the individual 
freedom of movement should never be curtailed by environmental policies, the restraint 
principle would suggest that this freedom only be granted under the further condition that 
alternative means of transport will be developed that do not need non-renewable fossil 
fuels to move people around the world. The development of such new means of transport 
should compensate future generations for the current generation's use of non-renewable 
fossil fuels (Aarts et al, 1995). 
Wissenburg argues that the potential laxity in the application of the restraint 
principle in environmental policy-making is largely curtailed by the fact that it puts the 
onus of proof for justifying destructive uses of nature and the environment on the users. 
Since he develops the argument for a reversal of the burden of proof partly in a critique of 
the precautionary principle, it is wise to pay some special attention to this principle. Since 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, 1992) the 
precautionary principle acquired international support among environmentalists as a 
promising instrument to challenge vested economic and political interests. The proponents 
of the precautionary principle suggest that the argument to put the onus of proof on the 
users of nature and the environment is based on a procedural account of what counts as a 
rational course of action in circumstances of uncertainty. O'Riordan and Jordan (1995), for 
instance, argue that at "the core of the precautionary principle is the intuitively simple idea 
that decision makers should act in advance of scientific certainty to protect the 
environment (and with it the well-being interests of future generations) from incurring 
harm. [...] In essence, it requires that risk avoidance becomes an established decision 
norm where there is reasonable uncertainty regarding possible environmental damage or 
social deprivation arising out of a proposed course of action" (194). From a strategic 
point of view it is quite understandable why environmentalists wish to embrace such 
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arguments. However, this quote should make it perfectly clear that the precautionary 
principle depends on a quite specific and substantial, risk-avoiding attitude towards 
uncertainty about the repercussions of current lifestyles on nature and the environment to 
argue for a reversal of the burden of proof. It argues that the only reasonable course of 
action in circumstances of uncertainty is to hedge against the worst-case scenario [cf. 
Beck, 1988; Perrings, 1991; Vollebergh, 1995). This is a quite controversial account of 
rationality indeed. 
Environmentalists should, therefore, welcome Wissenburg's claim that his restraint 
principle calls for a reversal of the burden of proof without relying on such controversial 
assumptions about people's risk perceptions. The kernel of the restraint principle is that a 
right to destroy nature and the environment can never be granted, and that users, therefore, 
need to proof that some particular destructive use of nature and the environment is 
necessary to fulfil primary human needs. Hence, when it is certain that some use of nature 
and the environment has destructive consequences, the need to proof the necessity of this 
particular use should be put on the users. Unfortunately, no sound arguments seem to be 
available to claim that the users of nature and the environment should also always proof 
that their use does not imply destruction, when principal or practical uncertainty rules out 
such evidence. The restraint principle only justifies a halved reversal of the onus of proof, 
and that is not the political ammunition that environmentalists wrongly thought to have 
found in the precautionary principle. However, even environmentalists should try to 
accept the absence of a short cut to certainty. 
Nevertheless, political pragmatism might lead people to grant environmentalists the 
benefit of the doubt in case of reasonable doubt about the destructive repercussions of 
some use of nature and the environment. This is exactly what people increasingly appear 
to do when companies and environmental organisations present competing claims about 
the risk of certain technological innovations. 
5.3 
Green Ideals 
The exclusive focus on universal principles and strong negative obligations drew the 
spatio-temporally egalitarian interpretation of the kernel of the notion of sustainable 
development to the same preoccupation with the survival of the human species that 
characterises the apocalyptic views of radical environmentalists (e.g. Hardin, 1968; 
Ophuls, 1977). Although such a survivalist stance might be necessary to secure an 
environmental baseline, it does not fully reflect people's empathetic moral concerns about 
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the deterioration of nature and the environment and its negative repercussions for the 
opportunities of future generations to follow their lifestyles and narratives of self-identity. 
Toulmin (1981) and Gert (1998) signal a quite similar exclusionary focus on moral 
principles in applied bio-ethics and argue that this principled approach should be 
complemented by a more inclusive account of morality. Next to the moral obligations of 
principlism, moral ideals are to motivate people to move beyond the mirumum 
requirements of morality and develop a fuller sense of responsibility. Such moral ideals 
invite people to follow future-oriented narratives, while at the same time provoking them 
to reflexively reconstruct these narratives in the ongoing flow of daily life. Moral ideals 
should "guide action, not by prescribing things to do, but by inspiring agents not to be 
content as soon as they have satisfied the minimum requirements of morality" (Verweij, 
1998; 176). 
Therefore, if survivalist minimalism is to be transcended in environmental policy-
making, the principled interpretation of sustainable development should be supplemented 
by an account of sustainable development as a fuller, future-oriented, green ideal. This 
complementary account of sustainable development builds on people's empathetic 
concerns about the preservation of nature and the environment to argue that the current 
generation should strive to leave nearby future generations more than the conditions for 
mere survival. Moreover, people's concerns and ideals should already be involved in the 
application and specification of the necessarily abstract notion of sustainable development 
in public deliberations, for instance when this particular regulative ideal conflicts with 
other supposedly universal moral principles (Korthals, 2000a). 
5.3.1 
Transgenerational Communities 
Passmore's (1980) notion of a chain of love between generations could be one the leading 
threads in an interpretation of sustainable development as a green ideal. He argues that 
people's concerns about the opportunities of future generations rest on their love for their 
children and their wish to look after these children. Since people love their children and 
grandchildren, who in turn will love their children and grandchildren, the current 
generation should accept a responsibility to preserve a natural environment that provides 
ample opportunities for future generations, up to and including the grandchildren of their 
grandchildren, to live a good life. Moreover, Passmore argues that the current generation 
also has this responsibility to future generations because previous generations preserved a 
natural environment in which they could live a good life. In return, the current generation 
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should maintain this chain of love, and pass on to the next generation a good natural 
environment. 
Whereas the discussion of Rawls's initial defence of the savings principle (5.2.1) 
showed that such a chain of love cannot justify strong negative obligations to remote 
future generations, Passmore fortunately does not need to defend that claim to argue for a 
fuller responsibility towards our nearest and dearest descendants. Passmore's chains of 
love could never justify obligations to individuals who will live more than four 
generations from now. However, they do reflect a crucial part of people's empathetic 
concerns about the preservation of nature and the environment that should be captured by 
an interpretation of sustainable development as a green ideal. Hence, these chains of love 
could provide guidelines to address intergenerational environmental concerns that do not 
transcend the realm of intimacy between one generation and its immediate offspring, e.g. 
Passmore's account could offer leads to address the short-term environmental 
repercussions of going on holidays by air. 
De-Shalit's (1995a) account of transgenerational communities" could provide a 
second leading thread in the articulation of people's empathetic concerns about the 
preservation of nature and the environment in an interpretation of sustainable development 
as a green ideal. De-Shalit's communitarian argument holds it that since the community, or 
social group, to which people belong, largely constitutes their narratives of self-identity 
(see 3.2.2), this constitutive community should be sustained over time. The idea is that 
because communities stretch across generations, thus the term transgenerational 
communities, the current generation should feel responsible to preserve nature and the 
environment in order to provide future members of the community with ample 
opportunities to live a good life. Just like people perceive of the common past as part of 
what constitutes their self-identities, they should also become reflexively aware that the 
future of the community is part of these self-identities. According to De-Shalit, people 
already identify themselves, on a subconscious level, with such future-oriented narratives 
and visions of the good life. He argues that if only the transgenerationally communitarian 
constitution of people's self-identities were raised to the level of reflexive consciousness, a 
responsibility to provide future generations with a good environment would become self-
evident. Since the current generation belongs to a transgenerational community, it has 
responsibilities to future members of this community. The idea is that by extending the 
notion of community to include future generations, a responsibility to preserve the natural 
environment would rest directly on the empathetic bonds within the community. 
1 1 Golding (1972) was probably the first to suggest that the transgenerational extension of 
communities might provide sound arguments to justify environmental policy-making. 
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However, De-Shalit acknowledges that at a certain moment in time a stage of substantially 
reduced communitarian affinity will be reached, which implies that the community-based 
responsibilities to future generations fade away. Since communities are characterised by 
continuity and change, the communitarian argument for the preservation of nature and the 
environment looses force, say, eight to ten generations from now. Again, like Passmore's 
chains of love, De-Shalit's transgenerational communities cannot justify strong negative 
obligations to remote future generations, but his account could offer leads to capture the 
fuller short-term environmental responsibilities that sustainable development as a green 
ideal is supposed to articulate. His account may not be able to address, for instance, the 
contribution of going on holidays by air to long-term environmental problems like the 
greenhouse effect, acid rain and the destruction of the ozone layer. However, his emphasis 
on transgenerationally communitarian affinities does offer sound arguments for an 
extension of the realm of fuller intergenerational environmental responsibihties beyond 
the immediate intimacy of parent-children relationships. 
Some scholars may raise the question of whether De-Shalit's transgenerational 
communities really exist. Is the plurality of lifestyles, visions of the good life, and 
consumptive preferences, within and between communities and societies, not enough 
reason to skip these imaginary transgenerational communities from the interpretation of 
sustainable development as a green ideal? Beckerman (1999) is surely right to assert that 
an "appeal to some transcendental unique community comprising groups of people who 
have no contact with each other in order to provide an entity that values greater equality 
over generations seems to be stretching the concept of community beyond reasonable 
limits" (82). However, the narrative overtones of De-Shalit's account should not be thrown 
out with the bath-water. He is quite right to argue that people's, socially constituted, 
narratives of self-identity extend after their death and into the future. This temporal 
extension is an important ramification of the narrative conceptualisation of the notions of 
lifestyle and self-identity (see 3.2.1). 
People do assume, for instance, that future generations will actually come to exist, 
otherwise it would be quite meaningless even to have any concerns about the provision of 
ample opportunities for future generations to follow their own narratives of self-identity. 
Moreover, the current generation would welcome reflexive agreement of future 
generations with their visions, ideals, or uses of nature and the environment. This wish for 
approval from future generations might indeed be another important argument, or thread, 
in people's empathetic concerns about the preservation of the natural environment that 
should be captured by the complementary narrative interpretation of sustainable 
development as a green ideal (cf. O'Neill, 1993). 
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5.3.2 
Current Ideals, Narrative Futures 
After the discussion of Passmore's chains of love and De-Shalit's transgenerational 
communities it should be obvious that a full interpretation of sustainable development 
should also build on people's green ideals. Quite a few environmental philosophers closed 
this open door in their focus on deducing an intergenerational moral principle that would 
warrant strong negative obligations to prevent further deterioration of nature and the 
environment. Would these environmental philosophers still appreciate their cumbersome 
arguments when hiking in some area of natural beauty? Perhaps environmental 
philosophers and radical environmentalists have been worrying too much that their 
arguments for strong sustainability policies could never successfully challenge vested 
economic and political interests without an environmental archimedean point (cf. Zweers, 
1995). Therefore, although the minimal requirements of the restraint principle should be 
embraced to obviate such worries, it should also be acknowledged that an exclusive 
preoccupation with spatio-temporally remote environmental harms and risks hampers the 
mobilising force of the notion of sustainable development. Sustainable development 
should also capture the empathetic concerns about nature and the environment in people's 
future-oriented green ideals and narratives of self-identity. Beyond the minimal 
requirements of the restraint principle dawns a debate on fuller responsibilities towards 
nearby future generations. 
Hence, a full interpretation of the notion of sustainable development should also 
capture people's ideals of the good environment: "Perhaps people in the future might learn 
to find satisfaction in totally artificial landscapes, walking in the astroturf amid the plastic 
trees while electronic birds sing overhead. But we cannot but believe that something 
horrible would have happened to human beings if they did not miss real grass, trees, and 
birds" (Barry, 1999a; 102). The pursuit of sustainable development should also offer leads 
for the preservation of unique environmental goods as part of the natural and cultural 
heritage that the current generation is proud to pass on to their offspring. The deterioration 
of these environmental goods would have severe repercussions on current identities, since 
the preservation of these goods is constitutive for many people's future-oriented narratives 
of self-identity. Since the current generation is to decide which environmental goods to 
preserve for future generations, environmental policy-making is inescapably involved in 
the dirty business of prioritising the preservation of some over other environmental goods. 
This prioritising job will be tainted by current ideals and narratives, which precondition 
the social and material conditions of future lifestyles (Giddens, 1994a; Norton, 1996b; 
Arrler, 1999). 
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The introduction of chains of love between successive generations, transgenerational 
affinities, and the wish for future approval of the current use of the natural environment as 
leading threads in the complementary interpretation of sustainable development as a green 
ideal already foreshadowed a particular, previously neglected, aspect of the narrative 
conceptualisation of the notions of lifestyle and self-identity (see 3.2.1). People's 
narratives of self-identity extend beyond their own lives and into the future. People always 
keep an open eye on future consequences and opportunities in enacting their narratives of 
self-identity, following their lifestyles and making their behavioral choices. Although the 
future is principally unknowable, people do construct this future by anticipation in their 
day-to-day behavioral choices. They, at least, tend to take the existence of future 
generations for granted. This assumption that future generations will actually come to 
exist seems to be a common thread in the otherwise quite divergent narratives of self-
identity in contemporary pluralistic societies, and implies that current concerns about the 
opportunities of future generations to follow their lifestyles are also concerns about our 
own identities. These concerns about the opportunities of future generations reflect the 
current generation's interest in being able to follow narratives of self-identity that can be 
framed in a long-term perspective. 
The current generation finds itself in the peculiar situation that at the very same 
moment that the negative repercussions on nature and the environment of their behavioral 
choices seem to stretch across larger spatio-temporal distances than ever before in history, 
they also have become reflexively aware of their identities and ideals as spread over time. 
Long-term environmental policy-making should grasp the chance to build on this reflexive 
trust in social and material continuity as a leading thread in many contemporary narratives 
of self-identity. Such trust in the future is necessary to give meaning to any behavioral 
choice or narrative of self-identity whatsoever, and could fuel the fuller environmental 
responsibilities towards nearby future generations that sustainable development as a green 
ideal tries to articulate (Giddens, 1990 & 1991; O'Neill, 1993). 
Another leading thread of the complementary narrative interpretation of sustainable 
development as a green ideal should be to acknowledge that people's empathetic concerns 
about the preservation of nature and the environment are ultimately constituted in their 
immediate encounters with the human and non-human other in circumstances of co-
presence. In his famous attempt to come to terms with the horrors of the Holocaust, 
Bauman (1989) writes in one of his most Levinasian moments: "Responsibility, this 
building block of all moral behaviour, arises out of the proximity of the other" (184). 
Extending this other to include the non-human other serves to clarify why the proximity of 
animals and the rest of nature in people's immediate encounters represents a formative 
experience in the incorporation of green ideals in their future-oriented narratives of self-
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identity.12 Of course, these nature experiences, even quite similar ones, could have 
divergent consequences for people's narratives of self-identity. Some nature experiences 
may even be so threatening that they have negative consequences on the development of 
green ideals. Notwithstanding this ramification, the principled interpretation of sustainable 
development simply misses the crucial point that "nature, both domesticated and wild 
non-human nature, is a source of intense and immediate aesthetic delight. Because of its 
immediacy, this type of aesthetic experience requires no warrant. It just is" (Hickman, 
1996; 65). Although such aesthetic experiences should be included in a full account of 
sustainable development, this is not to be mistaken for the deep ecological claim that some 
intrinsic value warrants direct obligations towards nature. Nature remains the object and 
not the subject of moral and aesthetic values. 
The narrative interpretation of sustainable development as a green ideal holds it that 
a particularly important objective of environmental policy-making should be to support 
initiatives to have people, especially young people, experience nature in, for instance, 
environmental education at primary and secondary schools (cf. Margadant-van Arcken, 
1988).13 Such immediate nature experiences could fuel support for the idea that the current 
generation should leave its offspring with a good environment. Do we really need to 
devise ever more esoteric justifications for environmental policy-making? No, it suffices 
that most people feel some responsibility for the preservation of nature and the 
environment, and for the rest environmental philosophy better "forswears the search for 
knockdown arguments that will convince absolutely everyone that natural values are 
important" (Weston, 1996b; 303). 
To conclude the, sometimes rather unearthly, discussion of sustainable development 
as both a principle of intergenerational justice and a future-oriented green ideal, it should 
be perfectly clear that the baseline of the restraint principle could justify directive 
strategies for government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles. The complementary 
narrative interpretation of sustainable development as a green ideal, however, both calls 
for fuller responsibilities towards nearby future generations and could only justify non-
directive strategies for government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles. People in 
1 2 Dobson (1998) identifies a similar line of argument in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology (see 
also Riphagen, 1997). 
1 3 On a personal note; I was a member of the 'Nederlandse Jeugdbond voor Natuurstudie' (a 
Dutch organisation for young naturalists) as a teenager. It is my educated guess that it is no 
coincidence that so many members of this youth organisation became prominent Dutch ecologists, 
environmental scientists, conservationists, environmentalists, or, for that matter, environmental 
philosophers in their professional lives (cf. Coesèl, 1997). 
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contemporary pluralistic societies are bound to disagree on the perfectionist ideals of the 
good environment that should support such fuller responsibilities. Therefore, the narrative 
interpretation of sustainable development suggests extensive public deliberation about 
these ideals, and their materialisation in sustainable lifestyles, as a crucial element of 
environmental pohcy-making (see 4.5). Such deliberations will hopefully result in stronger 
demands on the current generation to secure a good environment for nearby future 
generations than the rninimal requirements of environmental survivalism. In the case of 
going on holidays by air, for instance, these deliberations could address not only the use of 
non-renewable fossil fuels but also discuss eco-tourism as a perfectionist green ideal. It 
would be a disappointing restriction of the public environmental debate, if survivalist 
preoccupations in the interpretation of sustainable development precluded discussion 
about such ideals. 
5.4 
Stocktaking or Systems Ecology 
At this stage, it is time to shift attention to the more mundane problem of how to 
operationalise the environmental baseline of the restraint principle in a, possibly 
quantified, guideline for day-to-day environmental policy-making. This section will, 
therefore, discuss the stocktaking approach of drawing a list of primary environmental 
goods and the systems ecological approach of defining an environmental utilisation space 
(EUS) as a modest and a more ambitious operafionalisation respectively. Both alternatives 
start from the same spatio-temporally egalitarian premises that flavoured the restraint 
principle, but diverge on the issue of taking either a pragmatic or a principled stance 
towards these premises. 
5.4.1 
Primary Environmental Goods 
The stocktaking approach to operationalising the environmental baseline of the restraint 
principle starts by acknowledging that the emphasis on the principal impossibility to be 
certain about future preferences (see 5.2.1) may have obscured that you do not need to be 
uncertain about future needs. It holds it that, whereas it is impossible to predict future 
preferences, lifestyles or visions of the good life, you can be quite certain that some 
primary goods need to be secured to follow whatever future preferences, lifestyles or 
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visions. According to Rawls (1972), such primary goods are "things which it is supposed a 
rational man wants whatever else he wants. Regardless of what an individual's rational 
plans are in detail, it is assumed that there are various things which he would prefer more 
of rather than less. With more of these goods men can generally be assured of greater 
success in carrying out their intentions and in advancing their ends, whatever these ends 
may be" (93). Rawls focused on primary social goods, which he listed as: rights and 
liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth, and a sense of one's own worth. 
However, it is rather obvious that future life also depends on a minimum of primary 
environmental goods being kept available from one generation to the next. Some 
environmental goods are essential to all human life, and environmental policy-making 
should prioritise the preservation of these necessary environmental conditions to form and 
pursue current and future visions of the good life (O'Neill, 1993; Barry, 1999a; Miller, 
1999). 
If environmental policy-making is to be of practical significance, it will have no 
choice but to prioritise the preservation of some environmental goods and accept the 
deterioration of other, less essential, goods. The stocktaking approach suggests that a 
tentative list of transgenerationally primary environmental goods be drawn to provide 
environmental policy-makers with a rule-of-thumb for this inescapable prioritising job. 
This list of transgenerationally primary environmental goods should only contain 
environmental goods that are necessary for the pursuit of any current or future lifestyle, 
and exclude the many environmental goods that are only valuable for the pursuit of certain 
specific narratives of self-identity or visions of the good life. 
In drawing a tentative list, you may think of such environmental goods as fresh air, 
clean water, fertile soil, and the availability of sufficient power sources. However, listing, 
for instance, power sources as a transgenerationally primary environmental good does not 
necessarily imply that the current generation should stop all its use of non-renewable fossil 
fuels. It does ask the current generation to compensate future generations for usurping 
these power sources by developing a) better extraction techniques for fossil fuels, b) new 
techniques for using renewable power sources (solar and wind energy, water-power), and 
c) energy-saving techniques. So, listing power sources as primary environmental goods 
does not necessarily imply that the current generation should stop going on holidays by 
air, but it does imply that this use of non-renewable fossil fuels should be compensated for 
by the development of alternative means of transport (Dobson, 1998; Arrler, 1999). 
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5.4.2 
Environmental Utilisation Space 
The notion of an environmental utilisation space (EUS) represents a more ambitious, 
systems ecological, approach to the operationalisation of sustainable development. The 
proponents of this notion share with the stocktaking approach the spatio-temporally 
egalitarian outlook that also flavoured the environmental baseline of the restraint principle, 
but draw stronger conclusions from these premises. A discussion of the EUS notion is 
particularly relevant, since the second Dutch National Environmental Policy Plan 
(NEPP2)(VROM, 1993) officially enshrined this notion in Dutch environmental policy-
making. 1 4 
The proponents of the EUS see this notion as an operationalisation of what Daly 
(1995) coined strong sustainability, i.e. the idea that the natural environment imposes 
limits or constraints on the pursuit of lifestyles and consumptive preferences. Whereas 
weak sustainability advocates think of these limits as being the products of social 
construction, the proponents of the EUS hold it that the laws of nature ultimately 
deterrnine the limits of sustainable development. They argue that the natural environment 
will pose real limits on people's lifestyles and consumptive preferences, if the current 
generation is to secure the opportunities of future generations to follow their visions of the 
good life. Thus, environmental policy-making is supposed to be justified by scientific 
arguments. 
The kernel of the EUS notion is that exploitation ceilings can be formulated for the 
sustainable use of renewable environmental goods. Such goods may be exploited short of 
impairing natural regeneration, or to the extent that exploitation is compensated by 
deliberate replacement. However, the use of the natural environment does not only involve 
the exploitation o f renewable environmental goods, it also includes using the natural 
environment as a sink for emissions. To a certain degree natural assimilation processes can 
absorb this environmental strain, but environmental quality will decrease when these 
processes are overtaxed. Regeneration and absorption represent the life support function of 
the natural environment. Together they constitute the natural conditions for the pursuit of 
lifestyles and consumptive preferences. If you analyse environmental utilisation in these 
terms, a space will literally emerge. The boundaries of this space represent patterns and 
levels of environmental utilisation that can be sustained over time. This space, which is 
enclosed by a cluster of exploitation and emission ceilings, is the EUS. The proponents of 
1 4 Opschoor & Weterings (1994) and Van Hengel & Gremmen (1995) offer good introductions to 
the kernel of the EUS notion. 
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the EUS notion argue that sustainable development should be interpreted as the 
requirement to keep the environmental utilisation of each generation within the boundaries 
of this EUS. 
It is more difficult to formulate a rule for the sustainable use of non-renewable 
environmental goods like fossil fuels. In this case sustainable use is strictly speaking 
impossible, because any use would diminish available stocks and this would have negative 
repercussions on the opportunities of future generations to follow their lifestyles and 
consumptive preferences. Therefore, sustainable development seems to demand that all 
generations refrain from using any non-renewable environmental goods. To avoid this 
rather absurd conclusion, two prominent proponents of the EUS invented the ingenious, 
though somewhat arbitrary, rule that "residual stocks must be kept at (or raised to) a level 
sufficient for the use over a period of at least 50 years" (Weterings & Opschoor, 1994; 
224). This rule requires that in each succeeding year two percent less will be used of some 
non-renewable environmental good than in the preceding year. Thus, the environmental 
good will never become completely exhausted. It could also be possible to compensate 
future generations for the use of non-renewable environmental goods by bequeathing to 
them more knowledge and better know-how about a) the exploitation of these 
environmental goods, and b) the development of alternative renewable environmental 
goods. The 50-years rule provides a stimulus to take such compensatory measures. The 
rule also illustrates the ambitions of the EUS notion to quantify the environmental baseline 
of the restraint principle, and to justify directive strategies to abate the environmental 
repercussions of going on holidays by air. 
One of the most striking features of the EUS notion is that it not only embraces an 
intergenerational egalitarianism in the distribution of environmental goods, but also argues 
for a strictly egalitarian distribution of the EUS among the members of the current 
generation. The idea is that any individual may follow his or her own lifestyle or 
consumptive preferences as long as he or she stays within an individualised EUS. This 
personal EUS is simply the total EUS divided by the number of current inhabitants of the 
world, and could be defined by natural scientists without invoking any particular 
perfectionist vision of the good environment. In a political liberal frame of reference, it 
surely makes sense to argue that each individual be granted an equal right to use the very 
same amount of each and every kind of environmental good. In the absence of a common 
notion of the good environment, on which a different division of the EUS could be based, 
this seems to be a reasonable individuation rule indeed. However, a strict application of 
this individuation rule is not as simple as it seems (see 5.5)(Arrler, 1999). 
Unfortunately, the proponents of the EUS share the survivalist preoccupations of the 
spatio-temporally egalitarian branches of political liberalism. This is particularly clear 
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once you take a closer look at their arguments about the preservation of biodiversity. The 
EUS notion captures that the life support system of the human species encompasses a 
large number of non-human species, and that the preservation of these species is secured 
by the requirement of mamtaining the EUS. However, the disappearance of numerous 
other species and habitats may not affect humanity's life support system. It bears witness 
to the intellectual and emotional anaemia of the EUS notion that it cannot argue for the 
preservation of these species and habitats. This shows that the cogency of the EUS notion 
in arguing for unassailable and non-negotiable limits on people's lifestyles and 
consumptive preferences rests on survivalist sentiments. Once survival of the human 
species is no longer at stake, the assumption that the EUS can be specified by the methods 
of objective science looses its credibility. Hence, the EUS notion cannot articulate fuller 
responsibilities for the preservation of a good environment in the interest of nearby future 
generations. 
5.5 
Science and Politics 
While the promise of a fuller quantification of the environmental baseline of the restraint 
principle may speak in favour of the EUS notion, this promise is severely compromised by 
an anachronistic understanding of the relation between science and politics among the 
proponents of the EUS. They seem to assume that scientific knowledge about the natural 
environment, and about the repercussions of people's behavioral choices, would be enough 
to justify the objectives of environmental policy-making. They, thus, neglect the principal 
uncertainty of scientific knowledge in contemporary affluent societies. This principal 
uncertainty of scientific knowledge will manifest itself most clearly, when attempts are 
made to quantify the EUS. Therefore, any interpretation of sustainable development 
should address ways to deal with this uncertainty in arguing about the proper relation 
between scientific knowledge and normative choices in environmental policy-making. 
Giddens's account of reflexive modernisation is worth discussing in this respect, 
since he emphasises that contemporary affluent societies are characterised by radical 
uncertainty about science and technology (see 3.4.1).15 According to him, uncertainty 
permeates day-to-day policy-making and represents an inescapable dimension of people's 
daily lives in contemporary affluent societies. Although people need to use scientific 
1 5 The uncertainty of scientific knowledge is a recurring theme in Giddens's substantial sociology 
of the reflexive modem condition (Giddens, 1990; 1991; 1994a & 1994b). 
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knowledge in the flow of daily life, they can never be certain that some piece of 
knowledge will not have to be revised in the second instance. In the past people may have 
thought that the gradual growth of scientific knowledge would create greater certainty 
about social life and future developments and prospects, but now they have to 
acknowledge that this was wishful tWnking. No scientific knowledge will ever be certain. 
The temporary character of each piece of knowledge is an inherent aspect of the scientific 
enterprise. Hence, citizen-consumers and policy-makers alike continuously need to revise, 
for instance, their views on the use of nature and the environment in the light of new or 
altered scientific claims. Whatever behavioral options may seem acceptable, appropriate 
or recommendable today, tomorrow's knowledge may assess them differently. Once you 
accept this principal uncertainty of scientific knowledge, you should also adopt a more 
modest position on the possibility of quantifying an environmental baseline than shown by 
the proponents of the EUS. 
Moreover, scientific experts also routinely contest the authority of other expert 
claims, thus questioning the very possibility to base policy-making on the results of 
scientific research. This disagreement and critique among scientific experts happens to be 
the motor of the scientific enterprise, but it also means that policy-makers and citizen-
consumers have no choice but to choose between the competing claims of rival scientific 
experts. In the absence of an authoritative meta-expert, it is perfectly reasonable that 
people opt for a rather sceptical stance towards the dazzling plurality of scientific claims. 
Thus, trust in science is subverted by the very scepticism that is also the motor of the 
scientific enterprise. The proponents of the EUS and other radical environmentalists tend 
to ignore this principal uncertainty of scientific knowledge and show an unwarranted trust 
in the capabilities of science to justify governmental policies. However, they too should 
acknowledge that it is principally impossible to make full scientific calculations of 
environmental risks, since it is impossible to predict all unintended consequences of 
people's behavioral choices. Moreover, any risk assessment should at least also include the 
risk of which experts to consult or whose authority to take as binding. Since science can 
never provide the certainties that the proponents of the EUS promise, a reflexive and 
interactive relation between science and politics should characterise environmental policy-
making. 
However, it should also be acknowledged that the radical uncertainty about 
scientific knowledge is doubled by an equally radical impact of science and technology on 
everyday life in contemporary affluent societies. The social and material conditions of 
people's daily lives increasingly become the products of science and technology. 
Nowadays, people live in thoroughly manufactured environments. With the expansion of 
scientific intervention in almost every realm of individual and social life, it has become 
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practically impossible to disengage from the technological systems of contemporary 
affluent societies. The scientific and technological reconstruction of the natural 
environment is so radical and total indeed that it is no exaggeration to speak of the end of 
nature, as a guideline for behaviour, next to the end of tradition (McKibben, 1989)(see 
3.4.1). 
The reconstruction of the natural environment by scientific and technological 
knowledge may thus have brought nature to an end, but the proponents of the EUS are 
surely right to argue that the tremendous expansion of human control over nature seems to 
reach its outer limits now. You do not need to be a doomsday prophet to acknowledge that 
the current generation's use of fossil fuels, for instance to go on holidays by air, cannot be 
sustained into the future. Nature and the environment are subject to a more far-reaching 
and intensive man-made deterioration than ever before in history. Unfortunately, deep 
ecologists and other radical environmentalists conclude from this sobering statement that 
the real environmental problem is people's instrumental perception of nature. They lament 
about the loss of nature's enchanted character as a metaphysical source of value in 
contemporary affluent societies. With their denial of the disenchantment or end of nature, 
and their retreat to some esoteric mtrinsic value of nature, deep ecologists and other radical 
environmentalists fall prey to the naturalistic fallacy of deducing normative choices from 
objective facts about the natural environment. The preservation of nature can no longer 
depend "on calling for a reversion to 'nature' [since] nature no longer exists!" (Giddens, 
1994a; ll)(c/Keulartz, 1998). 
The paradox of environmental policy-making is that the conservation of nature is 
embraced only at the point of its disappearance. People began to worry about the 
environment only once nature had all but dissolved in a thoroughgoing process of social 
reconstruction. However, to accept the social constitution of environmental problems does 
not necessarily imply that you could no longer argue against the further deterioration of 
the nature and the environment. The account of the restraint principle and primary 
environmental goods hopefully showed that much (see 5.2.2 and 5.4.1). 
The twin processes of radicalising uncertainty of scientific knowledge and a far-
reaching reconstruction of the natural environment by science and technology introduced 
the notions of risk and trust in the public environmental debate. First, the reflexive modern 
redefinition of the notion of risk (cf. Beck, 1986) articulates the idea that the negative 
repercussions on nature and the environment are mostly unintended consequences of 
people's routinely made behavioral choices. People do not go on holidays by air to spoil 
the natural environment. Such unintended consequences generate risks that, unlike natural 
disasters, are social in origin. The reflexive modern notion of risk thus emphasises that 
environmental problems are principally social problems mediated by the impact of science 
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and technology on the natural environment. It is mostly impossible to hold specific 
individuals responsible for these risks, and it is equally difficult to develop individuated 
constraints to mitigate the generation of these risks. Therefore, a straightforward 
individuation of the environmental risks of, for instance, usurping fossil fuels is a 
problematic enterprise. Since people's risk perceptions, calculations and strategies are 
bound to be matters of ongoing public debate in contemporary pluralistic societies, an 
unequivocal quantification of the EUS is an unrealistic and over-ambitious project. 
Second, the renewed interest in the notion of trust probably relates to the reduced 
visibility of the links between risks and their causes. When these links were more visible, 
people's trust in political, scientific and technological systems was more routinely 
incorporated in the ongoing flow of daily life. At present, however, it is no longer self-
evident that people trust governments, scientists or technological experts to take the 
appropriate courses of action to abate the spatio-temporally remote risks of the current 
generation's use of nature and the environment. People's trust in these expert systems 
seems to depend on whether these systems secure the transparency of risks and thus 
sustain people's opportunities to avoid these risks (Wynne, 1996). This trust in the 
plurality of political, scientific and technological systems is necessary to prevent risk 
awareness from starting down the slippery slope of socially destabilising scares. The 
continuous apocalyptic lamenting by the survivalist proponents of the EUS surely does not 
serve to sustain this trust. 
For all these reasons, it seems wise to leave the principled and over-ambitious stance 
of the proponents of the EUS, and embrace the more modest and pragmatic approach of 
drawing a tentative, possibly quantifiable, list of primary environmental goods. This list 
offers a guideline to prioritise between the objectives of environmental politics in the 
pursuit of sustainable development. The narrow operationalisation provides environmental 
policy-making with a baseline to justify directive strategies for government intervention in 
non-sustainable lifestyles in a limited set of conditions. 
5.6 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out to answer the question of whether the pursuit of sustainable 
development could justify government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles. The 
authoritative WCED-definition (1987) of sustainable development as "development that 
meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs" (43) suggested that this question essentially asks 
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whether the objective of preventing further deterioration of nature and the environment 
could justify restrictions on people's freedom to follow their own lifestyles. An affirmative 
answer to this question would count as a justification for environmental policy-making 
that should be welcomed by environmental philosophers who are keen to avoid any of the 
hitherto unsuccessful attempts to base environmental policy-making on some presumed 
intrinsic value of nature. 
Fortunately, it could be shown that, whereas Rawls's initial grounding of his savings 
principle on the emotional ties between successive generations was defective, his latest 
defence convincingly argues that a savings principle should be incorporated in the political 
liberal frame of reference as a spatio-temporal extension of the justice and harm principles 
to safeguard the opportunities of future generations to follow their own lifestyles. The 
kernel of Rawls's latest defence of his savings principle is that the participants in the 
original position are to reach agreement on a savings principle under the further condition 
that they should be willing to accept that previous generations saved according to the same 
principle. This is indeed an appropriate intergenerational equivalent of the Kantian 
categorical imperative that people should only embrace moral principles that they would 
welcome all other people to agree upon. Although Rawls's account provides sound 
arguments why the current generation should save for future generations, he remains silent 
about what should be saved. The restraint principle was shown to be capable to'fill this 
gap by giving the spatio-temporally egalitarian interpretation of sustainable development 
as intergenerational justice its much-needed substantial flesh and bone. The kernel of this 
restraint principle is that people cannot claim an unconditional right to destroy 
environmental goods. Therefore, users should always prove that some particular 
destructive use of environmental goods is necessary to meet basic human needs. The 
principle thus puts the onus of proof on the users of environmental goods, and it does so 
without having to rely on controversial assumptions about people's attitudes towards risks. 
This reversal of the burden of proof provides environmentalists with the ammunition they 
wrongly thought to have found in the popular precautionary principle. 
Although the restraint principle should be embraced to secure a baseline that could 
justify directive strategies for government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles, it 
would be a pity if the pursuit of sustainable development were confined to these minimum 
requirements of environmental survivalism. Therefore, the principled account was to be 
supplemented by a future-oriented narrative interpretation of sustainable development as a 
green ideal to call for fuller moral responsibilities towards nearby future generations. 
Passmore's chains of love between successive generations, De-Shalit's transgenerational 
(communitarian) affinities, and the wish for future approval of the current use of nature 
and the environment were introduced as leading threads in the future-oriented narratives of 
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self-identity that fuel people's empathetic concerns about the deterioration of nature and 
the environment. Furthermore, it was argued that these future-oriented narratives or green 
ideals build on the aesthetic nature experiences in people's immediate encounters with the 
human and non-human other in circumstances of co-presence. However, it was 
acknowledged that such nature experiences would materialise in a plurality of visions of 
the good environment in contemporary affluent societies. The complementary narrative 
account of sustainable development as a green ideal, therefore, accepts that people's fuller 
responsibilities towards nearby future generations could only justify non-directive 
strategies for government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles. These strategies 
should include extensive public deliberation on people's perfectionist visions of the good 
environment to inspire the further development of sustainable lifestyles (see 4.5). 
At that stage it was time to shift attention to the more mundane issue of 
operationalising, or quantifying, the baseline of the restraint principle for day-to-day 
environmental policy-making. First, a stocktaking approach was discussed, which aims to 
draw a tentative list of transgenerationally universal primary environmental goods. These 
primary environmental goods (fertile soil, clean water, fresh air, and the availability of 
sufficient power sources) are necessary to follow whatever lifestyle, vision of the good life 
or consumptive preferences. Therefore, environmental policy-making should prioritise 
their preservation over the preservation of other, presumably less essential, environmental 
goods. Second, a discussion of the more ambitious notion of an environmental utilisation 
space (EUS) showed that the mobilising force of this notion depends on an unwarranted 
trust in the capabilities of the natural sciences to justify the objectives of environmental 
policy-making. The promise to quantify fuller minimum requirements for environmental 
policy-making is severely compromised by an anachronistic understanding of the relation 
between science and politics among the proponents of the EUS. A natural scientific 
definition of the EUS might be an attractive prospect for radical environmentalists who 
wish to challenge vested political and economic interests. However, the principal 
uncertainty of scientific knowledge, as well as the problematic individuation of the EUS, 
suggest a more modest role for scientific expertise in environmental policy-making. 
Therefore, the over-ambitious and principled stance of the EUS should be left for the 
more pragmatic and modest approach of drawing a tentative, possibly quantifiable, list of 
primary environmental goods to justify directive strategies for government intervention in 
non-sustainable lifestyles in a limited set of conditions. Any further objectives of 
environmental policy-making should accept people's divergent risk perceptions to build 
the reflexive trust that is necessary for a voluntary adjustment of non-sustainable lifestyles 
in the non-directive strategies of a green third way. 
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The minimum requirements of the restraint principle and the list of primary environmental 
goods thus justify directive strategies for government intervention in non-sustainable 
lifestyles. However, non-directive strategies will probably have to do the majority of the 
job in calling for fuller responsibilities towards nearby future generations. One of the 
biggest challenges would be to broaden the spectrum of communicative and economic 
strategies (see 2.2 & 2.3) by presenting an outline of a reflexive egalitarianism as a green 
third way of government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles (see chapter 6). 
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6 
Conclusion - Outline of a Green Third Way 
"You've got to make me an offer, 
that cannot be ignored [...] 
You can take it or leave it... 
Temptation" 
(Heaven 17,1983) 
6.1 
Summarising the Argument 
Although it is about time to present the outline of a green third way for government 
intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles now, let's summarise the book's main line of 
argument first. The book kicked off by remarking that the year 1972 must have been a 
very special year indeed. The Club of Rome published its report 'The Limits to Growth', 
the Ecologist published its 'Blueprint for Survival', and the United Nations held its first 
environmental conference in Stockholm. These three occasions were the first to use the 
notion of sustainable development with its current connotations. However, sustainable 
development only received its lasting status as a meta-objective for national and 
international environmental policy-making with the publication of the WCED-report 'Our 
Common Future' in 1987. This report defined sustainable development as "development 
that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs". Subsequently, the debate on sustainable 
development reached a new climax with the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. This conference introduced the 
idea that sustainable development asks for adjustments of lifestyles and patterns of 
consumption, apart from adjustments in the sphere of production. UNCED emphasised the 
need for government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles, and the second Dutch 
National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP2) translated this emphasis to the Dutch 
context. 
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UNCED and NEPP2 initiated an extensive public debate on government intervention in 
non-sustainable lifestyles, which was dominated by communicative and economic 
strategies. Unfortunately, these strategies hitherto failed to reconcile government 
intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles and respect for people's freedom to follow their 
own lifestyles. Therefore, this book's objective has been to provide this very reconciliation 
by drawing an outline of a green third way for government intervention in non-sustainable 
lifestyles. This green third way was to present itself as an alternative for the first 
(communicative) and second (economic) ways in the Dutch public debate. The book 
aimed to articulate people's concerns about the deterioration of nature and the 
environment, materialised in the worldwide support for the notion of sustainable 
development, within a largely political liberal frame of reference. 
Chapter 2 mapped the Dutch public debate on government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles. This analysis showed that although communicative and economic 
strategies dominate the debate, these strategies are seriously flawed in their attempts to 
evade the principled question of whether government intervention in non-sustainable 
lifestyles implies an intolerable infringement of people's freedom to follow their own 
lifestyles, visions of the good life or consumptive preferences. Communicative and 
economic strategies were thus criticised on three accounts: 1) their failure to recognise the 
inextricable interconnectedness between attitudes and behaviour in people's lifestyles; 2) 
their evasion of the question of how government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles 
could respect the individual freedom of choice; and 3) their unwillingness to investigate 
whether sustainable development could offer sound reasons to restrict this freedom of 
choice. Both strategies are, therefore, incapable of providing a meaningful interpretation of 
all key terms in the phrase 'government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles'. It was 
not much of a surprise then that they cannot reconcile government intervention and respect 
for people's freedom to follow their own lifestyles. Therefore, the chapters 3,4 and 5 
subsequently set out to remedy these three flaws of communicafive and economic 
strategies. Luckily, lately a third strategy dawned in the Dutch public debate. This third 
strategy will provide some of the materials to develop an outline of a green third way for 
government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles in this chapter. 
Chapter 3 argued, mainly inspired by Giddens's theory of structuration, his and 
Beck's accounts of reflexive modernisation and Douglas's grid-group analysis, for a 
narrative conceptualisation of the notions of lifestyle and self-identity. This 
conceptualisation 1) emphasised the inextricable interconnectedness of practices and 
narratives of self-identity in people's lifestyles, 2) stressed the duality of individual and 
society in the constitution of lifestyles, 3) changed the modernist distinction between 
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citizen and consumer for the pubhc-private hybrid of the citizen-consumer, and 4) mapped 
the plurality of lifestyles in contemporary globalising, individualising and 
detraditionalising societies. The narrative conceptualisation of lifestyles implied that it was 
no longer possible to evade the question of whether government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles necessarily entails an intolerable infringement of people's freedom to 
follow their own lifestyles. It will not do to emphasise some remaining freedom in either 
practices or narratives of self-identity, since these practices and narratives are inextricably 
interconnected in people's lifestyles. 
Chapter 4 argued, mainly informed by Berlin's and Rawls's political liberalism, 
Raz's liberal perfectionism and Habermas's notion of a deliberative democracy, that most 
government intervention in lifestyles is indeed an intolerable infringement of the 
individual freedom of choice. This liberal point of view 1) argued that respect for the 
individual freedom of choice implies that the government should take a neutral and anti-
perfectionist stance, 2) held it that directive, communicative and economic, strategies for 
government intervention would only be justified if certain choices harmed others, caused 
injustice, or were obviously irrational, 3) accepted, in the second instance, that the political 
liberal argument is not neutral and anti-perfectionist at all, but believed that this 
perfectionist turn only strengthened the need to respect the individual freedom of choice, 
and 4) advocated extensive public deliberation on the objectives and instruments of 
environmental policy-making. The political liberal emphasis on the need to respect the 
individual freedom of choice implied that directive strategies for government intervention 
in non-sustainable lifestyles generally do not show enough respect for people's freedom to 
follow their own lifestyles, unless it is obvious that certain lifestyles harm others or cause 
injustice. 
Chapter 5 argued, mainly on the basis of Rawls's savings principle, Wissenburg's 
restraint principle, Passmore's chains of love, and De-Shalit's transgenerational 
communities, for a double interpretation of sustainable development as a principle of 
intergenerational justice and a future-oriented green ideal. This double interpretation 1) 
embraced the restraint principle and the argument that no individual can claim an 
unconditional right to destroy environmental goods as a baseline that could justify 
directive strategies for government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles, 2) suggested 
that people's concerns about the deterioration of nature and the environment articulate 
future-oriented narratives of self-identity that could fuel non-directive strategies to develop 
further responsibilities towards nearby future generations, 3) preferred to draw a list of 
primary environmental goods instead of quantifying some environmental utilisation space 
as a practical guideline for day-to-day environmental policy-making, and 4) concluded 
that the uncertainty of scientific knowledge about the unintended environmental 
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repercussions of consumptive choices casts serious doubt about attempts to justify 
directive strategies for government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles beyond the 
requirement of sustaining the baseline of the restraint principle and the list of primary 
environmental goods. Sustainable development, thus, provided sound arguments to restrict 
people's freedom to follow their own lifestyles, when these lifestyles transgressed the 
baseline of the restraint principle and the list of primary environmental goods. However, 
the individual freedom of choice should not be restricted for any further environmental 
considerations. Non-directive strategies were thus to stimulate the development of such 
further responsibilities towards nearby future generations. The challenge for a green third 
way of government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles became to search for 
adjustments of social and material conditions that could tempt people to develop 
sustainable lifestyles. A short account of a remarkable initiative may serve to meet this 
challenge. 
6.2 
Schönau Energy Initiatives 
In 1986 Chernobyl's nuclear power station exploded. This catastrophe not only shocked 
the world but also motivated a group of citizen-consumers in Schönau, a small town in the 
German Black Forest, to start a series of remarkable initiatives. Suddenly awakened by the 
enormous environmental and health risks of nuclear power, this group initiated a thorough 
reconstruction of Schönau's system of power provision. After Chernobyl, these citizen-
consumers felt the urge to convert from nuclear and other non-renewable power sources 
towards sustainable energy. Since they acknowledged that the possibilities for energy 
saving are principally limited, a new system of power provision had to be developed that 
would preserve non-renewable resources and reduce pollution. Soon afterwards, the 
citizen-consumers discovered that large power stations are an inefficient way of producing 
electricity and they decided that small cogeneration plants should produce Schönau's 
electricity. These cogeneration plants produce heat and electricity at the same time and 
since they normally produce more electricity than can be used at the place of generation, 
the surpluses can be fed into the network. Other people may thus make use of these 
surpluses in their households. 
In 1990 the citizen-consumers of Schönau founded the Elektrizitätswerke Schönau 
(EWS) to finance and install such decentralised power stations. This was a first major step 
in their initiative to buy back the local electricity network and to develop sustainable 
energy policies. The EWS was destined to develop into an electricity distribution system 
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with an environmental rationale. With this new distribution system the citizen-consumers 
of Schönau hoped to create the necessary social and material conditions for a successful 
conversion from nuclear and other large power stations to decentralised small 
cogeneration plants. In 1997 the EWS was able to buy the local electricity distribution 
system. For the first time in history an anti-nuclear organisation became the owner of its 
system of energy provision. 
Once the citizen-consumers got hold of the distribution system, they introduced a 
business strategy in which profits were no longer invested where they bear the highest 
financial interest but in the interests of future generations. The first obligation of the EWS 
became to serve long-term environmental objectives instead of a short-term maximisation 
of profit. It introduced linear electricity tariffs to reward energy saving and higher feed-in 
tariffs to support cogeneration plants. People's electric meter simply runs backwards now, 
when they feed-in cogenerated electricity. The meter sets off used and produced electricity 
and one simply has to pay the difference. Consequently, the citizen-consumers of Schönau 
do not pay more for their electricity than they did before. Since the EWS does not produce 
but only distributes electricity, it also does not fall prey to the temptation of selling as 
much electricity as possible. 
With their energy initiatives the citizen-consumers of Schönau not only 
reconstructed the system of power provision but also introduced new deliberative 
arrangements in local environmental politics. At the same time they regained 
responsibility for the provision of energy and enhanced their opportunities to influence 
local environmental policy-making. However, whereas the deliberative model of 
democracy sometimes seems to demand too much active involvement of all citizen-
consumers (see 4.5), these energy initiatives are remarkably pragmatic and down-to-earth. 
They leave individuals ample room to choose from a variety of behavioral options. 
Although the EWS, for instance, depends on some people's willingness to install 
cogeneration plants, others may simply use this cogenerated electricity and contribute in a 
far less demanding way to the development of sustainable lifestyles 
(Http://www.oneworldweb.de/schoenau). 
6.3 
Social and Material Conditions 
The story of the Schönau energy initiatives should not be misread. It does not spell out 
some realised ecotopia. The Elektrizitätswerke Schönau inevitably has its own drawbacks. 
However, this story is telling for the presentation of an outline of a green third way for 
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government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles. The Schönau energy initiatives tried 
to address one of the most inextricable environmental issues of today. The domestic use of 
electricity, or energy in general, is a major consumptive practice in people's daily lives 
with possibly irreversible repercussions on nature and the environment, and thus on the 
opportunities of future generations to follow their own lifestyles, visions of the good life 
and consumptive preferences. Next to people's use of water and waste services, their use 
of energy has the largest environmental impact of all domestic consumptive practices. The 
key to the success of the Schönau energy initiatives is the acknowledgement that people's 
domestic consumption of energy depends on what the DOMUS project (Chappels et al., 
2000) calls a socio-material system of provision. Energy, water and waste utilities are 
systems of provision that are crucial for the most basic practices in people's households, 
and therefore an ideal take-off point for the development of sustainable practices of using 
energy, water and waste services. 
The Schönau energy initiatives exemplify that it is possible to adjust non-sustainable 
lifestyles and consumptive practices by reconstructing the social and material conditions 
in which people live their daily lives and make their consumptive choices. The success of 
the Schönau energy initiatives in converting to a sustainable use of renewable power 
sources depended on a unique combination of regaining control over the local system of 
power provision and exchanging large-scale non-renewable power sources for renewable 
energy produced by decentralised cogeneration plants. This shows the importance of 
allowing space for people's own creativity in reconstructing established systems of 
provision. The EWS not only stimulates energy-saving by introducing linear tariffs but 
also enables people to become co-providers of electricity by installing their own 
cogeneration plants. The reconstruction of the system of power provision thus confronted 
people with a whole new range of behavioral options. Such an incision in people's 
routinised practices of energy consumption calls for a welcome reflexive and critical 
stance towards their own domestic use of electricity (cf. Beckers et al. (eds.), 1999). 
The challenge for a green third way of government intervention in non-sustainable 
lifestyles is to generalise from the Schönau experience to develop a strategy for adjusting 
other presumably non-sustainable consumptive practices like car-driving, eating meat, and 
going on holidays by air. Although each consumptive practice has its own peculiarities, 
this green third way should always look for adjustments of the social and material 
conditions that would tempt people to develop their own sustainable lifestyles. The 
government should provide social and material conditions that leave ample room for a 
plurality of sustainable lifestyles. However, it should exclude the option of following 
lifestyles with irreversible repercussions on the natural environment, and thus on the 
opportunities of future generations to follow their lifestyles. The discussion of how to 
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address the environmental repercussions of livestock production for meat consumption 
(see chapter 4), for instance, showed that the green third way should include a directive 
strategy for government intervention in non-sustainable styles of animal husbandry. This 
policy should ensure that citizen-consumers can trust that their piece of meat is not 
produced in farming systems with irreversible negative repercussions on nature and the 
environment. This intervention, however, does not interfere with people's freedom to 
choose between omnivorous and vegetarian diets, and thus leaves ample room to follow a 
plurality of lifestyles. 
Citizen-consumers started the Schönau energy initiatives. However, the government 
does not have to await such an initiative but could also start the reconstruction of the 
social and material conditions in which people follow their lifestyles and make their 
consumptive choices. Such a government-initiated adjustment of social and material 
conditions, however, does need to involve people at an early stage of environmental 
policy-making. Although Giddens's (1984) duality of structure implies that the adjustment 
of social and material conditions always depends on people's practices, the government 
could facilitate such adjustments with rules and regulations and by providing ample room 
to experiment. Here, consumer-oriented environmental politics may profit from 
experiences in the context of food safety policy-making. These experiences show that the 
government could facilitate adjustments in a sustainable direction by making it 
compulsory for companies to have a consumer council and to present environmental 
reports. Such rules and regulations facilitate that consumers and producers of, for instance, 
electricity not only meet at the marketplace (cf. Korthals, 2000b). 
One of the most striking features of the Schönau energy initiatives is that its success 
depends on the active involvement of some people but that it does not call for a similar 
involvement of all people. Some people may simply profit from the adjustment of social 
and material conditions in a sustainable direction and consume sustainable energy for the 
same price as they used to pay for non-sustainable energy. Such a strategy, thus, accepts 
that contemporary liberal-democratic societies should leave ample room for quite 
divergent levels of active involvement in public deliberations about the objectives and 
instruments of environmental policy-making (cf. Munnichs, 2000). It is, for instance, 
perfectly reasonable that most people settle for indirect participation in the processes of 
environmental policy-making through their adherence to a variety of non-governmental 
organisations (cf. Dubbink, 1999). 
The green third way shows some family resemblance with Achterhuis's (1998) 
Latourian argument for a moralising of devices as an instrument in environmental policy-
making. Achterhuis, for instance, proposes to reconstruct the shower in such a way that it 
will combine comfort with a low water consumption, thus leaving it up to people to decide 
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how long they prefer to shower. The green third way suggests the similar but more 
ambitious approach of reconstructing society's system of water provision. It accepts the 
Latourian (1996) argument that devices, or material conditions in general, contain moral 
scripts and can make a difference to the world. In other words, these devices 'act' and may 
quite properly by coined as 'actants'. However, by raising the level of intervention from a 
singular device to whole social and material systems, it escapes the charge of either 
material determinism or futility. The story of the EWS exemplifies that a systems 
approach may leave ample room for a plurality of lifestyles to flourish and still make a 
real difference to day-to-day local environmental politics. 
Now, it is possible to spell out the leading threads of a green third way for 
government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles: 
1) The green third way accepts that practices and narratives of self-identity are 
inextricably interconnected in people's lifestyles. Therefore, it is no longer possible 
to evade the question of whether the government should be allowed to intervene in 
people's lifestyles in view of the objective of sustainable development by suggesting 
that people remain free in either their practices or their narratives of self-identity; 
2) The green third way acknowledges that contemporary affluent societies are 
permanently characterised by a plurality of lifestyles, narratives of self-identity and 
consumptive preferences. Any strategy for government intervention should leave 
ample room for a plurality of these lifestyles to flourish over time by securing the 
availability of a wide range of behavioral options; 
3) The green third way embraces the environmental baseline of the restraint principle 
and the list of primary environmental goods to prevent any irreversible damage to 
the natural environment, and thus to secure justice between generations in the use of 
this environment. This environmental baseline justifies directive strategies of 
government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles in a limited set of conditions; 
4) The green third way emphasises that, beyond the requirement of securing an 
environmental baseline, non-directive strategies should do the majority of the job in 
the development of sustainable lifestyles. These non-directive strategies operate 
primarily through the adjustment of social and material conditions, build on people's 
future-oriented green ideals, and imply an active, though numerically limited, 
involvement of citizen-consumers in the deliberative processes of environmental 
policy-making. 
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5) The green third way sees a complementary role for communicative and economic 
instruments. Exchange of information about the environmental repercussions of 
certain behavioral choices, financial incentives to repair market failures and the 
establishment of markets for green products should enhance the rationality of 
people's behavioral choices. 
Hopefully, this concise 5-point programme for green third way politics sheds sufficient 
light on the kernel of this alternative strategy for government intervention in non-
sustainable lifestyles. Anyway, it is about time to answer the final question of whether it is 
reasonable to qualify this green third way as a sufficiently non-directive strategy for 
government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles to be acceptable for the spatio-
temporally egalitarian branches of political liberalism. In other words, does the green third 
way show enough respect for people's freedom to follow their own lifestyles, while 
precluding the pursuit of non-sustainable lifestyles? 
6.4 
A Non-Directive Strategy? 
The question of whether the outline of a green third way presents a sufficiently non-
directive strategy for government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles should be 
answered with a firm but qualified yes. 
First, the qualification: green third way politics acknowledges that it is impossible to 
secure the environmental baseline of the restraint principle and the list of primary 
environmental goods without using any directive instruments. The green third way needs 
to interfere with people's freedom of choice to safeguard fair opportunities of future 
generations to follow their lifestyles, narratives of self-identity and consumptive 
preferences. The justification for this interference with people's freedom to follow their 
own lifestyles is firmly established by the need to prevent that the current generation's use 
of nature and the environment causes irreversible harm or injustice to the members of 
future generations. Moreover, the green third way accepts that financial incentives and 
exchange of information about the environmental repercussions of specific behavioral 
choices should enable people to make considered, i.e. reasonable or rational, choices. The 
spatio-temporally egalitarian branches of political liberalism should embrace this 
intervention in people's freedom of choice as a necessary means for the pursuit of 
sustainable development and intergenerational justice in the use of nature and the 
environment. 
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Second, the affirmation: beyond the minimal requirements of securing an environmental 
baseline, green third way politics operates through the provision of social and material 
conditions that tempt people to build on their future-oriented green narratives of self-
identity to develop a plurality of sustainable lifestyles. These social and material 
conditions do not enforce people to adopt some particular lifestyle or perfectionist vision 
of the good environment, and the green third way thus respects people's negative freedom 
from interference with their lifestyles. Moreover, the green third way strengthens the 
double-role of citizen-consumers in the formation and execution of environmental policy-
making. Its emphasis on extensive public deliberation about the objectives and 
instruments of environmental policy-making enhances people's positive freedom in 
contemporary liberal-democratic societies. The Elektrizitätswerke Schönau and other 
similar initiatives exemplify that "the changing relations between consumers and 
providers [of utilities - VB] do not impede the greening of domestic consumption but 
instead offer new opportunities for consumers to 'green' their lifestyles" (Chappels et al, 
2000; 138). Hence, it is reasonable to claim that the outline of a green third way presents a 
sufficiently non-directive strategy for government intervention in non-sustainable 
lifestyles to gain support from the spatio-temporally egalitarian branches of political 
liberalism. 
Some radical environmentalists may argue that it is principally impossible to 
reconcile environmental objectives and basic democratic liberties. They will probably 
reject the green third way as an overly lax strategy. However, I am not a magician and the 
green third way is not a conjuring trick. Although environmental objectives and basic 
democratic liberties may conflict indeed, green third way politics prefers to emphasise the 
inextricable interconnectedness of these objectives in a spatio-temporally egalitarian frame 
of reference. Arrler (2000) nicely expressed this twin challenge of a green third way for 
government intervention in non-sustainable lifestyles when he wrote that "this is probably 
what sustainability is about at its deepest level: the protection and continuation of a 
democratic process where individuals can continue to have participatory rights and a free 
scope which is wide enough to allow them to put unique fingerprints on their own life. But 
these lives will certainly have a much better chance of improvement, if they can also 
inherit the unique resources which have been most important to their ancestors". 
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Samenvatting 
(Summary in Dutch) 
Een Groene Derde Weg ? 
Filosofische Reflecties op 
Overheidsbemoeienis met 
Niet-Duurzame Levensstijlen 
In milieu-historisch perspectief moet 1972 een bijzonder jaar zijn geweest. De Club van 
Rome publiceert 'De Grenzen aan de Groei', de Ecologist publiceert de 'Blauwdruk voor 
Overleving', en de Verenigde Naties houdt haar eerste milieu-conferentie in Stockholm. 
Het begrip duurzame ontwikkeling wordt dan voor het eerst in zijn huidige betekenis 
gebruikt. Duurzame ontwikkeling krijgt haar blijvende status als overkoepelende 
doelstelling van nationaal en internationaal milieubeleid echter pas met de publikatie van 
het rapport 'Onze Gezamenlijke Toekomst' in 1987. Dit rapport definieert duurzame 
ontwikkeling als "een ontwikkeling die voorziet in de behoeften van de huidige generatie 
zonder daarmee voor toekomstige generaties de mogelijkheden in gevaar te brengen om 
ook in hun behoeften te voorzien". Het debat over duurzame ontwikkeling bereikt 
vervolgens een nieuw hoogtepunt met de VN-conferentie over milieu en ontwikkeling 
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Deze conferentie introduceert de idee dat duurzame 
ontwikkeling ook vraagt om een verandering van levensstijlen en consumptiepatronen, 
naast de al eerder bepleite veranderingen in produktiemethoden. UNCED benadrukt de 
noodzaak van overheidsbemoeienis met niet-duurzame levensstijlen, en het tweede 
Milieubeleidsplan (NMP2) vertaalt deze nadruk naar de Nederlandse situatie. 
UNCED en NMP2 brengen een uitgebreid publiek debat op gang over 
overheidsbemoeienis met niet-duurzame levensstijlen, waarin communicatieve en 
economische benaderingen domineren. Tot op heden lukt het deze benaderingen echter 
niet om overheidsbemoeienis met niet-duurzame levensstijlen op bevredigende wijze te 
verzoenen met respect voor de individuele vrijheid tot ontplooiing van een eigen 
levensstijl. Dit boek stelt zich daarom ten doel om precies deze verzoening tot stand te 
brengen door het schetsen van een derde weg voor overheidsbemoeienis met niet-
duurzame levensstijlen. Deze groene derde weg presenteert zichzelf als alternatief voor de 
eerste (communicatieve) en tweede (economische) wegen in het Nederlandse publieke 
debat. Zij beoogt de zorgen over de aantasting van natuur en milieu, zoals die ten 
grondslag liggen aan het streven naar duurzame ontwikkeling, te verwoorden binnen een 
grotendeels politiek-liberaal perspectief. 
Hoofdstuk 2 brengt daartoe eerst het Nederlandse publieke debat over 
overheidsbemoeienis met niet-duurzame levensstijlen in kaart. Daarbij valt op dat hoewel 
communicatieve en economische benaderingen dit debat domineren, deze benaderingen 
ernstig tekortschieten in hun pogingen om de principiële vraag te omzeilen of 
overheidsbemoeienis met niet-duurzame levensstijlen een niet te rechtvaardigen 
inmenging in de vrijheid tot het ontplooien van een eigen levensstijl, visie van het goede 
leven of consumptieve voorkeuren impliceert. Communicatieve en economische 
benaderingen worden daarom op een drietal punten bekritiseerd: 1) zij weigeren de 
onlosmakelijke verbondenheid van houdingen en gedrag in levensstijlen te erkennen; 2) 
zij ontwijken de vraag hoe overheidsbemoeienis met niet-duurzame levensstijlen de 
individuele keuzevrijheid zou kunnen respecteren; en 3) zij vergeten te onderzoeken of 
duurzame ontwikkeling wellicht geldige redenen biedt om die keuzevrijheid in te perken. 
Daarmee zijn deze benaderingen niet in staat tot een betekenisvolle interpretatie van alle 
centrale termen in de zinsnede 'overheidsbemoeienis met niet-duurzame levensstijlen'. Het 
wekt dan ook weinig verbazing dat zij overheidsbemoeienis niet op een bevredigende 
wijze kunnen verenigen met respect voor de individuele vrijheid om een eigen levensstijl 
te ontplooien. Daarom zetten de hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 in op het achtereenvolgens 
overwinnen van deze drie tekortkomingen van communicatieve en economische 
benaderingen. Gelukkig gloren sinds kort aanzetten voor een derde benadering in het 
Nederlandse publieke debat. Deze aanzetten leveren bouwstenen voor de ontwikkeling 
van een groene derde weg voor overheidsbemoeienis met niet-duurzame levensstijlen. 
Hoofdstuk 3 pleit, vooral op basis van Giddens' structuratie-theorie, zijn en Beck's 
idee van reflexieve modernisering en Douglas' group-grid analyse, voor een narratieve 
conceptualisering van de begrippen levensstijl en identiteit. Deze conceptualisering 1) 
benadrukt de onlosmakelijke verbondenheid van praktijken en levensverhalen in 
levensstijlen, 2) beklemtoont de dualiteit van individu en samenleving in de ontplooiing 
van levensstijlen, 3) verruilt het modernistische onderscheid tussen burger en consument 
voor de publiek-private hybride burger-consument, en 4) brengt de veelheid aan 
levensstijlen in hedendaagse globaliserende, individualiserende en detraditionaliserende 
samenlevingen in kaart. De narratieve conceptualisering van levensstijlen betekent dat de 
vraag niet langer ontweken kan worden of overheidsbemoeienis met niet-duurzame 
levensstijlen noodzakelijkerwijs een niet te rechtvaardigen inmenging in de individuele 
vrijheid tot ontplooiing van een eigen levensstijl impliceert. Het gaat niet langer aan een 
resterende vrijheid in ofwel praktijken ofwel levensverhalen te suggereren, aangezien deze 
praktijken en verhalen onlosmakelijk verbonden zijn in levensstijlen. 
Hoofdstuk 4 argumenteert, vooral op basis van Berlin's and Rawls' politieke 
liberalisme, Raz's liberale perfectionisme en Habermas' idee van een deliberatieve 
democratie, dat de meeste overheidsbemoeienis met levensstijlen inderdaad een niet te 
rechtvaardigen inmenging in de individuele keuzevrijheid is. Deze liberale benadering 1) 
redeneert dat respect voor de individuele keuzevrijheid een neutraal en anti-
perfectionistisch standpunt van de overheid vooronderstelt, 2) meent dat directieve, 
communicatieve en economische, benaderingen voor overheidsbemoeienis alleen dan 
gerechtvaardigd zijn wanneer bepaalde keuzes anderen schaden, onrechtvaardigheid 
veroorzaken, of aantoonbaar irrationeel zijn, 3) accepteert, in tweede instantie, dat haar 
politiek-liberale stellingname helemaal niet zo neutraal en anti-perfectionistisch is, maar 
denkt dat deze perfectionistische draai het pleidooi om de individuele keuzevrijheid te 
respecteren alleen nog maar versterkt, en 4) bepleit uitgebreide publieke deliberatie over 
de vormgeving en uitvoering van het milieubeleid. De politiek-liberale nadruk op het 
respecteren van de individuele keuzevrijheid betekent dat directieve benaderingen voor 
overheidsbemoeienis met niet-duurzame levensstijlen onvoldoende respect tonen voor de 
vrijheid om een eigen levensstijl te ontplooien, tenzij aannemelijk gemaakt kan worden 
dat bepaalde levensstijlen anderen schaden of onrechtvaardigheid veroorzaken. 
Hoofdstuk 5 bepleit, vooral op basis van Rawls' savings principle, Wissenburg's 
restraint principle, Passmore's ketens van liefde, en De-Shalit's transgenerationele 
gemeenschappen, een dubbele interpretatie van duurzame ontwikkeling als enerzijds een 
principe van intergenerationele rechtvaardigheid en anderzijds een toekomstgericht groen 
ideaal. Deze dubbele interpretatie 1) omhelst het restraint principle en het argument dat 
niemand een recht kan claimen om milieu-goederen te mogen vernietigen als 
randvoorwaarde die directieve benaderingen voor overheidsbemoeienis met niet-duurzame 
levensstijlen kan rechtvaardigen, 2) suggereert dat zorgen over de aantasting van natuur en 
milieu een uitdrukking zijn van toekomstgerichte levensverhalen die in een non-directieve 
benadering de ontwikkeling van verdergaande verantwoordelijkheden jegens nabije 
toekomstige generaties kunnen stimuleren, 3) geeft de voorkeur aan het opstellen van een 
lijst met primaire milieu-goederen boven het kwantificeren van één of andere 
milieugebruiksruimte als leidraad voor de alledaagse praktijk van het milieubeleid, en 4) 
concludeert dat onzekerheid van wetenschappelijk kennis inzake de onbedoelde milieu-
gevolgen van consumptieve keuzes twijfels zaait bij pogingen om directieve benaderingen 
voor overheidsbemoeienis met niet-duurzame levensstijlen te rechtvaardigen die uitgaan 
boven het realiseren van de minimale eisen van het restraint principle en de lijst met 
primaire milieu-goederen. Duurzame ontwikkeling levert daarmee geldige argumenten 
voor een inperking van de individuele vrijheid om eigen levensstijl te ontplooien indien 
aannemelijk is dat deze levensstijl zich niet beweegt binnen de randvoorwaarde van het 
restraint principle en de lijst met primaire milieu-goederen. De individuele keuzevrijheid 
mag echter niet opgeofferd worden aan verdergaande milieu-overwegingen. Slechts niet-
directieve benaderingen kunnen deze verdergaande verantwoordelijkheden jegens nabije 
toekomstige generaties gestalte geven. 
In milieu-historisch perspectief is 1986 misschien wel net zo'n bijzonder jaar als 
1972. Wanneer de kerncentrale van Tsjernobyl ontploft, schokt dat niet alleen de wereld 
op haar grondvesten maar motiveert dat ook een groep inwoners van Schönau, een klein 
plaatsje in het Duitse Zwarte Woud, tot het ontplooien van een opmerkelijk initiatief. Zij 
starten een grondige reconstructie van de energievoorziening in Schönau en zijn in 1997 in 
staat om de lokale energievoorziening in eigen handen te nemen. Dan wordt voor het eerst 
in de geschiedenis een anti-nucleaire beweging de eigenaar van haar eigen 
energievoorziening. Daarmee reconstrueren de inwoners van Schönau niet alleen de 
energievoorziening maar introduceren zij ook nieuwe deliberatieve arrangementen in het 
lokale milieubeleid. Dit verhaal moet niet verkeerd begrepen worden. Het verwoordt géén 
gerealiseerde utopie, maar is wel informatief voor het schetsen van een groene derde weg 
voor overheidsbemoeienis met niet-duurzame levensstijlen. Het initiatief van de inwoners 
van Schönau toont namelijk dat het mogelijk is om niet-duurzame levensstijlen en 
consumptiepatronen te veranderen door de sociale en materiële voorwaarden te veranderen 
waaronder mensen hun dagelijks leven vormgeven. 
De uitdaging van een groene derde weg voor overheidsbemoeienis met niet-
duurzame levensstijlen is om deze ervaringen te veralgemeniseren naar een benadering 
voor het aanpassen van andere niet-duurzame consumptieve praktijken zoals auto rijden, 
vlees eten, en met het vliegtuig op vakantie gaan. Hoewel elke consumptieve praktijk zijn 
eigen specifieke kenmerken heeft, moet een groene derde weg altijd op zoek naar die 
aanpassingen van sociale en materiële voorwaarden die mensen ertoe verleiden om zelf 
duurzame levensstijlen te ontwikkelen. De overheid moet daarbij steeds voldoende ruimte 
laten voor een veelheid aan duurzame levensstijlen. Zij dient echter wel de mogelijkheid 
uit te sluiten om levensstijlen te ontplooien met onomkeerbare negatieve gevolgen voor 
natuur en milieu, en daarmee voor de mogelijkheden van toekomstige generaties om hun 
eigen levensstijlen te ontplooien. Een 5-punten programma vat de groene derde weg voor 
overheidsbemoeienis met niet-duurzame levensstijlen samen: 
1) De groene derde weg accepteert dat praktijken en levensverhalen onlosmakelijk 
verbonden zijn in levensstijlen. Daarmee is het niet langer mogelijk de vraag te 
ontwijken of het de overheid toegestaan moet worden zich te bemoeien met 
levensstijlen met het oog op duurzame ontwikkeling. 
2) De groene derde weg erkent dat hedendaagse welvarende samenlevingen 
gekenmerkt worden door een veelheid aan levensstijlen, levensverhalen en 
consumptieve voorkeuren. Elke benadering voor overheidsbemoeienis moet 
voldoende ruimte laten voor zo'n veelheid aan levensstijlen door de beschikbaarheid 
van een ruime hoeveelheid keuze-mogelijkheden te garanderen. 
3) De groene derde weg omarmt de randvoorwaarde van het restraint principle en de 
lijst met primaire milieu-goederen om onomkeerbare schade aan het natuurlijk 
milieu te voorkomen en rechtvaardigheid tussen generaties te garanderen. Deze 
randvoorwaarde rechtvaardigt directieve benaderingen voor overheidsbemoeienis 
met met-duurzame levensstijlen in een beperkt aantal omstandigheden. 
4) De groene derde weg benadrukt dat een niet-directieve benadering het merendeel 
van het werk zal moeten doen in de ontwikkeling van duurzame levensstijlen. Deze 
niet-directieve benadering verandert sociale en materiële voorwaarden, bouwt op 
toekomstgerichte groene idealen, en vraagt om een actieve deelname van burger-
consumenten aan de deliberatieve vormgeving van het milieubeleid. 
5) De groene derde weg ziet een aanvullende rol voor communicatieve en economische 
instrumenten. Een uitwisseling van informatie over de milieu-gevolgen van 
bepaalde keuzes en het repareren van markt-falen middels financiële prikkels 
kunnen de rationaliteit van consumptieve keuzes verhogen. 
De vraag of de groene derde weg geldt als een voldoende niet-directieve benadering voor 
overheidsbemoeienis met met-duurzame levensstijlen kan met een gekwalificeerde 
bevestiging beantwoord worden. De groene derde weg erkent dat het onmogelijk is de 
randvoorwaarde van het restraint principle en de lijst met primaire milieu-goederen te 
waarborgen zonder gebruik van directieve instrumenten. Daarenboven verlaat de groene 
derde weg zich echter op het voorzien in sociale en materiële voorwaarden die mensen 
ertoe verleiden hun toekomstgerichte groene idealen te verwerkelijken in een veelheid aan 
duurzame levensstijlen. 
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